G-Watch is an independent national action-research organization embedded in a constituency of advocacy and civic organizations all over the Philippines that aim to contribute to the deepening of democracy through citizen empowerment and the scaling of accountability.

ARC is an action-research incubator based in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University. ARC partners with civil society organizations and policy reformers to contribute to research and practice in the field of transparency, participation and accountability.

Book Information
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Book cover: G-Watch research team on their way up the mountain to meet with farmers in Bondoc Peninsula for the validation of their research findings (taken by Joy Aceron)
Going Vertical: Citizen-led Reform Campaigns in the Philippines (2nd edition)

Joy Acreron, Editor

Co-authors:
Francis Isaac, Jonathan Fox, Danilo Carranza, Benedict Nisperos, Marlon Lara Cornelio, Federick Vincent Marcelo, Rhia Muhi, Romeo Saliga
As a framework of analysis, vertical integration untangles the complexity involved in accountability politics. It allows a comprehensive look at all levels, actions and actors.

As a strategy, it synthesizes in a coherent whole, the different dimensions critical to a meaningful campaign: state–society engagement, coalition–building approaches, tactics and actions, levels of decision–making, horizontal representation, and vertical coordination.
Acknowledgments

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1 Introduction: Studying vertically integrated approaches to citizen-led reforms

Joy Aceron and Francis Isaac

1.1 Introducing the research and its significance

The Philippines has had a long experience of state–society engagement to introduce reforms in government and politics. Forces from civil society and social movements interface with reform-oriented leaders in government to make governance more responsive, to introduce policy reforms, and/or make the government more accountable.

Although this has been a well-discussed strategy of introducing reform in the Philippines, there is very little research done on it among governance reform actors. One well-known exception in the Philippines is the work of Saturnino Borras (1998) on agrarian reform where he coined the term ‘bibingka strategy’ as the strategy employed to successfully push for the implementation of agrarian reform, especially in areas considered as ‘local authoritarian enclaves.’ After this application, there has been no other initiative with state–society engagement studied using this framework, although arguably, the bibingka strategy has informed much of the subsequent campaigns of social movements in the country in influencing policy change.
Meanwhile, an approach to civil society engagement in governance was developed in the 2000s that focused on fighting corruption. This approach integrates civil society monitoring of government processes as a transparency mechanism that aims to improve performance and deter corruption in the bureaucracy. This is later referred to as social accountability (SAcc).

Due to the relative openness of the Philippine Government to SAcc initiatives, as well as the increasing support from international actors, SAcc initiatives have multiplied over the years throughout the country. They exhibited varied features, but generally aimed at ensuring that the government and/or contractors (duty bearers) complied with the standard processes, quantity, time, quality, and costs. Today, there is an emerging question of how to sustain these initiatives to ensure their impact on governance and politics. Consequently, it raises several questions as to what features have been most effective and should therefore be sustained.

These points of inquiry are also being reflected upon in the international arena. American academic–activist Jonathan Fox’s 2014 paper, entitled Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say? scans the evidence on the impact of social accountability initiatives, and concludes that while the existing empirical evidence is mixed, strategic approaches seem more promising. According to Fox:

Strategic approaches to SAcc... bolster enabling environments for collective action, scale up citizen engagement beyond the local arena and attempt to bolster governmental capacity to respond to voice (Fox 2014: 35).

One example of a strategic approach is ‘vertical integration.’ Fox argues that, “vertical integration of local, regional and national civil society oversight” has the greatest potential of addressing corruption and exclusion. This is so because:

[Corruption and social exclusion are produced by vertically integrated power structures. Insofar as multiple links in the chain of governance facilitate the deflection of civil society oversight and advocacy, effective responses require parallel processes that are also vertically integrated (ibid.: 31).

The challenge of sustainability that various SAcc initiatives confront has a lot to do with the structural deficit of accountability in Philippine politics and governance. There is a need for the different SAcc initiatives to see beyond their usually focused, compartmentalized and technocratized engagement for their results and gains to be sustained.

These theoretical propositions for what kind of strategy works best for strengthening accountability and instituting reforms build on a review of evidence. As such, it is timely to apply these theoretical propositions to particular country contexts, to share, and to test its veracity with social and political actors engaged in exercising voice and claiming accountability.

The Philippines offers an ideal context to explore Fox’s propositions because of certain aspects of the interplay of citizen engagement in accountability, sustainability and impact. In 2015, we started a research project on ‘Vertically Integrated’ Advocacy and Monitoring Initiatives in the Philippines. The study aimed to understand what makes civil society initiatives ‘successful’ in achieving its target goals at a given period of time, and reflect on how the gains from ‘successful’ initiatives can be deepened and sustained in order to achieve substantive changes in Philippine politics and society.

The challenge of sustainability that various SAcc initiatives confront has a lot to do with the structural deficit of accountability in Philippine politics and governance. There is a need for the different SAcc initiatives to see beyond their usually focused, compartmentalized and technocratized engagement for their results and gains to be sustained. This will be critical to see how these initiatives impact broader developmental and democratization goals.

To achieve impact, reform-oriented initiatives in the country that rely on citizen empowerment (particularly on their ability to make a difference felt by ordinary people) face multi-fold challenges. These challenges concern their ability and willingness to learn from each other, consolidate their efforts, and define a common accountability strengthening agenda that cuts across their respective campaigns and traverses a wider spectrum of arenas for change.

Hence, this study is deemed significant in practice for it provides insights on two things: one, on what has worked in civil society monitoring and advocacy (by aiming to improve state responsiveness and accountability),
and two, on ways forward to improve the impact of civil society on democratization and inclusive development.

In terms of theory, this study is important for testing vertical integration as a framework of analysis. Particularly, it checks the analytical capability of vertical integration as a lens for investigating civil society initiatives in terms of how it supports the study of civil society initiatives that go beyond generalized, linear, and simplistic propositions. In addition, it fleshes out the details and nuances of the propositions of vertical integration while examining how these propositions and characteristics play out in reality.

1.2 Case study selection

The main research approach is to profile selected cases of civil society initiatives that have achieved significant gains using the vertical integration framework. It looks into how the different propositions for vertical integration were fleshed out in the initiatives that were profiled. This report narrates how the selected initiatives were able to cover the different levels of engagement by employing a specific set of actions that mobilized a broad variety of actors. It then explains how such “strategic” components have contributed to the achievement of the campaigns’ goals.

For the purpose of this report, the term ‘civil society’ is used with a caveat that different groups may define and apply said term distinctly depending on their respective vantage points. This is especially so in the Philippines, with its extensive history of social movements and actions interlinked with international social movements. Although the Tocquevillian notion of civil society, i.e., associational and harmonious civil society, as well as the notion of civil society as a counterpart to the state, is commonly used in the Philippines, this notion may not fully capture the kinds of civil society actors and actions profiled in this report. The more appropriate definition of ‘civil society’ for this report is that of Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci’s definition looks at civil society as an ‘arena’ of contestation of diverse actors that try to gain hegemony or counter-hegemony on norms and ideas in society. Such a definition recognizes the diversity of actors, their views of themselves, their environment, and the political nature of civil society as a space and set of actors. The definition provided by Institute of Development Studies (IDS)’s Jethro Pettit (pers. comm.) which tries to reconcile both the Tocquevillian and Gramscian definitions, best captures the use of the term ‘civil society’ in this report: “linked to a notion of actors, knowledge and spaces interacting to shape decision-making and policy processes.”

Using vertical integration as our framework, this research investigated seven cases of campaigns in the Philippines that have registered relative ‘success’ in achieving their objectives through civil society advocacy and/or monitoring. These initiatives show how ordinary citizens responded to the most pressing challenges affecting governance, democracy, and development. They also represent some of the key themes that continue to shape Filipino collective action.

This research investigated seven cases of campaigns in the Philippines that have registered relative ‘success’ in achieving their objectives through civil society advocacy and/or monitoring. These initiatives show how ordinary citizens responded to the most pressing challenges affecting governance, democracy, and development. They also represent some of the key themes that continue to shape Filipino collective action.

- Addressing corruption and improving government efficiency and responsiveness, especially in service delivery. The case study focuses on the education sector, examined Textbook Count, a joint monitoring project of the Department of Education and the Government Watch (G-Watch) program of the Ateneo School of Government, which was designed to determine whether the right quantity and quality of textbooks were being delivered to students at the right time while following the right procedures. It is widely considered as one of the most successful social accountability initiatives in the country.

- The centuries-old struggle for land by poor peasants and farmers, considered the very first social movement in the Philippines. The case study focuses on the organizing efforts of two national agrarian reform networks, i.e., the Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services (known as RIGHTS Network), and the Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice (Katarungan), and their campaign with local farmers’ organizations in the Bondoc Peninsula.

- The need for decent and affordable housing for the urban poor, which emerged as a consequence of rapid urbanization and the migration of rural people to the cities. The case study looks at the work of Damayan ng Maralitang Pilipinoong Api (DAMPA, Solidarity of Oppressed Poor Filipinos), a network of more than 90,000 poor
urban households, working to provide “viable solutions to basic poverty problems endemic to the urban poor” (DAMPA 2004).

• The growth of large-scale mining, which represents the increasing penetration and expansion of corporate interests in the Philippines. The anti-mining case study focuses on the activities of the Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task Force (ABAKATAF), a community-based organization in a town in Surigao del Norte, formed in 2000 to fight a large mining company that was starting operations in their locality.

• Threats to the rights of indigenous peoples, which come from many directions, including large-scale mining. Indigenous peoples have a rich and long history of struggle, and the case study of campaigning for indigenous peoples’ rights examines the work of the Têduray Lambangian Women’s Organization Inc. (TLWOI), a federation of community-based organizations fighting for the rights of indigenous women in Mindanao.

• The women’s rights agenda, which has been pursued through issues, such as reproductive health. The case study examines the work of the Reproductive Health Advocacy Network (RHAN) to push for the passage of the Reproductive Health Bill, despite stiff opposition from the highly influential Catholic Church.

• The increasing demand for disaster preparedness as a result of growing concerns over environmental degradation and climate change. The case study focuses on the work of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Network Philippines, a large civil society coalition that aims to transform the country’s paradigm on disaster management from that of emergency relief and response to one that focuses on risk reduction and community participation.

The case study initiatives were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

First, these initiatives' profiles point to facets of vertical integration. This means that there were multiple levels of engagement with a broad set of actors and actions involved over time.

Second, these initiatives are relatively 'successful' in achieving concrete or tangible reforms. Success means that an initiative could do at least one of the following:

• Pass a progressive policy that addresses a specific issue or concern; and/or
• Monitor government performance or service delivery to improve policy implementation; and/or
• Ensure voice and representation of marginalized groups or sectors in decision-making bodies.

Third, the selected initiatives have all achieved national prominence. This means that the featured initiative either has a presence in the National Capital Region and in at least five other localities, or that it has local chapters and has representation in national policy-making bodies.

Fourth, organizations that either initiated or were involved in the campaign were willing to take part in the study by being available for interviews and by allowing the researchers to access their documents.

And fifth, the cases present a cross-section of Philippine society since they offer a diverse range of issues featuring a wide array of actors using different modalities of engagement.

Evidence for each case was collected from existing literature, especially those that focus on Philippine reform dynamics. Interviews were conducted with at least three key informants covering at least one area/site per case, using a previously prepared interview guide. This was followed by a series of workshops with participants in these campaigns, which enabled the researchers to process the data, identify the findings that are beginning to emerge, and reflect on how the research has so far been conducted.

The analyses and conclusions found in this report are drawn heavily from the results of our interviews and from the secondary materials that we have gathered. The analyses of the information gathered were subjected to a process of validation and triangulation. Such processes are important not only in validating the data, but also in attributing a precise action to the overall success of a particular reform initiative. To push this further, most of the cases were co-authored by representatives from the initiatives to ensure that the narrative and analysis are co-owned by the initiatives themselves.
1.3 Why vertical integration as a framework of analysis?

For the past two decades or so, numerous studies have been conducted on some of the most significant citizen-led reform initiatives in the Philippines. Although focusing on different individual campaigns, most of these studies share similar findings, and attribute the success of these reform efforts to three general factors, namely:

- ‘Champions’ on top, or the presence of important reform-minded leaders in government;
- Mobilization below, or the capacity of social movements and civil society organizations (CSOs) to organize people, gather support for their cause, and tilt public opinion in their favor;
- Partnership/engagement between state and societal actors, or the constructive interaction of pro-reform forces to advance the desired policy measures.

This is the case, for example, of Textbook Count, because of: (1) the presence of champions in the Department of Education (Majeed 2011; Leung 2005); (2) the presence of civil society monitors and strong citizen participation (Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 2013; Arugay 2012; Leung 2005); and (3) the collaborative engagement between state and non-state actors (Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 2013; Arugay 2012).

In a similar vein, former Senator Wigberto Tañada argues that the success of the land reform movement was due to the “collaboration, cooperation and partnerships of various agencies of the government, civil society and farmers organizations” (cited in Carranza 2011: 409). This is an observation that is shared by scholars Saturnino Borras and Jennifer Franco, who stress the importance of “a high degree of social pressure from below and a high degree of independent state reform initiatives from above” (2010: 85). On the one hand, by arguing that the actions of state reformers “are likely to achieve only a limited impact” (ibid.: 85), Borras and Franco conclude that the best conditions for reform occur when “autonomous mobilizations ‘from below’ by peasant movements and their allies meet autonomous reformist initiatives by reformers ‘from above’ within governmental institutions” (ibid.: 86).

On the other hand, the success of the right to housing initiative has been attributed more to the ability of housing advocates to mobilize its forces from below. This has been made possible by having approximately 500 urban poor leaders, who are spread throughout 95 different communities. In turn, they are assisted by nineteen community organizers and volunteers who are responsible for providing grassroots training and education to all DAMPA members (Castillo 2006; DAMPA 2004).

Scholars attribute the relative success of the anti-mining campaign to two main factors. The first factor is the ability of reform advocates to mobilize support from below. For example, at the national level, Alyansa Tigil Mina was able to establish a strong multi-sectoral coalition that successfully created an extensive coordination network with different advocacy groups from the local level up to the national level. The campaign has also generated community support such as in Barangay Anislagan, where a village-based organization known as ABAKATAF prevented the Manila Mining Corporation from entering their area for nearly a decade (Chapoling–March 2011; Rovillos, Ramo and Corpuz 2003). The second factor is that anti-mining advocates found reform champions in the legislature who were pushing for the enactment of the Alternative Minerals Management Bill that would maximize the gains from the mining industry while “preventing or mitigating its adverse effects” (SOS–Yamang Bayan Network 2012: 4).

Two factors were also identified to explain the success of the indigenous women’s campaign. The first was the campaign’s capacity to organize at the grassroots level and gather support from below. Believing that its political strength lies in basic organizing work, TLWOI identified leaders in every village and designated community workers to assist them. The second was that it was able to engage other societal actors and gather broad support from different groups and sectors, such as academia, the religious community, and other CSOs (De Vera 2007). One such example is the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (PKKK), a national women’s network that TLWOI is a part of. PKKK provides technical knowledge on policy advocacy and project management. It has also worked with international organizations, such as The Asia Foundation, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies in the Philippines and the European Union, on issues involving health, peace and security, and human rights.

The successful campaign for the enactment of the Reproductive Health (RH) Law resulted from the massive support generated from below. In fact, even as the bill was being deliberated, the proposed measure already had overwhelming public approval. This is evident in the surveys undertaken by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in 2011 and 2012, which indicated
that eight out of ten Filipinos favored the measure’s passage. The campaign also found a state champion in President Benigno Aquino III who openly declared his support for reproductive health, and urged his allies in Congress to vote for its passage (Melgar 2014; Ocampo 2014; Acosta-Alba 2013).

Similarly, the passage of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Law in 2010 was due to the mobilization of grassroots support. In addition, the DRRM Network was able to find reform champions in both the Executive and Legislative branches, all of whom played important roles in passing the legislation (Scriven 2013; Agsaoay-Sano 2010).

1.3.1 Bibingka strategy

In sum, the existing studies suggest that reforms are likely to occur if there is adequate demand from below, as well as sufficient opening from above. On the one hand, the former refers to autonomous social movements clamoring either for substantive policy changes or better policy implementation. On the other hand, the latter comes from state officials who seek to enhance service delivery or curb government inefficiency.

With sufficient demand from below and with adequate opening from above, state and societal actors can interact with one another, which then pushes the reform agenda forward. Such an approach is often described as the ‘bibingka strategy’ – a term that was coined by Borras in his pioneering book The Bibingka Strategy in Land Reform Implementation to refer to the mutually reinforcing reform measures undertaken by government leaders from above and the radical actions by autonomous peasant movements from below. Borras observes that “the symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups from below and strategically placed state reformists from above provides the most promising strategy to offset strong landlord resistance to land reform” (Borras 1998: 125).

However, this does not suggest that, among the various actors from ‘above’ and ‘below’, there are no potential and actual differences, and even clashing interests. The existence of these potential, actual, and even clashing interests thereby ensures a terrain that is marked by dynamics, engagement, and discourse.

Eventually, the bibingka strategy became so influential that it is now often used to explain the “partial but significant successes in land reform” (Borras and Franco 2010: 70). Even though redistributive efforts in the Philippines are often marred by “a lukewarm state response and government inertia” (ibid.: 69), this has often been overcome by “the peculiar nature of state–society interactions around national policy-making and implementation during this period” (ibid.: 70).

To prove this point, Borras and Franco (2010) cite data from the Department of Agrarian Reform, which states that by 2007, six million hectares of land (both public and private) had already been redistributed to three million rural poor households – a number that represented approximately two-fifths of the agricultural population. In addition, 1.5 million hectares of land had been subjected to leasehold, benefitting more than one million tenant households.

Without a doubt, the bibingka strategy has been the most significant development in the reform discourse in the Philippines. Nonetheless, despite its importance, the framework also has its limitations. This is because the framework does not fully capture the reform dynamic at every level of engagement. While it can, in principle, account for state–society interactions at both the national and subnational levels, the framework has not explicitly addressed this issue of scale and the interactions between advocacy efforts at multiple levels. In most instances, very little detailed explanation is offered regarding the interrelationship of these different levels with each other.

As a consequence, the bibingka strategy is often only able to offer general explanations on how reform takes place. It is unable to adequately discuss context, including how certain factors converge at a given point in a particular time to produce reform or the different actions taken at different levels by various actors. While it can offer generally broad explanations of how reforms take place, such knowledge has yet to be unbundled in order to fully comprehend the complex political dynamics at every level of engagement.

1.3.2 Vertical integration

The analytical gaps identified above can be addressed by adopting the concept of ‘vertical integration,’ which can potentially provide an adequate description of the reform dynamics at every level of engagement. A more detailed discussion of vertical integration will be provided by Jonathan Fox in the next Chapter, but in sum, it refers to the “systematic coordination of policy monitoring and advocacy between diverse levels of civil society, from local to state, national, and international arenas” (Fox 2001: 617).
Meant as a strategy for civil society to scrutinize government performance in order to influence it, Fox argues that:

The vertical integration of policy analysis articulates processes of monitoring, evaluation, and analysis of all levels of official decision making at the same time, permitting civil society advocacy actors to develop strategies in real time rather than after the fact (ibid.: 621).

For this reason, vertically integrated initiatives can deliver more lasting and substantive governance reforms, since:

Systematic, coordinated monitoring of the performance of all levels of public decision-making can reveal more clearly where the main problems are, permitting more precisely targeted civil society advocacy strategies.” (ibid.: 624)

Vertical integration is both a strategy and an analytical framework that unpacks campaigns to see their strengths and limitations through the lens of scale. As an analytical framework, vertical integration aims to uncover the complexities of the reform process by focusing on coordinated, multi-level and multi-actor reform initiatives that employ a variety of strategies to achieve success. Vertical integration captures the following:

- The combination of actors and actions at a given level;
- The intensity of the use of different kinds of action at each level; and
- The extent of civil society use of different actions/strategies at each level.

Such dimensions are important since they can highlight the specific context and dynamics of a particular reform initiative, i.e. the prevailing politico-economic conditions, the existing power structures, and the established governance institutions at each level. These factors, in turn, are likely to affect:

- State–society relationships (or how society makes use of the mechanisms of government and how the state, in turn, reacts to societal forces); and
- Society–society relationships (or how societal actors interact with one another).

By properly understanding the scale and context of an initiative, we can provide a solid analytical frame to capture the varied factors of the reform process. It could also yield better insights for future strategies and actions, which in turn increases the likelihood of success. Under this approach, the various actions that citizens and their organizations and movements employ at different levels can be broadly categorized, as shown in the matrix in Table 1. Mapping which actions, if any, are taken by the initiative at each level of decision-making shows the interlinkages of the actions and the scale of the initiative.

Interfacing with the state involves approaches that range from collaborative to adversarial, as shown in the matrix in Table 2. The actions include: policy advocacy with executive and legislative bodies; legal actions; participation in ‘invited spaces’ and in ‘claimed spaces’ (Gaventa 2006); public protest; and engagement with public accountability agencies.

By applying vertical integration as a lens to analyze the ways in which issue-advocacy campaigns operate on multiple levels, we can better understand the seven cases featured in this paper. Each of these represent coordinated, multi-level and multi-actor reform initiatives that employ a variety of strategies to gain concrete results. This analysis can also help us understand how substantive reforms are actually achieved in the Philippines, as well as draw lessons and insights to inform future actions.

Vertical integration, therefore, is a potentially useful tool for both researchers and practitioners. In the hands of the former, it can be used as an analytical framework to explain the relationship and dynamics of the various reform actors at every level of engagement. When employed by the latter, it can serve as a guide for improving policy and for pushing for more strategic reforms to improve policy formulation, implementation, or evaluation.
1.4 Overview of the report

Following this introduction, this book continues with a framing Chapter by Jonathan Fox, who popularized the term ‘vertical integration.’ This is followed by a brief Chapter contextualizing the use of vertical integration in the history of civil society in the Philippines. The subsequent Chapter brings together summaries of the case study findings. The final Chapter synthesizes the findings, and discusses the common features observed in the case studies that flesh out the empirical details behind the propositions put forward by vertical integration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very local (community/school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing / awareness-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already organized, shared constituency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public education strategy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Horizontal exchange of experiences/deliberation</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Participatory process to develop CSO policy alternative</td>
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<td>Strategic use of ICT for constituency-building</td>
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## Table 2. Scaling accountability mapping matrix: interface with the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>Very local (community, village, neighborhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in 'invited spaces' (shared but government-controlled)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in 'claimed spaces' (shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Engagement with public accountability agencies (ombudsman, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)</td>
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### References


2

Doing accountability differently: Vertically integrated civil society policy monitoring and advocacy

Jonathan Fox

2.1 Introduction

Civil society initiatives in the field of transparency, participation, and accountability (TPA) are flourishing in the global South, yet governmental responsiveness often falls short of expectations. This limited impact suggests the need to rethink reformers’ strategies and tactics. How can institutional change initiatives focus more directly on the causes, rather than on the symptoms of accountability failures? To help civil society organizations (CSOs) and their allies in government to get more traction on the uphill climb towards accountability, this Chapter makes the case for a more systemic approach: the vertical integration of civil society policy monitoring and advocacy.
Recent reviews of the evidence of accountability outcomes underscore the problem. A now-classic review of transparency and accountability initiatives found that transparency had very uneven and modest impacts on accountability (McGee and Gaventa 2010). A more recent meta-analysis of social accountability initiatives finds that many of them are too superficial and limited in scope to actually leverage accountability (Fox 2014). Numerous ‘civic-tech’ online platforms inspire hope for citizen voice to leverage better public service provision, but so far, only a few have tangibly improved service delivery (Peixoto and Fox 2016; Edwards and McGee 2016). In the global arena, a recent review of the evidence from international multi-stakeholder initiatives promoting open government (e.g., Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Open Government Partnership) finds that, while they often manage to encourage more information disclosure, they have yet to reach accountability gains (Brockmyer and Fox 2015).

These TPA efforts differ in terms of whether their main focus is local, national or international, but they share the assumption that ‘information is power.’ This assumption turns out to be overly optimistic. Research on the track records of these TPA initiatives suggests a disconnect: information access and citizen voice are often not enough to deliver accountability (Fox 2007a; Halloran 2015; Joshi 2014). Indeed, transparency and accountability initiatives are often not well-articulated with other anti-corruption, democratization, and citizen participation efforts that one might expect would all be coordinated and moving in the same direction (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014). Looking across the TPA field, one finds more fragmentation than synergy, and the whole is sometimes less than the sum of the parts. 4 This raises the question: how can transparency and accountability initiatives get more traction? This essay discusses one CSO strategy that tries to take entrenched institutional obstacles more fully into account by ‘doing accountability differently;’ vertical integration of coordinated CSO policy monitoring and advocacy. 5

The point of departure here is that if the causes of accountability failures are systemic, then strategies that seek systemic change are needed (see Box 1). After all, anti-accountability forces, with their strong vested interests in opposing change, are often quite effective at isolating, neutering, and rolling back incremental pro-accountability action initiatives or institutional enclaves. 6 This suggests that building effective accountability systems requires strategies that take ‘anti-accountability systems’ into account.
2.1.1 Defining terms 1: From scaling up to ‘connecting the dots’

Insofar as the TPA field has relied on overly optimistic assumptions about the power of information, a conceptual reboot seems to be in order. One missing link involves the challenge of how to ‘take scale into account.’ In international development discussions, scale is usually understood as a reference to size: more or bigger – as in ‘scaling up.’ Here, ‘scale’ will be understood differently. ‘Taking scale into account’ refers to articulating how different levels of development decision-making interact with each other (from the local level to district, provincial, national and transnational arenas) – both for the public sector and for civil society.  

Conventional approaches to social accountability and transparency do not take a multi-level approach. On the one hand, most social accountability initiatives (such as community scorecards) are locally bounded, while on the other hand, most open government initiatives rely on national agencies to disclose official budget or activity data, which is rarely disaggregated in citizen-friendly or actionable ways. These initiatives are often limited by their approach to scale: local interventions remain localized, rarely spreading horizontally or extending their leverage vertically by influencing higher-level authorities, while national initiatives based in capital cities risk circulating primarily among those already convinced – or remaining limited to cyberspace, delinked from offline civic action. In contrast, vertically integrated accountability initiatives ‘take scale into account’ by linking citizen action at the grassroots with action at the national level, while seeking to broaden their ‘coverage’ horizontally in terms of geographic and social inclusion of excluded citizens. Multi-level citizen oversight initiatives can gain additional traction if the evidence they produce would manage to trigger public checks-and-balances institutions, such as legislative oversight committees, audit bureaus, ombudsman agencies, human rights commissions, consumer protection agencies or public prosecutors.

This approach to ‘scaling accountability’ goes beyond ‘scaling up,’ a concept that is usually understood as replication (doing more of a particular activity). When a pilot, often localized activity ‘works,’ then replication is certainly called for. Yet, replication may not be enough to address the underlying systemic causes of accountability failures. How to do that depends on the particular national context, but the more general point is that it is more sensible to focus on how to get more impact, rather than seeking scale (growth) per se – as when developing more numerous but still strictly localized actions (Guerzovich and Poli 2014).

This is the context for the proposition of ‘vertical integration’ of civil society policy monitoring and advocacy, a strategy that tries to address power imbalances by emphasizing the coordinated independent oversight of public sector actors at local, subnational, national, and transnational levels. The goal is for the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts.

For example, if a social accountability initiative involves community interface meetings between health clinic workers and communities, then scaling up as replication would mean convening them in more clinics (e.g., from 10 to 50 to 500 villages). Yet, the underlying causes of medicine stock-outs or abusive staff may lie far ‘upstream.’ If civil society oversight efforts addressing these problems were to ‘do accountability differently,’ and make connections across levels, they would bring together democratic representatives from those 10, 50, or 500 grassroots communities. Such meetings could ground a strategy to build a broad-based civic or social process that would have not only significant evidence-generating capacity, but also the civic clout needed to persuade policy-makers to act on those findings, especially on problems in the health system caused by factors located beyond their respective clinics.

‘Taking scale into account’ requires investing in the capacity to do independent citizen monitoring at multiple levels, and allowing public oversight of the links in the official decision-making chain that are not visible from the community level. To sum up, ‘doing accountability differently’ involves ‘connecting the dots’ to produce sustainable institutional change. This can be done by generating credible and actionable independent evidence, targeting citizen action, and leveraging power shifts at multiple levels (Fox and Halloran 2016).

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integration puts coalition-building between social and civic actors with different, complementary strengths at the center of the strategy – for example, infomediaries plus membership-based civic organizations and alternative media.

If government reformists are also willing to invest their political capital in insider–outsider coalitions, so much the better. Those committed to good governance both inside and outside the state manage to forge balanced partnerships, thus, creating the possibility for each set of actors to strengthen the other. The dynamic process of change in which outsider pressure strengthens insiders, while insider willingness and capacity delivers tangible reform progress, can drive a ‘virtuous circle’ of mutual empowerment. This process is called ‘state–society synergy’ (see Box 2). This framework informs the idea of the ‘sandwich strategy,’ which combines pressure from ‘above’ and ‘below’ to isolate and weaken anti-accountability forces embedded in the state (Fox 1992, 2014). In the Philippines, the sandwich strategy was applied as the bibingka strategy, the broad-based advocacy campaign that led to the substantial (and unexpected) progress achieved with land reform implementation in the mid-1990s (Borras 1998, 2001). However, recent conversations in the Philippines suggest that, more recently, at least in some circles, the term ‘bibingka strategy’ is now more generally used to refer to collaborative government–CSO partnerships. This watered down usage of the term loses the analytical and civic ‘edge’ that was central to the original version, where autonomous mass organizations of stakeholders energized implementation by carrying out protests to target governmental bottlenecks that blocked the agrarian reform law.

This article spells out the rationale for vertical integration with five propositions that address major challenges faced by CSOs working to build public accountability. Note: The term ‘policy’ is used here as a broad umbrella category, referring to the full array of governmental decisions and non-decisions that shape public sector performance – including agenda-setting, policy formulation, and implementation.

The empirical examples cited here are illustrations of ‘proof of concept’ rather than claims of definitive evidence. Indeed, even though the practical experiences with ‘partial vertical integration’ of monitoring and advocacy are common, there is little robust empirical research on the trajectories and impacts of multi-level work because research agendas in the TPA field have yet to address the strategy. That is why this book’s case studies of CSO-led independent monitoring and advocacy make such an important contribution to the national and international discussion on how TPA initiatives can get more traction.

**Box 2. Three concepts for discussion**

*State–society synergy*

How can the seeds of accountability grow in spite of public institutions marked by entrenched corruption and systemic impunity? Embedding accountability into the state is an inherently uneven, partial and contested process. ‘State–society synergy’ offers a relevant conceptual framework. This approach tries to identify the dynamics and impacts of the mutual empowerment of actors in state and society. In this view, the construction of public accountability is driven by cycles of mutually reinforcing interaction between the thickening of civil society and state reformist initiatives. Though this kind of state–society synergy is the exception rather than the general rule in most countries, the exceptions matter. Past struggles can leave cracks in the system that serve as handholds for subsequent campaigns seeking to open it up to greater public scrutiny. These processes tend to unfold outside the realm of national elections and political parties.

In the state–society synergy framework for understanding how public institutions change, the main cleavage is not between the ostensibly dichotomous and implicitly monolithic state versus society, but rather between contending pro- versus anti-accountability forces that are both embedded in the state and society. Anti-accountability forces often manage to sustain mutually empowering coalitions that cross the state–society divide, perpetuating ‘low accountability traps’ that keep them strong and pro-accountability forces weak. As a result, pro-accountability actors both in state and society face the challenge of finding strategies for their own mutual empowerment that will allow them to isolate and weaken anti-accountability forces.

*Accountability politics*

This approach focuses on the processes of accountability politics, i.e., the conflicts and coalitions that determine whether or not public and private sector elites are held publicly responsible for their decisions, and
if so, in what manner. Accountability politics involves challenging who is accountable to whom, as clients become citizens, politicians become representatives, and bureaucrats become public servants. Accountability politics can overlap with pro-democracy movements, but are not limited to them. Accountability campaigns involve not only protests against powerful elites, but also partnerships with insiders who are willing to invest their political capital to support institutional change. As a result, constructing public accountability involves not only challenging the state, but also transforming the state. Accountability politics is not the same as political accountability; it is related to but distinct from electoral competition, both logically and empirically.

Transitions to accountability

Back in the 1980s, as authoritarian regimes fell around the world, transitions to democracy were widely expected to drive transitions to accountability. Clearly, however, competitive electoral politics has not managed to end systemic corruption, abuse, and impunity. This unsettled combination of continuity and change underscores the relevance of the conceptual distinction between the political regime, i.e., the set of public institutions that determine who governs, and the state, i.e., the public institutions that govern society and the economy in between elections. Most of the political science literature on democratic transitions and governance focus on electoral and elected institutions, but public concerns about accountable governance are as much about states as they are about regimes. Where electoral democracy produces highly uneven and inconsistent degrees of accountable governance, then it may be useful to think in terms of ‘transitions to accountability.’ Such transformations of the state are analogous to, but distinct from, transitions to democratic regimes. Among scholars, the study of ‘transitions to accountability’ today is where the analysis of transitions to electoral democracy was back in the late 1970s or early 1980s: it still lacks comprehensive explanatory frameworks. Scholars still lack analytical frameworks that can explain how accountable governance becomes stronger, or how it spreads from enclaves across entire state apparatuses, or how accountability expands vertically, from the local to the national or vice-versa. Perhaps, more scholarly attention to accountability politics can inform the development of more relevant analytical frameworks.

2.1.2 Defining terms 2: Unpacking vertical integration

This reframed meaning of scale sets the stage for the proposition of ‘vertical integration’ of civil society policy monitoring and advocacy. This approach tries to address power imbalances by emphasizing the coordinated independent oversight of the public sector actors at the local, subnational, national and transnational levels. The goal is for the whole to be greater than the sum of its parts. The core rationale for monitoring each stage and level of public sector decision-making, non-decision-making and performance is to reveal more precisely not only where the main causes of accountability failures are located, but also their interconnected nature. This focus on understanding as many links in the chain of public sector decisions as possible is relevant to inform possible solutions, and to empower the coalitions needed to promote them.

Vertical integration puts coalition-building between social and civic actors with different but complementary strengths at the center of the strategy (for example, CSO policy analysts plus membership-based civic organizations to do bottom-up oversight and advocacy, plus independent media to disseminate both the findings and the citizen action).

Figure 1. Seeking synergy: Multi-level independent policy monitoring and advocacy
The metaphor of vertical integration draws from political economy, where the term refers to an enterprise's control of its own supply chain, including both backward linkages (inputs, parts) and forward linkages (distribution, sales, and repair). In contrast to the business context, where ‘integration’ refers to centralized control, ‘integration’ as used in the realm of civil society, points much more loosely towards the coordination of independent monitoring and advocacy capacity across as much as possible of the governance process – from policy debate and agenda-setting to the formulation of policy and budget decisions, as well as to their implementation throughout different agencies and levels of government.

Figure 1 illustrates this process of CSO oversight, with independent watchdog capacity of some kind at each level, parallel to the vertical structures of governance. In practice, ‘full’ vertical integration of independent policy monitoring and advocacy is rare since it involves a relatively high degree of institutional capacity as well as many ‘moving parts.’ Yet, as will be discussed below, even ‘partial’ degrees of vertical integration (e.g., from local to district or provincial levels, or from national to departmental levels) can generate more comprehensive, and therefore, stronger civil society oversight efforts.

2.1.3 Defining terms 3: Policy monitoring and advocacy

CSO oversight is understood here as potentially including both monitoring and advocacy, though a preliminary scoping of the civil society landscape suggests that, in practice, only a few CSOs do both. Indeed, diverse types of organizations are likely to play very different roles in this process, as will be discussed below, even ‘partial’ degrees of vertical integration (e.g., from local to district or provincial levels, or from national to departmental levels) can generate more comprehensive, and therefore, stronger civil society oversight efforts.

Monitoring and advocacy may have the potential to reinforce each other, as suggested in Figure 1, but it turns out that they involve quite different repertoires of action. In national capitals, independent policy analysts and think tanks that dedicate themselves to extracting, processing, and disseminating government data – sometimes called infomediaries – are very well-positioned to reveal the government’s priorities by monitoring the legislature or analyzing the budget. Partnerships with broad-based membership organizations, with their thousands of eyes and ears on the ground, make it possible to monitor actual government performance and to encourage citizen voice and action. The potential complementarity between technically skilled CSOs and large social or civic organizations, with the challenge of building and sustaining cross-sectoral, multi-level coalitions at the center of the practice of vertical integration. In the context of such often-delicate processes of building coalitions among very different kinds of organizations (which underscores the need for balanced power-sharing and transparent decision-making), the term ‘integration’ can be interpreted as implying an undue degree of centralization. The rationale for using the term, however, is to emphasize the goal of creating synergy, which would be produced by coordination among multiple CSOs – both playing different roles and working across levels – for reasons discussed below (see also Figure 1). 11

2.2 Vertical integration is easier said than done: Five propositions for discussion

The different kinds of coordination proposed here – among different kinds of actors, across levels, and bridging monitoring and advocacy – address at least five distinct challenges, framed here as propositions for discussion:

1) Vertical integration can deal with the problem of ‘squeezing the balloon’;
2) Locally-bounded citizen voice and oversight misses upstream governance problems;
3) Even ‘partial’ vertical integration can bolster citizen voice and leverage;
4) CSO coalitions can increase leverage by finding synergy between policy monitoring and advocacy; and
5) Broad-based CSO monitoring and advocacy coalitions can bring together policy analysis, civic muscle, territorial reach, and under-represented voices.
The following discussion of each of these propositions combines analysis of how multi-level approaches can contribute to pro-accountability leverage with a consideration of the difficulties involved.

2.2.1 Vertical integration can take on the problem of ‘squeezing the balloon’

The expression ‘squeezing the balloon’ conveys the way in which authorities and vested interests may resist independent oversight efforts by either deflecting or eluding reform efforts (Fox 2001, 2014). Deflection is when officials point the finger elsewhere in response to CSO monitoring and advocacy efforts, claiming that the actions in question were really decided somewhere else, may it be in a different agency or at a different level of government. For example, municipal authorities may claim that a problem lies with the provincial or district government. Those subnational authorities may point the finger either back downwards to the local level, or upwards to the national level. National officials, in turn, may claim that the problem resides at the subnational level – or they may point the finger at international actors (as in “the World Bank made us do it” – see Box 3). International actors, in turn, are quite capable of eliding their responsibility by shifting blame to national or subnational governments.

Governance processes often involve many different public sector actors. This raises what political scientists call ‘the problem of many hands’ (Thompson 1980), which refers to institutional decisions involving many parties, thereby making it difficult to hold a single actor responsible for misdeeds. Yet, even when many hands are indeed involved, some decision-makers are usually more responsible than others in any specific case of accountability failure. The challenge for pro-accountability actors is to open the black box of the state to figure out who did what, and why (e.g. Grandvoine et al. 2015).

The second challenge of the ‘squeezing the balloon’ problem emerges when the targets of citizen oversight adapt by modifying their corruption practices. The corrupt are flexible, and they are quite capable of shifting their efforts to where opportunities are greatest and oversight is weakest. As funding flows through long chains of official decision-making, and public scrutiny is only able to shed the spotlight on one or two of those stages, then ‘leakage’ is likely to shift to those decision-making processes that remain in the dark. For example, in some large, government-sponsored rural community development programs that include citizen oversight mechanisms (like India’s social audits or Indonesia’s KDP rural development program), it seems that corrupt officials have responded by inventing new and less visible ways to divert funds, shifting from wage theft to the manipulation of billing practices (see for example, Shankar 2010; Olken 2009). In other words, the ‘squeezing the balloon’ phenomenon means that program monitoring that is exclusively local in scope may well manage to change the ‘shape’ of the ‘corruption market,’ but not necessarily the volume of corruption (Zimmerman 2015). 12

In response to this problem, the core rationale for trying to monitor each stage and level of public sector decision-making, non-decision-making, and performance is to reveal more precisely not only where the main causes of accountability failures are located, but also their interconnected nature. The proposition here is that CSO oversight of as many links in the chain of public sector decisions as possible is made relevant to inform possible policy reforms, and to empower the coalitions needed to promote them, including bolstering the government’s own checks-and-balances institutions (in case they are merely weak rather than actually captured by vested interests).
Vertical integration, as a multi-level strategy combining independent monitoring and advocacy, emerged from a decade’s worth of independent CSO monitoring of World Bank-funded rural development projects in Mexico. It is grounded in coalitions between a CSO and autonomous regional peasant and indigenous organisations. Led by the CSO Trasparencia (1995–2005), the goal was to monitor each project decision-making actor at the local, state, national and international levels to identify possible gaps in the application of the development bank’s own social and environmental safeguard policies. The focus was on its public information access, indigenous peoples, and environmental policies, which at that time were stronger than the Mexican government’s policies.

Trasparencia partnered with the international CSO campaign that was advocating for the World Bank to comply with its commitment to what are now called ‘safeguard policies.’ Because each World Bank-funded project involved multiple states and localities, broad geographic coverage was necessary to produce credible evidence, and anticipate official responses that possible problems were merely anecdotal exceptions.

Trasparencia’s strategy was to partner with region-wide, community-based autonomous indigenous organisations, especially in Oaxaca and the Huastecas region, to advocate for their right to informed participation in rural development projects. Project resources were supposed to be allocated through participatory regional councils. Though these councils were dominated by membership organizations that were subordinate to the government, they sometimes created an opportunity for more autonomous organizations to seek a seat at the table. In the process, World Bank officials would point to the national government, which in turn, shift responsibility to state government officials, leading to a continuous shifting of responsibility back and forth. This challenge led Trasparencia to pursue a vertically integrated approach, in order to determine where specific policy and resource allocation decisions were actually being made. For a decade, this CSO coalition monitored the projects both from the top down and from the bottom up, including local and state governments, and both the line ministries and Treasury Departments at the national level (since the Treasury controlled the government’s relationship with the World Bank), as well as the World Bank itself. The team monitored six World Bank projects in depth, and found that, in practice, only one of them consistently applied the ostensibly mandatory safeguard policies (though another project applied them partially in some regions).

The principal impact of this World Bank project-monitoring initiative was to increase the civic space for relatively autonomous indigenous organizations in some regions to engage with the government and to participate in resource allocation decisions (Fox and Gershman 2000). In response to these efforts for citizen participation in program decision-making, the government decided to eliminate the regional councils and to shift the ostensibly participatory process down to the municipal level, where the more autonomous regional organizations would have less clout (Fox 2007b). In retrospect, the ‘squeezing the balloon’ dynamic predominated.

2.2.2 Locally-bounded citizen voice and oversight misses upstream governance problems

The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report (WDR) emphasized that citizen voice and oversight could contribute to improving public service delivery. This unprecedented official legitimation not only encouraged what the World Bank would call its own ‘demand-side’ approaches to promote good governance, but it also emboldened very large, international service delivery non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to venture into the terrain of citizen engagement (e.g., CARE, World Vision, Save the Children). These NGOs followed the ‘constructive engagement’ approach, drawing on pre-existing partnerships with governments to create bounded spaces for local citizen voice. ‘Constructive engagement’ designates collaborative CSO–government relationships that avoid confrontation, or even public criticism, and can be applied in any arena, from local to global (see Box 5). Most often, these ‘invited spaces’ for citizen voice have been strictly locally focused, though the Philippines’ case discussed below shows how a constructive engagement approach can be applied to a multi-level policy monitoring initiative that connects local oversight with national level CSO–government dialogue.
The WDR’s explicit legitimation of citizen voice as a constructive input to the governance of service delivery opened up modest, incremental yet unprecedented space in some relatively closed societies. Yet, the WDR’s influential conceptual framework circumscribed the acceptable role of citizen voice exclusively to the local arena and limited the targets of legitimate public oversight to frontline service providers, which some refer to as the ‘last mile.’ Indeed, in some cases, the combination of community access to information about service provision, and the creation of safe spaces for citizen voice have made a dramatic difference in local service delivery performance (e.g., Bjorkman and Svennson 2009). Still, such high-impact outcomes have been both rare and difficult to replicate. After all, when clinics suffer from stock-outs, this may be attributed to either of two reasons: one, medicines were diverted further up in the health ministry’s chain of command, or, two, affected clinics were undersupplied after senior health ministry officials overpaid corrupt providers in exchange for kickbacks (e.g., Vian 2008). When healthcare workers demand informal payments from patients, the cause may be located upstream because they had to pay to get their job or, they are required to pass money from patients up the chain of authorities (Schaaf and Freedman 2013). Similarly, schools may suffer from absent teachers not because of their individual issues; rather, it is due to more systemic reasons. If teachers are absent from the classroom because they bought their government jobs, or because they are busy working full-time for a political party, then the key accountability failures are located upstream, where decisions about hiring and firing are made – far from the reach of school-level parent committees (Altschuler 2013).

After more than a decade of donor investment in social accountability and open government initiatives, discussion of multi-level citizen oversight remains rare (see Garza 2013 for an exception). In retrospect, it appears that the 2004 WDR’s exclusive focus on local voice led many influential stakeholders to expect that they could achieve tangible and sustainable service delivery improvements without investing in the bolstered civil society capacity-building that is needed to challenge upstream vested interests. Yet, so far, there is little evidence that shows that top-down, externally-supported, locally-bounded citizen voice initiatives trigger replication beyond the area of influence and the period of international funding (e.g., Gutman and Bhargarva 2015). This underscores the need to rethink how to ‘do accountability differently.’ This leads to the proposition that independent multi-level oversight has the potential to identify where the bottlenecks are concentrated, which, in effect, can inform and/or change strategies that address the causes, and not just the symptoms of accountability failures.

2.2.3 Even ‘partial’ vertical integration can bolster citizen leverage and voice

Clearly, the vertical integration of CSO oversight is an extremely ambitious goal and few organizations have the institutional capacity needed for the ‘full coverage’ of an entire policy process (from agenda-setting to formulation through implementation) even in a narrow issue area. ‘Partially integrated’ policy monitoring refers then to citizen oversight of some dimensions or levels of a public sector process. The proposition here is that – in spite of the challenge posed by ‘squeezing the balloon’ – public oversight of even some of the links in a chain of public sector decisions (or non-decisions) can make a significant difference, especially if the monitoring is articulated with problem-solving collective action that can also reach across scale.

Informed by an extensive experience with ‘partial integration’ of citizen oversight, the emphasis on multi-level work proposed here is limited to two vertical links: from the village to the regional level, defined as including multiple municipalities (districts). This process extended very broadly to promote citizen oversight of an official food distribution network through 300 regional Community Food Councils in rural Mexico, with each of them representing dozens of villages. In 1979, long before the term ‘social accountability’ was in use, Mexico’s federal food distribution agency, Diconos, promoted this citizen oversight strategy nationwide, embedding it within its vast network of community-managed village food stores in low-income rural regions. The program still delivers staple foods to more than 27,000 village stores, which are supplied by 300 warehouses (each serving approximately 90 stores). The program’s goal is to regulate consumer food prices by offering low-cost basic staples in remote rural areas that otherwise would lack market competition.

The warehouse oversight councils had an anti-corruption mission to ensure that food was actually delivered to the remote villages. Program architects recognized that, in the absence of stakeholder oversight, the risk was that warehouse staff would illegally divert the subsidized food to the same private retailers whose high prices were the target of the regulatory strategy. Community Food Council leaders also faced the challenge of fending off attempts to use the program for political control, which is a persistent problem in Mexico. The councils’ approach to anti-corruption
was primarily preventive since they had little formal recourse if and when food supplies were diverted.

The architects of the Diconsa social accountability process created multi-level ‘invited spaces,’ and some became autonomous ‘claimed spaces’ in practice. Elected village committees oversaw the management of the local stores, but what makes the program design especially distinctive is that those committees were also represented on elected regional warehouse oversight committees: Community Food Councils. Their mission was to represent between 50 and more than 100 communities of at least 1,000 to 2,000 people each, giving them legitimacy and potential clout, based on representing the interests of perhaps 50,000 or 100,000 very low-income rural consumers.

Reformist policy-makers in charge of the program knew that if this oversight system was to work, the regional warehouse oversight councils had to be autonomous from both the bureaucracy and local elites. This led them to recruit hundreds of non-partisan community organizers to create regional ‘free spaces’ that allowed the village representatives to exercise freedom of association and of expression. This was set as a precedent back in the early 1980s, when Mexico was under an authoritarian one-party system. By the late 1990s, networks of food councils had gained sufficient national clout to roll back an attempt of national technocrats to dismantle the program, briefly reaching ‘full’ vertical integration of policy oversight and advocacy.

According to a field research carried out in 1985–1986 and again in 2005–2006 (Fox 2007b), about one-third of these regional councils managed to act as autonomous countervailing powers. Moreover, even though the official scope of their oversight role was limited to the food distribution program, the more autonomous food councils often generated spillover effects that encouraged other kinds of self-managed, scaled-up rural development initiatives (e.g., marketing cooperatives, coffee processing, fertilizer distribution, etc.). Yet, many of the agency’s key decisions were made at higher levels, i.e., state and national. Indeed, the regional oversight councils ostensibly had elected their own representative bodies at state and national levels, but it is no coincidence that agency managers made certain that autonomous leaders did not gain leverage within those higher level ‘invited spaces.’ Most of the time, the agency succeeded in containing the autonomous food councils’ capacity of combining monitoring and advocacy to the regional warehouses.

The food councils’ “sustainability” has been a challenge. Such is the case with Textbook Count. For at least a decade and a half, this oversight program’s lack of national-level allies, either in government or civil society, had taken its toll, and the food councils’ oversight capacity appeared to have been significantly weakened. Indeed, this program was largely invisible to potential allies, such as urban-based pro-accountability CSOs. Nevertheless, this experience suggests that the program monitoring by stakeholders, even if coordinated across just two levels, particularly from village to regional, can make a qualitative difference because it can, at least, identify and engage, through collective action, the plugging of leakages at those levels, as seen in the case of the ForoSalud–CARE indigenous women’s health monitoring experience in the province of Puno, Peru (see Box 4).

The conditions under which partial vertical integration of citizen oversight can make a difference are far from clear. Convincing answers require extensive subnational comparative research that holds constant national context, focuses on a specific program, and selects cases on the variance in the level of government targeted by citizen oversight efforts (Snyder 2001). Yet, the absence of systematic research on partial vertical integration should not be confused with a lack of participatory pro-accountability experiences that could be subject to such analysis. Around the world, local grassroots social and civic initiatives become visible, and can influence large institutions precisely when they come together at regional and subnational levels. In the scholarly literature on social movements, this process is known as the ‘scale shift’ (Tarrow 2010).
Box 4. Vertical integration in one province: Indigenous women's monitoring of health services.

In Puno, Peru, indigenous women’s monitoring of health services to promote respect for rights and accountability was different from the usual locally-bounded approach because it was coordinated through a regional government’s ombudsman office. At interface meetings, they presented findings to district- and regional-level health administrators and hospital directors. Citizen monitors became the official eyes and ears of the regional ombudsman office. Intensive oversight of clinics by almost 100 monitors (two to three visits a week) identified widespread patterns of medicine stockouts, facilities closed during peak demand times, ‘informal payments,’ as well as mistreatment, cultural bias and rejection of national health system rules intended to defend women’s rights. The initiative was led by the Civil Society Health Forum (Foro Salud) and CARE, with grass-roots and government partners. This ‘partial vertical integration’ of health monitoring, articulated at local and regional levels, achieved national policy impact in 2008 when advocates persuaded the health minister to officially recognize citizen monitoring committees, legitimating the ‘sandwich strategy’. In 2011, however, a new government dropped its support, in spite of quantitative and qualitative evaluations that consistently found positive results. By 2014, Foro Salud’s and CARE-Peru’s priorities had shifted as well (Frisancho 2015; Aston 2015), but the grass-roots monitors and volunteer professionals continue their work.

2.2.4 CSO coalitions can increase leverage by finding synergy between policy monitoring and advocacy

In the civil society landscape, how often is there strategic coordination between the documentation of public sector performance patterns (policy monitoring) and the exercise of citizen voice to influence public sector decisions or non-decisions (advocacy)? In practice, independent monitoring and advocacy are perhaps most often well articulated with each other in the context of a very specific kind of CSO initiative: responses to large infrastructure and extractive projects that threaten to impose social and environmental costs on constituencies that were not considered in the decision-making process. Frequently, in the absence of public, timely, and independent assessments of the implications of such decisions, authorities and interested parties underestimate their social, environmental, and economic costs, while overestimating the benefits, which are often concentrated in social sectors that are not expected to bear the costs (Fox and Brown 1998; Clark et al. 2003). Large infrastructure and extractive projects are also notorious for creating huge opportunities for corruption. Yet, outside this specific genre of large footprint projects, strategic coordination of CSO monitoring with advocacy is much less common, especially in the provision of much more dispersed public services or anti-poverty programs.

The goal of bringing independent monitoring and advocacy together is to find synergy between the evidence-generating potential of policy monitoring and the civic muscle that broad-based advocacy campaigns can bring to bear (as illustrated in Figure 1 above). Yet, combining these approaches requires coalition-building strategies that take the diversity among potential participants into account (to be discussed further in 2.2.5). CSO policy monitoring and advocacy often involve groups with very different goals, skills, repertoires, and theories of change. For example, advocacy goals grounded in the strongly felt needs of organized social constituencies may not involve what evaluation experts would consider ‘rigorous’ policy monitoring. Affected groups may conclude that they already have the information they need in order to justify their cause, as well as to identify their allies and adversaries. After all, in the eyes of citizens who have long been subjected to corruption, discrimination or abuse, the prospect of making significant efforts to generate ‘objective’ data to demonstrate what is already obvious to them may seem like a poor investment of limited organizational resources. Plus, grassroots advocates may not want to reinforce official claims that the legitimacy of their cause depends on producing what constitutes ‘proof’ in the eyes of policy elites and academics.

From a public interest advocacy logic, independent policy monitoring involves significant costs. It is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to an end, such as exposing and naming previously invisible problems, reframing public debates, garnering mainstream media coverage, identifying ‘smoking guns’ with specific perpetrators, producing a ‘killer statistic’ with the potential to go viral, or influencing national and international politicians or technocrats who are receptive to evidence. These goals involve more than technical monitoring capacity. They also require advocacy strategies that draw on skills, such as working with the media, coalition-building, mass citizen action, as well as the knowledge and relationships needed to identify potential insider allies.
Coalition-building also involves managing political differences. While CSO policy monitoring and advocacy clearly vary in terms of the skill sets and organizational capacities involved, the two approaches may also be associated with different political strategies. In practice, policy monitoring is often associated with a constructive engagement approach. Yet, if the primary goal is to improve policy implementation by plugging leaks and identifying performance problems in partnership with officials, it can discourage the direct questioning of the overall policy or of the key assumptions behind it. Such partnerships may limit CSO policy monitors’ independence, constraining them from publicly revealing the governance problems they encounter, and thereby leaving the questions of whether and how to actually address the problems to their governmental coalition partners (see Box 5).

**Box 5. Frames for collaborative reform strategies: ‘constructive engagement’ or ‘state–society coalitions for change’?**

In principle, the constructive engagement approach (collaborative partnerships between reformists in government and civil society) can strengthen insider reformists by providing them with civil society backing, as well as with eyes and ears on the ground. However, policymakers often expect civil society partners to abstain from any public criticism, which in turn might reduce CSO leverage. After all, the willingness to consider an exit option increases bargaining power. Indeed, the experience in the Philippines suggests that government participants in these partnerships often perceive short-term incentives to discourage their CSO partners from publicly targeting anti-accountability forces in government since an adversarial approach would carry the risk of political backlash against insider reformers. Insider allies may also fear that CSO revelations of governance failures will be used against them in the next election (even if they are not responsible for the problems). At the same time, from the CSO’s point of view, the loss of its allies in the next election could end the chances of any insider–outsider coalition.

Constructive engagement may be most relevant in more closed political contexts. In countries where there is little-to-no political space for autonomous civil society, subordinated alliances with more enlightened elements within government may be the only avenue open for CSOs to address governance failures. The creation of modest ‘free spaces’ for very constrained collective deliberation and action may turn out to be significant in the longer term.

Though constructive engagement partnerships are quite common, they are justified more often on the grounds of political pragmatism than on extensive empirical evidence that identifies the conditions under which they actually lead to lasting institutional change. Indeed, it would be useful to apply a political economy analysis to a wide range of cases in order to identify the interests and incentives that make successful state–society collaborative problem-solving possible.

The term ‘constructive engagement’ itself may well constrain its capacity for leveraging change, insofar as the language conceals the full range of possible collaborations between reformers in state and society. The word ‘constructive’ implies that adversarial approaches are necessarily not constructive, yet, insider reformists may well need external pressure on anti-reform forces to gain leverage. In other words, strategic state–society coalitions may actually combine CSO collaboration with pro-reform forces in government on the one hand, and with conflict that is targeted to weaken the vested interests in government that oppose reform on the other. As a result, terms like ‘state–society coalitions for change’ and ‘critical collaboration’ leave room for this productive deployment of adversarial approaches, and therefore, capture a more strategic theory of collaborative change than does the term ‘constructive engagement.’

In contrast to the widely assumed dichotomy between CSO collaboration and contestation with the state, some of the most innovative state–society anti-corruption coalitions involve both kinds of interaction. The ‘sandwich strategy’ involves collaborative partnerships between social actors and some elements within the state. These partnerships are intended to create pathways to confront corrupt elements embedded elsewhere within the state (see Boxes 2 and 5). This is what happened in the Mexican Community Food Council approach cited above, as well as in the thousands of officially–enabled social audits in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. There, the government builds conflict into a sandwich strategy
by supporting a vast process of participatory public oversight hearings. These hearings are designed precisely to create a safe institutional public space for the poorest members of the community in order to identify local elites who steal from their anti-poverty programs (e.g., Maoriano 2014). In other words, some monitoring strategies try to combine voice with teeth by creating institutionalized processes to expose and challenge corruption (Fox 2014). In contrast to outsider confrontations, these processes are adversarial, but they unfold within rule-based ‘proper channels.’

Advocacy campaigns, in contrast to monitoring, usually focus on changing policy formulation. Often, those seeking systemic change do not prioritize ‘only’ improving the implementation of existing policy. Their theories of change may lead them to want to expose the vested interests opposing policy reform, insofar as their goal is to address the causes of accountability failures. As a result, reform advocates often deploy pressure politics with elements of confrontation or protest, and invest less in documenting how implementation works out in practice. Since governments and civil societies are rarely monolithic, there are also middle-ground scenarios in which reform factions within the government coordinate with CSOs to challenge opposing factions within the same government. The bibingka strategy was a clear example of this dynamic in which pro-accountability state–society coalitions outflanked anti-accountability coalitions.

In addition, the institutional geographies of monitoring versus advocacy processes may also be quite different, insofar as credible policy monitoring requires broad geographic coverage to document broad patterns of government actions, decisions and non-decisions at subnational, local, and national levels. In contrast, advocacy campaigns may be able to influence the national government even though they are confined to the capital city. Legislative lobbying power, media access, or citizens in the streets of the national capital may certainly be enough to change laws or policies – but the persisting question is whether the behavior of the state actually changes.

In spite of these differences, monitoring and advocacy each have complementary strengths. Each approach can contribute to the other. Most notably, independent policy monitoring can inform possible policy alternatives by seeking to identify the causes of governance problems, rather than just focusing on their symptoms. In addition, independent monitoring capacity can also generate the credible evidence that advocacy campaigns may need to reframe debates, to generate positive media coverage, to isolate adversaries, and to win over allies.  

Moreover, if and when advocacy campaigns do win policy victories, they then need some degree of bottom-up monitoring capacity in order to identify the degree to which new laws and policies are actually put into practice.

This last challenge underscores the importance of the geographic breadth of policy monitoring coverage. For example, when a broad-based social constituency’s advocacy campaign did earn a national policy win – as when PEKKA in Indonesia won legal standing for women-headed households, or when Malawi’s Our Bodies, Our Lives movement won a commitment for the national health system to provide appropriate anti-retroviral medicines – they needed broad-based, bottom-up monitoring capacity in order to determine whether and where the legal or health authorities throughout the country would actually respect those decisions (Essof and Khan 2015; Zulminarni and Miller 2015). For such campaigns, independent monitoring capacity can also inform future decisions about where and how to target bottlenecks that may block the implementation of their policy wins. For these two public interest campaigns, first evidence-gathering informed advocacy campaigns, then advocacy wins informed monitoring, which in turn can inform future advocacy (as illustrated in Figure 1).

This focus on geographic reach is relevant for both monitoring and advocacy, yet, they may follow different paths. To return to the two cases already mentioned, both the Community Food Councils in Mexico and Textbook Count in the Philippines involved monitoring multiple levels of government performance for a specific service, but the ways by which they combined monitoring and advocacy differed. The more autonomous of the Community Food Councils reached the local and the regional levels. In that context, they used their monitoring capacity to inform advocacy in their efforts to improve program performance. These regional social actors were willing to tackle policy implementation problems head-on, from the warehouses to state capitals, with a wide range of possible tactics, including mass protest when the agency was unresponsive. In contrast, Textbook Count carried out independent policy monitoring all the way from local to national levels, while its advocacy work was limited to the national level. It is at the national level where they brought the problems they had identified to the attention of national policymakers in regular problem-solving sessions. While their broad-based civic allies on the ground were
very willing to document textbook delivery and to report problems, they were not directly engaged in advocacy or problem-solving.

Figure 2 illustrates this difference between these two initiatives’ degrees of vertical integration. It distinguishes monitoring from advocacy in order to show that the geographic reach of each approach can vary independently. On the one hand, the food councils did both monitoring and advocacy, but mainly at regional levels. On the other hand, Textbook Count coordinated monitoring from national to local levels, while doing advocacy behind-the-scenes exclusively with national policymaker allies (Aceron 2016). The question of the most appropriate level(s) for focusing monitoring and advocacy attention will depend on the structure of a given policy system, most importantly, its degree of centralization / decentralization. That said, the proposition here suggests that in any system, to focus only on one level will miss some key decisions.

This fourth proposition about the need for synergy between monitoring and advocacy raises the specific issue of how to construct and sustain coalitions that would bring together diverse constituencies, both socially and politically, and sometimes reaching across the state–society divide in pursuit of shared goals. Sustaining balanced collaboration between professional CSOs and broad-based mass membership organizations is often especially challenging.

Figure 2. Mapping multi-level monitoring and advocacy

2.2.5 Broad-based CSO monitoring and advocacy coalitions can bring together policy analysis, civic muscle, territorial reach, and under-represented voices

The vertical integration proposition underscores the potential for synergy and mutual empowerment among CSOs that possess technical policy analysis skills, media presence, and access to policy-makers on the one hand, and broad-based membership organizations with potential civic muscle on the other hand. Yet, there are good reasons why such partnerships are actually rather rare. Relationships between NGOs and social organizations face the challenges of sharp imbalances of power and access to resources, as well as by social and status hierarchies, which are sometimes compounded by different ideologies. Yet, some issue advocacy coalitions do manage to find common ground across constituencies to bring together policy analysis, monitoring, media outreach, legislative
advocacy, and community organizing, as in the case of Ghana’s Oil 4 Agriculture campaign (see Box 6).

**Box 6: Ghana’s Oil 4 Agriculture coalition combines policy monitoring and advocacy at international, national and local levels**

The Oil 4 Agriculture campaign in Ghana advocates for the government’s oil income to be invested in smallholder agriculture. Backed by an international advocacy alliance with Oxfam’s GROW Campaign, the African Centre for Energy Policy participates in a broad-based, multisectoral CSO coalition that includes key public interest groups with broad-based membership organizations like the General Agriculture Workers’ Union and Peasant Farmers’ Association of Ghana (Oil 4 Agriculture 2015). The campaign combined technical policy analysis and budget monitoring with radio, TV, and online national awareness campaigns and citizen petitions to lobby the Finance Ministry, parliament, and the International Monetary Fund to win a key initial victory. The government increased the agriculture allocation in the national oil fund from 2.5% in 2013 to 15.2% in 2014 (ACEP reports that in practice agricultural spending actually reached 31% of the fund that year). Sustained grassroots policy monitoring will still be the key to ensure that the funds actually reach smallholder farmers. There is also a broader effort to encourage the Ghanaian public at large to get involved in monitoring oil money. This initiative builds on past experience. Key Ghananian public interest groups, such as SEND and Friends of the Nation, already have track records in using robust field-based findings from scaled-up, region-wide monitoring of governmental social programs to identify bottlenecks, and to propose specific improvement measures (Dogbe and Kwabane-Adade 2012).

Realistic analysis of CSO coalition dynamics requires unpacking the range of possible actors involved. The political logics and cultural styles of NGOs and broad-based membership organizations often differ. They suggest the need for negotiated terms of engagement. Grassroots leaders may well fear that national capital-based CSOs might end up trading one set of top-down approaches for another, without seeking the kind of broader power shift in both state and society that they may feel is necessary for sustainable accountability to excluded citizens. Conversely, when more oppositional CSOs lean towards adversarial approaches, especially if they belong to social groups that feel less vulnerable, fear of reprisals may confine grassroots organizations to ‘proper channels,’ especially if they are dependent on or vulnerable to the ruling party. The ‘fear factor’ can point to the other direction as well. Technically-oriented think tanks in national capitals, accustomed to elite policy dialogue, may be wary of partnering with social organizations that are perceived as ‘unruly.’ In many countries, national capital-based NGOs, which are understandably protective of their autonomy, have long histories of driving their own policy advocacy agenda in the absence of close consultation with broad-based social and civic organizations. For issues that technical elite policy dialogue cannot sufficiently resolve, ‘people power’ may be necessary.27

Longstanding ideological differences, social differences, and money issues also tend to lurk in the background. The perception that one is more loyal to a partisan agenda than to more tangible governance reform goals will complicate the efforts made to build the mutual trust that coalitions need to survive and be effective. Sharp differences in access to funding can also keep groups apart, especially if some are perceived as having privileged access to government or international funding, or if groups differ over the legitimacy of accepting such funds. Differences in social origin and status can also exacerbate trust issues. The leadership of more technical CSOs may have more in common socially with counterparts in government, which are similarly urban, middle-class professionals, than with grassroots rank-and-file members of pro-accountability social or civic movements. A specific form of social distance – stigma – can also complicate accountability initiatives that are focused on defending the rights of social excluded groups. Culturally grounded support strategies are needed to nurture and protect collective action for those who the dominant society excludes and stigmatizes. This underscores the importance of creating safe spaces that can nurture grassroots organizing among members of the most excluded groups. In order to offset stigma, these safe spaces create the pride, collective identity, and capacity for collective action, which are preconditions for citizens to participate in policy monitoring and advocacy for accountability (see Box 7).

The need for cross-sectoral coalitions to pay deliberate attention to these issues of political difference and social distance, and to build and sustain bridges across cultural and power gaps within civil society, as well as between
society and the state, points towards the important role of interlocutors (defined as two-way, cross-cultural communicators) (Tembo 2013; Fowler 2014; Fox 2014).

Box 7. Targeted long-term organizing strategies can empower the excluded to speak for themselves

The TPA field would benefit from broadening its scope to recognize that many CSOs seeking accountability are not necessarily considered part of the field’s usual ‘community of practice.’ For example, many grassroots membership organizations that empower women to claim rights are doing accountability work in spite of the fact that the dominant TPA frame does not include a gender perspective. Two longstanding grassroots feminist-organizing initiatives are now identifying with the accountability field. Malawi’s Our Bodies, Our Lives campaign of HIV-positive women, and Indonesia’s Women-Headed Family Empowerment Program (PEKKA) do grassroots awareness-raising to combat stigma, and to create enabling environments for positive collective identities. These actions are crucial steps for the voiceless to gain voice. Their experiences are especially relevant to this discussion of vertical integration because they combine independent policy monitoring with policy advocacy across multiple levels of government, building multi-sectoral coalitions, and pursuing insider–outsider approaches to gain standing for their members in order to influence government policy and how it plays out on the ground (Essof and Khan 2015; Zulminarni and Miller 2015).

Interlocutors can help different participants in multi-sectoral coalitions to understand where the others are coming from. Such is a key condition for finding common ground. If and when coalition members manage to ‘agree to disagree’ over some issues in order to pursue shared goals, they then face the challenge of agreeing to – and sticking to – terms of engagement that address key issues such as how decisions are made, and who speaks for whom. Very basic practical issues, such as how groups based in the provinces can participate in national-level decisions can loom large. In this context, multi-sectoral coalitions for accountability face the challenge of building bridges and developing terms of engagement that are perceived by diverse participants as balanced and inclusive (Fox 2010).

2.3 Final thoughts

This essay was inspired by extensive discussions of the Textbook Count experience, which in turn, informed the conceptual framework that guides the other case studies included in this book. Though these case studies address a wide range of accountability campaigns driven by coalitions of diverse actors, they address the potential synergy between advocacy and policy monitoring. These cases also analyze how each campaign faced the challenge of ‘taking scale into account.’ The studies were also informed and enriched by extensive dialogue with campaigners who were directly involved. The result is a set of highly original, analytically informed case studies that provide a strong foundation to ground more relevant future research and analytically informed strategizing by accountability advocates.
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Contextualizing vertical integration in Philippine civil society

Joy Aceron and Francis Isaac

It is often said that the Philippines has a vibrant and dynamic civil society for “thousands of voluntary organizations addressing various concerns dot the country’s sociopolitical landscape” (Ferrer 1997:1). Some of these groups provide a host of services, such as rural health delivery and legal aid, while “confront[ing] state power by raising alternative paradigms and courses of action” (Constantino- David 1997: 21). This noticeable feature of Philippine politics has been one of the lasting legacies of the People Power Revolution, which not only overthrew authoritarian rule in 1986, but also created various mechanisms for citizens’ engagement and direct people’s participation.
3.1 The beginnings of Philippine civil society

3.1.1 Social movement origins

Philippine civil society is not monolithic since it is composed of different formations with varied backgrounds and origins. Some of these organizations belong to various social movements that have sought to empower the marginalized and challenge the authority of the elites. Some of these organizations belong to various social movements that have sought to empower the marginalized and challenge the authority of the elites. One of the earliest social movements in the Philippines was the Katipunan, which was formed in the late nineteenth century to end Spain's colonial rule over the Philippines. Composed largely of landless farmers and artisans from Manila, the Katipunan advocated armed revolution as the means to obtain independence. Their actions eventually culminated in the declaration of independence on 12 June 1898. But independence proved to be short-lived since the United States of America quickly replaced Spain as the country's new colonial master.

With the collapse of the Katipunan, new social movements began to emerge. These new social movements articulated the interests of the peasantry and the working class. For instance, in 1901, the first labor union called the Union Obrero Democrata (UOD) was formed in Manila under the leadership of Isabelo de los Reyes. UOD was immediately crushed by the American government, and was eventually succeeded by the Union Obrero Democratica de Filipinas (UODF) and the Kongreso ng mga Anakpawis ng Pilipinas (KAP). These working-class efforts led to the formation of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) in 1930. PKP became the largest working class organization prior to the Second World War.

At around the same time, peasants in Central Luzon organized themselves into Partido Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (PSP, Socialist Party of the Philippines). The PKP and PSP would later merge in 1938 to strengthen the struggle of the poor for higher wages, land redistribution, and better living conditions. The new party, called PKP-1930, soon fielded local candidates and had several mayors and councilors in Manila and Pampanga province.

During the Second World War, PKP-1930 formed the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (HUKBALAHAP, Anti-Japanese People's Army), which was able to gain control of several towns in Central Luzon. In these 'liberated zones,' the Huks carried out land redistribution by parceling the haciendas to the farmers. With Japan's surrender in 1945, PKP-1930 laid down their arms and joined the congressional elections the following year. They were able to win six seats in the Lower House of Congress. However, President Manuel Roxas prevented the six congressmen from taking their seats and began a crackdown against the Left. Forced to go back to the hills, PKP-1930 formed the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army). By the mid-1950s, PKP-1930 was a waning political force.

The defeat of PKP-1930 prompted the youth and students of the 1960s to take a more active role in advancing the interests of the poor. This youth-initiated movement, later called the National Democratic movement or ND, led to the formation of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1968. CPP advocates for the revolutionary overthrow of the Philippine state.

Meanwhile, 'left-of-center' forces comprised of labor and peasant unions were organized alongside the ND, such as the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Federation of Free Workers (FFW), and Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). These forces began the discourse of reform, of working in critical collaboration with the government instead of advocating an armed takeover of the state. These groups would collectively be known as the social democratic movement or SD, which is considered more "moderate" compared to the more "radical" ND.

Despite the differences in their strategies, both the SD and ND movements played significant roles in the opposition to the Marcos dictatorship.

3.1.2 State-sponsored CSOs

Not all civil society organizations, however, came from social movements. Some were formed with the assistance of the state to serve either as conduits of patronage or to channel public discontent. In fact, the first voluntary associations in the Philippines appeared during the late sixteenth century, at the onset of Spanish colonization. These organizations were religious in character and received considerable encouragement from the colonial authorities as a form of social control.
This strategy was later replicated by the Marcos administration during the height of the dictatorship. At this time, the government began organizing various samahang nayon (rural associations), cooperatives, and other peoples’ organizations (POs) to assist in the delivery of services and neutralize the left-wing movements that were waging armed resistance against the dictatorship. Most of these organizations survived the fall of the dictatorship and continue to exist today. Because of the nature of their creation, these POs do not make claims or check those who are in power.

3.1.3 People Power Revolution

Although mass movements and independent organizations were suppressed during the Marcos dictatorship, both the ND and SD movements persisted in their organizing efforts and continued to mobilize popular resistance against authoritarian rule. For the ND, this meant waging armed struggle. The armed struggle was carried out by the Communist Party of the Philippines’ New People’s Army. At the same time, several above-ground organizations were also formed to wage ‘political struggle’ in the cities and peri-urban areas. These ‘legal’ organizations were later united under the umbrella group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN, New Patriotic Movement), which was established in 1985.

For their part, the SDs also tried to broaden and consolidate their forces with the formation of broader networks and coalitions, such as Filipino Social Democratic Movement (FDSM) and Bansang Naikaisa sa Diwa at Layumin (BANDILA, Nation United in Thought and Action) in 1985. Through their grassroots organizing, tireless information campaigns, and alliance-building, the ND and SD movements were able to slowly weaken the dictatorship’s hold on power. Such open defiance would eventually culminate in the People Power Revolution of February 1986, which led to the overthrow of the Marcos regime.

3.2 ‘Champions’ in the State

While civil society has generally been open to engagements with the state, the nature and extent of their relationship is largely dependent on the orientation of these CSOs, as well as the attitude of the incumbent president (Quimpo 2008).

The presidency of Fidel Ramos, for example, was marked by a relatively high degree of openness towards civil society participation. This eventually culminated in the crafting of the Social Reform Agenda, which had significant input from various CSOs. In short, the document contained a host of measures intended to empower marginalized groups and ensure greater citizen participation in decision-making.

The relationship, however, turned sour when Ramos’ successor, Joseph Estrada, was implicated in numerous corruption scandals, which led to his impeachment. Civil society groups organized massive demonstrations in Manila, demanding the members of the Senate (which was convened as an impeachment court) to convict Estrada. The Senate, however, was not able to complete the trial after the prosecution walked out in protest against the alleged manipulation of the president’s allies. This triggered a wave of anger in the streets, leading to Estrada’s ousting in January 2001 in an event now known in the Philippines as ‘People Power II.’

This incident marked a turning point in civil society’s approach to anti-corruption. Instead of solely relying on protest politics and various forms of agitation, a growing number of CSOs began to engage the government in earnest to fight corruption. This meant a shift in perspective from a stance wherein civil society takes on the role of political opposition, to one that involves partnership, collaboration, and constructive engagement with the state. It was during this time that the Philippine government adopted an anti-corruption strategy, alongside an anti-corruption program launched by the World Bank.

3.3 Emergence of social accountability

Coincidentally, it was also in 2001 that CSOs began to adopt social accountability as one of the strategies they employ in their respective reform work. Social accountability, as it was adopted at this time, generally employed constructive engagements between state reformists and civil society actors in the effort to improve government performance. This wave of initiatives, most of which no longer exist, focused on procurement monitoring, contract implementation, and service delivery. Because of the technical knowledge needed for such work, CSOs had to devote their efforts to mobilizing and training ordinary citizens in a variety of social accountability (SAcc) initiatives (ANSA-EAP 2012). Among the networks and coalitions for transparency and accountability formed during this decade...
were the Transparency and Accountability Network and the business-church-CSO Coalition Against Corruption.

While social accountability efforts yielded a number of positive results during the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, these were mostly scattered and sporadic cases with no assurance of expansion and sustainability. This was aggravated by the political crisis that overtook the Arroyo administration in 2005, when the President was accused of massive vote fraud. As public anger poured onto the streets, the administration began to impose repressive measures that threatened basic civil liberties.

Eventually, Arroyo’s husband was also implicated in numerous corruption scandals, which practically nullified the small gains that were achieved through social accountability. Worse, the Philippines experienced the worst democratic rollback since the Marcos dictatorship, which affected the prospects for citizens’ participation.

3.4 Participatory governance as a centerpiece platform

State–civil society relations only began to improve when Benigno Aquino III took over the presidency in 2010. With the slogan ‘Daang Matuwid’ (Straight Path), Aquino quickly invited prominent CSO leaders to join his Cabinet. This move opened up the state to citizens’ engagement like never before. Civil society stalwarts who were appointed to key government positions soon undertook various efforts to promote participatory governance in their respective departments.

Overall, anti-corruption and good governance became the Aquino administration’s top-most priorities, thereby putting considerable efforts into enhancing transparency, providing greater access to information, and expanding various platforms for civil society participation. All of these were apparent in the budget process, with information now easily available to ordinary citizens and CSOs that wanted to engage and participate in the budget process.

Another important reform initiative was the Seal of Good Housekeeping (SGH) that was implemented a year after the Aquino administration assumed power. A brainchild of the late Interior Secretary Jesse Robredo, the SGH was an incentive program that encouraged local government units (LGUs) to make key documents and information transparent and accessible to the public. Its implementation was an important touchstone in local politics since most LGUs have been under the control of political families who see no need for transparency and accountability. Through this program, LGUs were not only encouraged to become more transparent, but it also laid the groundwork for the active engagement of citizens in local governance.

In addition thereto, the Aquino government pursued efforts to exact accountability from the Arroyo administration. The first to fall was Merceditas Gutierrez, who resigned as Ombudsman on 29 April 2011, after she was impeached by the House of Representatives on 22 March 2011. Rumored to be a close friend of the Arroyo family, Gutierrez was accused of mishandling the cases against the former president and her family.

A year later, Renato Corona was also removed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after a four-month impeachment trial conducted by the Philippine Senate. Corona’s conviction stemmed from his failure to publicly disclose his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN) as required by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In both of these cases, administration efforts were complemented by civil society efforts to end corruption and remove Arroyo’s remaining allies.

Complaints were also filed against three senators for their alleged misuse of pork barrel funds, i.e., the discretionary funds to be spent for priority development projects identified by legislators. On average, each senator is given an annual allocation of 200 million Philippine Pesos (PHP) (US$4.5 million), while their counterparts in the Lower House receive PHP70 million each (US$1.56 million).

According to the Commission on Audit’s August 2013 special audit report (COA 2013), the three senators, along with several other legislators, misused their pork barrel funds by diverting the monies to fake foundations set up by businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles. Estimates reveal that the government lost PHP10 billion that were supposed to be used to assist small farmers. Unsurprisingly, the public was enraged when news of the scandal broke out. This eventually ignited the peaceful protest action in August 2013 called the #MillionPeopleMarch, which was the biggest gathering of anti-corruption forces organized since Aquino took power.

However, despite the reform measures implemented by the Aquino administration, it still had its fair share of shortcomings and criticisms. One glaring example was its seeming reluctance to pass the hugely popular Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill. Despite its strong anti-corruption
stance, the administration’s leadership in shepherding the bill was palpably absent, which led to its legislative demise. This setback was a crushing disappointment for civil society groups, such as the Right to Know Right Now Coalition (RKRN), which had been lobbying for the passage of the FOI Bill for years.

It remains uncertain how civil society will fare under the presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. While some civil society groups welcome this change of administration, others are more cautious and would rather wait for events to unfold before they make any bold move.

But, regardless of how civil society will engage the government in the next six years, it will have to put its vast experience to good use if it is to gain more reforms and successfully maneuver in the shifting landscape of Philippine politics.

3.5 How does vertical integration fit in?

Recent historical trends have made it compelling and conducive for civil society to integrate their campaigns in order to better address pressing societal concerns. Because the Philippines is “usually described as a strong civil society type” (Ferrer 1997: 1), it is highly probable that an advanced strategy, such as vertical integration, can be employed in the country even if the exact language is not yet widely used. Recent historical trends have made it compelling and conducive for civil society to integrate their campaigns in order to better address pressing societal concerns. We have identified three historical trends that are now enabling civil society to employ facets of vertical integration.

The first trend is the history of state–civil society interaction in the Philippines, wherein a vibrant civil society is forced to confront a weak Filipino state that is less than able to enforce its own rules and deliver basic public services. As Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez point out, “the elite-dominated and inefficient state did not necessarily go away” with the fall of the Marcos regime, even as the new dispensation “opened up new avenues through which civil society can make an impact directly on how the state governs and what program of governance it will adopt” (1997: 1).

The second trend is an offshoot of the first. It pertains to the decentralization process that began shortly after the People Power Revolution of 1986. For instance, a few months after coming to power, Corazon Aquino’s new administration issued a document entitled, “The Policy Agenda for People Oriented Development,” which pledged to reorganize the government based on the principle of decentralization (Atienza 2006: 425).

Then, by 1987, a new constitution was ratified, which contained a provision mandating the State to “ensure the autonomy of local governments” (Article I; Section 25). Article X further reinforced local autonomy by: (1) granting local government units the power to create their own sources of revenue, as well as levy taxes, fees and charges; (2) providing local governments with a just share of the national taxes, which are then automatically released to them; and (3) entitling LGUs to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas (Atienza 2006: 425).

These powers were further institutionalized through Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the Local Government Code. Enacted in 1991, the Code shortly became a “landmark piece of legislation governing the conduct of LGUs, their relations with each other, and with the national government” (Ocampo-Salvador 1999: 133).

Described by Filipino scholar Maria Ela Atienza as “revolutionary or radical in character,” the Code has four features “that set it apart from previous decentralization attempts in the country” (2006: 427). First, this measure transfers the delivery of certain basic services (such as health, agriculture, and public works) to local governments. Second, local governments are granted certain regulatory and licensing powers (such as the reclassification of agricultural lands, the enforcement of environmental laws, the operation of tricycles, and the implementation of the National Building Code, among others). Third, the Code broadens the taxing powers of local governments in order to increase their financial resources. Lastly, the Code provides a “policy framework for the direct involvement of civil society in local governance” (Ibid.: 427).

It is this aspect of the Local Government Code that paves the way for the third major trend in recent Philippine history: increasing civil society participation in governance. In the Local Government Code alone, several mechanisms have been introduced to ensure direct civil society involvement. This is done by:

- Allocating a specific number of seats for CSO representatives in local special bodies such as the local development council, the local health board and the local school board;
- Providing sectoral representation in the local legislative councils to represent women, workers and other sectors as determined by the council;
- Ensuring civil society involvement in local planning and in the implementation of local development programs; and
- Encouraging CSO participation in various political exercises, such as plebiscites, referendum and recall.

These mechanisms were put in place because the Code sees civil society as “active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy” (Section 34). In fact, the law even instructs all local government units to “provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such people's and non-governmental organizations for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction” (Section 36). Such provisions of the Local Government Code are based on the 1987 Constitution, which mandates the State to encourage the self-organizing activities of CSOs (Article II, Section 23). The same document further stipulates that “the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged,” adding that, “the State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms” (Article XIII, Section 16).

Maximizing the hard-won democratic space that was created after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, civil society began to view the government no longer “with antagonism tempered with fear and suspicion” (INCITEGov 2008: 23), but as “a strategic arena for engagement” (ibid.: 25). For this reason, several CSOs began forging “partnership agreements with the government that ranged from government-initiated partnerships, funder-initiated programs, and NGO-managed projects” (ibid.: 24). By the 1990s, “good governance” had become a buzzword in the Philippines. Before long, both the government and civil society were promoting the three core good governance principles of transparency, accountability, and citizens’ participation. In the decade that followed, a number of CSOs began using the concept of social accountability in anti-corruption efforts.

It was at that time that the country began to witness the crossover phenomenon, with civil society leaders joining government in massive numbers “to pursue the reforms that they have been advocating or prototyping for a long time” (Juliano-Soliman 2008: 9). This phenomenon was first recorded during the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

Tapped for both their leadership and technical skills, “NGO personalities were asked to assume the role of Cabinet members ... and play central roles in governance” (INCITEGov 2008: 28).

However, while the large number of CSOs engaging with the government became the hallmark of the post-Marcos period, not all of these efforts were vertically integrated. In fact, only a few civil society groups from the more mainstream social accountability tradition used vertical integration, though there was an explosion of SAcc initiatives in the Philippines that began in the early 2000s.

Intended to prevent government corruption, most of these efforts took the form of citizens' monitoring that cover various aspects of governance. This includes textbook delivery (Textbook Count), school buildings (Bayanihang Eskwela), medicine procurement (Medicine Monitoring Project), road construction (Bantay Lansangan), pork barrel projects (PDAF Watch), state appointments (Appointments Watch), campaign finance (Pera’t Pulitika), revenue generation (Bantay Kita), school performance (checkmyschool), general bidding processes, and even politicians’ lifestyles (Lifestyle Check).

However, with the exception of Textbook Count and Bantay Lansangan, most SAcc initiatives were hardly nationwide in scope. A large number of these efforts were engaged in ground- or local-level monitoring, coupled with engagements with policy-makers/government decision-makers at the top. As such, most national-level advocacies gave little attention to legislative/policy reforms, and were largely concerned with ensuring government response to their monitoring findings and seeking improvements in implementation.

One of the initiatives with a policy advocacy component is the RKRN coalition, a broad civil society network that is pushing for the passage of the FOI Bill. Its membership is nationwide in scope, and is composed of groups involved in transparency and accountability, as well as basic sectoral formations. Its engagements, however, have largely focused on lobbying and policy advocacy at the national level. Although the coalition has undertaken a number of local activities in the past, these are sporadic in character and are not part of its overall campaign strategy.

Some of the most vertically integrated campaigns have been initiated by progressive social movements. In fact, it was the more radical progressives that mostly organized the major efforts on agrarian reform, anti-mining, indigenous peoples’ rights, and reproductive health. Combining grassroots
organizing with national-level advocacy and coalition work, these organizations were able to effectively engage the various levels of the state, using protest action, lobbying and hard-nosed negotiations.

While a number of initiatives employ vertical integration, the groups that are involved in these campaigns do not use the term ‘vertical integration.’ However, there are a few exceptions, such as the Alternative Law Group, a member-organization of Alyansa Tigil Mina that openly uses vertical integration as part of its strategy. The RIGHTS/Katarungan Network also claims to use vertical integration, coupled with horizontal integration referring to the extent and spread of the mass base of the peasant organizations and their allies to advance land reform.

There are also vertically integrated campaigns that can be described as hybrid initiatives, which are progressive social movements that use social accountability techniques to pursue their agenda. This is apparent in housing and disaster risk reduction and management campaigns, which combine protest politics with performance monitoring.

Therefore, vertical integration has been adopted by some civil society groups in the Philippines. The following sections will discuss in detail how this framework was adopted in specific citizen-led campaigns.

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Case studies

4.1 Mobilizing citizens for transparency and accountability in education through Textbook Count

Joy Aceron

In 2000, a group of fresh graduates were fielded to monitor the delivery of textbooks to schools in the Philippines. The project was part of Government Watch (G-Watch), an initiative under the Philippine Governance Forum (PGF) that was established by the Ateneo School of Government, Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs (ACSPPA), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Largely experimental, the monitoring simply compared the textbooks delivered to public schools with the official records. The initiative found that:

- 40% of the textbooks reported as delivered in official records were missing.
- Suppliers delivered books seemingly at random; anytime, anywhere.
- Recipients were not notified about the deliveries.
- There were no feedback mechanisms to confirm that the schools actually received the books.
• Documentation reports were not properly filled out.
• There were no effective sanctions for late deliveries (G-Watch Presentation on Textbook Count, undated).

The objective of the project was simple: ensuring that the right quantity and physical quality of textbooks reached public school students at the right time and through the proper processes. Textbook Count was the starting point of social accountability initiatives in the Philippines.

G-Watch presented these findings to the Department of Education (DepEd). Through the initiative of then Undersecretary Juan Miguel Luz, DepEd decided to collaborate with G-Watch in the Textbook Count monitoring project. With support from donors including UNDP, The Asia Foundation, and the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF), G-Watch coordinated CSO participation in Textbook Count for four rounds between 2002 and 2007. DepEd covered other direct expenses, particularly those involving DepEd officials and staff.

The objective of the project was simple: ensuring that the right quantity and physical quality of textbooks reached public school students at the right time and through the proper processes. Textbook Count was the starting point of social accountability initiatives in the Philippines. A crucial characteristic of the initiative was that CSOs conducted the monitoring.

A series of articles and reports have presented Textbook Count as a “success story,” and attributed its accomplishments to champions or leadership in DepEd, the presence of civil society monitors, and the engagement between state and non-state actors (Leung 2005; Majeed 2006; Arugay 2012, Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 2013). While these factors are critical, the explanations remain rather broad and general. Little attention has been given to the specific strategies behind Textbook Count’s achievements.

This case study will revisit the processes, mechanisms, actors and activities, at various stages and levels, which made it possible for the initiative to cover all the vulnerabilities to corruption and inefficiency of DepEd’s Textbook Delivery Program. Unpacking the campaign’s components is also useful for determining the nature and causes of the program’s achievements and limitations in order to inform more strategic, coordinated, and deliberate interventions in the future.

This review will try to capture the key components that enabled the initiative’s success by using the notion of vertical integration discussed in the previous section (see also Fox 2001, 2014). This exercise will allow us to identify how reaching across levels of government to expose vulnerabilities contributed to fulfilling the aims of the initiative, while also providing an empirical example of how vertical integration works in practice. It highlights how CSO capacity to take action at multiple levels potentially helps accountability initiatives to overcome challenges and constraints encountered at specific levels.

The analysis highlights a stark contrast between the period in which G-Watch coordinated CSO participation (2002-2007) and later rounds of Textbook Count (2008-2013) related to changes in civil society engagement in the monitoring. Thus, this study concludes with a re-assessment of the success attributed to Textbook Count. The consequences of shifts in CSO participation in DepEd’s textbook delivery monitoring have made it difficult to ascertain whether the initial gains have actually been sustained.

4.1.1 The emergence of social accountability in the Philippines: The G-Watch approach

In 1999, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) reported that 65% of textbook funds were lost to corruption involving suppliers and officials from what was then called the Department of Education, Culture and Sport (DECS) (Chua 1999). According to the Social Weather Stations’ (SWS) corruption perception survey, the public saw DECS as one of the most corrupt agencies in the country (SWS National Survey 1999-2000, in World Bank 2001).

The public attention to corruption during this period was heightened further by the scandals that led to the ousting of former President Joseph Estrada in January 2001. These scandals and the related public mobilizations pushed government and civil society actors to pay closer attention to corruption in the Philippines. In 2000, the World Bank released “Combating Corruption in the Philippines,” which included the outline for an anti-corruption strategy (2000). The Philippine government made the fight against corruption a higher priority, and presented its first National Anti-Corruption Plan early the same year.

While anti-corruption advocacy was always a concern of civil society and social movements in the country (as in the demonstrations that
G-Watch embraced a preventive approach to anti-corruption through citizen monitoring. Real-time monitoring enables the detection of non-compliance with standards, corruption, or other forms of abuse of authority while the delivery of services or program implementation are still ongoing.

denounced the excesses of dictator Ferdinand Marcos, they mainly included protest actions. The tactic consisted largely of identifying government officials or agencies involved in corruption and seeking public support through media or public demonstrations to hold corrupt officials to account (Arugay 2005).

In the early 2000s, a new approach to anti-corruption began to emerge. It focused on strengthening citizen oversight. This approach is distinctive in its preventive character and in involving civil society participation. From this perspective, procurement, including contract implementation, becomes a key issue. According to a Procurement Watch report in October 2001, potential leakages from government corruption in the Philippines could reach as much as Php21 billion in 2001 alone (“Public Expenditure Management” 2009).

In this context, G-Watch embraced a preventive approach to anti-corruption through citizen monitoring. Real-time monitoring enables the detection of non-compliance with standards, corruption, or other forms of abuse of authority while the delivery of services or program implementation are still ongoing. Citizen monitoring serves as a proactive reminder to agents about what is expected from the relevant processes. Coupled with a quick feedback mechanism, this approach has proven to deter non-compliance, as well as to support enhanced compliance with standards.

G-Watch facilitates linkages with high-level management of government agencies and accountability institutions. The preventive approach also helped to keep G-Watch engagement with government collaborative, focusing on what can be done to improve the system, rather than on exposing problems publicly. This form of ‘constructive engagement’ involved working hand-in-hand with reformist allies inside the government (identified in the course of engagement itself) to strengthen accountability through active citizen participation.

Grassroots citizen-monitors rely on easy-to-use monitoring tools to observe the implementation of government policies in real time. The Textbook Count monitoring tool used checklists to document compliance with the performance standards to be monitored. These lists included the cost, quantity, quality, processing and delivery time of textbooks. These standards were specified and agreed upon with the government from the beginning.

Monitoring generates information that can be used for independent citizens’ assessments, as well as for proposing recommendations to improve the process monitored. The government agency or local government involved is given ample time to respond to the findings of the monitors, and to correct the flaws identified, before the results are presented to other stakeholders, including the media.

Textbook Count’s constructive approach included the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the government at the beginning of implementation. In G-Watch’s experience, this facilitates the government’s buy-in in the initiative for the MOA had set the parameters of engagement, and clarified the roles and responsibilities of both the government and the CSO participants. This approach assumes that the government and civil society can find shared goals in support of joint initiatives that maximize their respective strengths without compromising their respective mandates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DepEd Processes</th>
<th>CSO Activity</th>
<th>CSOs Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • DepEd, through its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), conducted pre-procurement, and the opening and awarding of bids | • Ensure the transparency of pre-bid conference  
  • Sign the abstract of bid when it is opened  
  • Ensure the transparency of the bid selection process  
  • Observe the conduct of content evaluation | G-Watch and Manila-based CSOs, including NAMFREL, Boy Scouts of the Philippines, Headquarters (BSP-HQ), Girl Scouts of the Philippines, Headquarters (GSP-HQ) and Procurement Watch |
| • DepEd, through the Quality Inspection Team, visits the selected suppliers to inspect the physical quality of textbooks to ensure that they meet contract specifications  
  • Inspection results forwarded to suppliers for corrections | • Inspect quantity and quality of textbooks, and ensure that they meet contract specifications  
  • May recommend the rejection of books that do not meet quality standards | G-Watch and Manila-based CSOs, including NAMFREL, BSP-HQ, GSP-HQ and Procurement Watch |

**Pre-Delivery**
- Allocation list is sent to division offices, which in turn forward it to high schools and district offices

**Actual Delivery**
- Suppliers’ forwarders deliver textbooks to district offices (for elementary school textbooks) and to high schools (for high school textbooks)
- District offices and high schools inspect and accept deliveries
- DepEd’s authorized receiving personnel sign the Inspection and Acceptance Receipts (IARs)
- The four copies of the signed IARs are given to: (1) division office, (2) supplier, (3) district office/High School, (4) third-party monitor
- Help in counting and inspecting the books, so that the right quantity and quality are delivered on time
- Record notable incidents and observations in the IARs, which are submitted to DepEd
- Sign the IARs’ third party monitor section.

**Post-Delivery**
- The division office validates deliveries in district offices/high schools where IARs were not signed by a third-party monitor
- The Division Office prepares the Certificate of Final Acceptance and submits it to DepEd’s central office
- DepEd’s central office prepares payment to the suppliers
- Help in counting and inspecting the books, so that the right quantity and quality are delivered on time
- Record notable incidents and observations in the IARs, which are submitted to DepEd
- Sign the IARs’ third party monitor section.

Mainly undertaken by school-based GSP and BSP, NAMFREL volunteers, and other local CSOs in a few areas


4.1.2 The organization of Textbook Count

Textbook Count was intended to cover the entirety of DepEd's textbook delivery program from procurement to distribution. Table 1 describes the stages and components of the initiative, indicating the different roles played by the DepEd and by CSOs at each stage.

During its four rounds of national implementation, Textbook Count ranged between 68% and 85% of the 4,800 to 7,656 delivery points (depending on the particular year), corresponding to DepEd district offices and public high schools. The areas with least presence of CSOs were those in the Mindanao divisions. According to DepEd's Instructional Materials Council Secretariat (IMCS), the areas not covered are likely marginal zones (uplands) and conflict-stricken areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CSO Coordinator</th>
<th>CSO Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Count 1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>G-Watch</td>
<td>68% of 5,613 delivery points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Count 2</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>G-Watch</td>
<td>85% of 7,656 delivery points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Count 3</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>G-Watch</td>
<td>77% of 4,844 delivery points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textbook Count 4</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>G-Watch</td>
<td>70% of 4,844 delivery points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepEd Textbook Delivery Program</td>
<td>2008-2009</td>
<td>DepEd</td>
<td>85% of 1,875-4,105 delivery points (average reported coverage of different textbooks)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepEd Textbook Delivery Program</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>DepEd</td>
<td>71% of 4,375-5,491 (average reported coverage of different textbooks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DepEd Textbook Delivery Program</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>DepEd</td>
<td>Data remains undisclosed/unconsolidated as of writing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1.3 CSO coordination of Textbook Count 2003-2007

G-Watch performed the role of CSO coordinator in Textbook Count from its inception in 2003 to 2007, when the task was turned over to the government (see below). The following discussion details the processes, activities and actors involved in Textbook Count rounds 1 to 4 (2003-2007), from the national level down to the school level. Then, it reviews the changes in CSO participation in DepEd's Textbook Delivery Program after G-Watch left the initiative.

1. Communication & Coordination Lines

As Figure 3 shows, between 2002 and 2007, Textbook Count employed both horizontal and vertical lines of communication and reporting. Actors at the national level (G-Watch, national CSOs and DepEd) coordinated with each other to undertake activities at the central office level in Manila. This national level coalition carried out the overall coordination of Textbook Count.

This multi-sectoral model of coordination was to be replicated at the regional, division and school levels among the organizations' local counterparts. G-Watch referred to this arrangement as the horizontal line of coordination, where responsible actors (persons, units, or groups) at the same level interacted with each other to fulfill their respective parts in Textbook Count. The degree of actual replication varied across the country, depending on the direct facilitation provided by G-Watch and on the leadership on the ground.
At the school level, where the actual counting of the textbooks had taken place, the different actors had to coordinate in order to accomplish the tasks related to receiving and accounting for the textbooks delivered. The vertical lines in Figure 3 indicate coordination within each organization. These were the channels employed for the transmission of information and monitoring findings.

2. Monitoring the Procurement, Production and Delivery of Textbooks

At the national level, CSO engagement in Textbook Count included attending DepEd’s bidding processes as procurement observers. The Government Procurement Reform Act of 2003 (GPRA, Republic Act No. 9184) requires all government agencies to invite observers from non-governmental organizations and private professional organizations to their bidding activities. DepEd procurement remains centralized, with textbooks and other large acquisition processes handled by their national office. The regional and division offices, however, started to conduct their own procurements as early as 2010.

As part of the initiative’s activities, CSOs also conducted inspections of the quality of production in the publishers’ warehouses to identify and prevent errors in the printing and binding of textbooks. According to G-Watch reports, the inspections contributed significantly in improving the physical quality of the textbooks delivered to students.

Once the textbooks were produced and their quality validated, the national CSO participants transmitted through the vertical channels of communication the information about the quantities to be shipped per delivery point and the delivery schedule. DepEd provided the information to G-Watch. G-Watch then transmitted it to the participating CSOs through its national civil society partners. The participants with larger networks were NAMFREL in Textbook Count 1, Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP), and Girl Scouts of the Philippines (GSP) in the succeeding rounds. DepEd sent the same information through its own communication channels.

Using CSO partners’ networks for monitoring in the field

In 2003, when Textbook Count 1 was launched, 37 million textbooks and teachers’ manuals for elementary and high school had to be brought to approximately 5,500 deliver points across the country. In fulfilling this challenging task, DepEd was assisted by civil society partners, such as NAMFREL. Established in 1983, NAMFREL has more than 500,000 volunteers in 103 chapters, and has a presence in all of the country’s 80 provinces. Given that the CSO monitored elections and teachers served as members of the Board of Election Inspectors in polling precincts, “Namfrel volunteers had working relationships with teachers or officials in most schools” (Majeed 2011).

The next year both the GSP and the BSP joined Textbook Count, and took on the challenge of monitoring the delivery of more than 14 million textbooks.
Redempto Parafina, former coordinator of G-Watch, who took the lead in the coordination of Textbook Count, invited the BSP and the GSP to join the initiative. The initiative took advantage of the scouts’ practice of voluntary service. Monitoring provided an excellent opportunity for scouts to earn their badges (Yasser Sarona, Program and Adult Resources Executive of BSP, pers. comm.).

Monitoring the delivery of textbooks
DepEd divided the country in four zones (north of Manila, south of Manila, Visayas and Mindanao) and had a schedule for every province within each zone. Publishers were instructed to deliver the textbooks within three-day windows in cities and three- to five-day windows in the provinces. Also, “they could not deliver before or after the dates assigned to a province or city within a zone” (Majeed 2011). Failure to deliver on schedule could cause DepEd to withhold payment.

Meanwhile, CSOs coordinated with suppliers and waited for the deliveries. They submitted their volunteers’ names and contact information to G-Watch. G-Watch forwarded these details to the suppliers to facilitate the process. In addition, the volunteers were given background materials and identifications, as well as information on the quantity of each textbook allocated to each school. In this way, “volunteers who help count the books [could] check the actual quantity delivered against this information” (Parafina n.d.).

The Inspection and Acceptance Receipts (IAR) had a space to be signed by school-level civil society monitors. The signature served as proof that the books had actually been delivered to the intended recipients. The number of signed IARs indicated the level of CSO coverage. If the IAR of the school was signed by a CSO during the delivery of textbooks, DepEd would no longer undertake post-delivery validation, which implied savings for the government.

After inspection at the school-level, both DepEd and the CSO monitors kept a copy of the IAR, which they submitted to their respective offices at the division or district levels (suppliers also kept a copy). The two sets of reports were consolidated at the national level by G-Watch and DepEd-IMCS. The parallel reporting system provided independent verification of the official results but also an additional incentive for the government reports to be accurate.

Joint problem-solving through government-CSO collaboration at the national level
To collaboratively address problems identified in the field, a sharing session was conducted at the national level where reports by DepEd and the CSOs (consolidated by both G-Watch and DepEd IMCS) were presented. There, DepEd and CSO representatives from all levels of Textbook Count shared experiences, identified problems, and proposed recommendations.

Following the initial information sharing session, Textbook Count’s problem-solving session was attended by key decision-makers from DepEd, such as the Secretary of Education and relevant Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries and directors. These sessions served as the space where problems were discussed and solutions were explored. Participants expected decision-makers to provide concrete actions and responses to monitoring findings.

Joint problem-solving between government and CSOs was central to the effectiveness of Textbook Count. The initiative itself was the product of a collaborative meeting in which G-Watch presented the 2002 study findings to DepEd officials. Critical decisions from the problem-solving sessions included: partnering with the private sector, a supplemental activity later called Textbook Walk, and a new government budget allocation (Php 1.50 per textbook) to address the problem of onward distribution of textbooks from district offices to schools (see below). Other issues in textbook delivery, such as delays in procurement, were also addressed in the sessions. The resolutions were incorporated in succeeding rounds.

Dissemination of results
Each Textbook Count cycle ended with a public event to showcase the results in Manila. There were at least four public presentations with around between 40 to 60 participants. Key CSOs, international development partners, government agencies involved in education, anti-corruption and good governance, and the media were invited to these events.

Dissemination events in which G-Watch and DepED presented the results of each Textbook Count cycle to the public were held one to three months after the joint sessions. This is to give the government enough time to respond to the recommendations. The G-Watch methodology and approach were discussed, including the process of closed-door problem-solving sessions, and the period given to the government to respond. Monitoring findings and DepEd’s responses and actions, as well
as the recommendations that had yet to be addressed by the government, were discussed. These public presentations served as an incentive for government officials to be responsive to the monitoring results. No information about the findings was disclosed until the public presentation. However, there was no systematic process in place to give further follow-up to the pending recommendations.

G-Watch handled media engagement very carefully throughout the initiative. During monitoring, participating CSOs were advised to refrain from engaging journalists. The media was provided information about each round of monitoring only after the complete cycle from planning to evaluation had been concluded, with DepEd’s response already incorporated into the report.

3. Monitoring at the Subnational and Local Levels: Building Capacity and Community Awareness

The intermediate level of Textbook Count included the transmission of information from the central office to the schools, the consolidation of the reports from the schools, and the transference of them to the central office.

The briefing-orientation that took place at the division level covered the following topics:

- The Textbook Policy of DepEd and its policy of CSO engagement;
- The amount, quantity and titles of textbooks procured and to be delivered;
- The schedule of delivery;
- The coordination and reporting system;
- The roles and responsibilities of all actors and stakeholders.

DepEd’s officials and CSOs at the intermediate level transmitted the information to the schools through their local counterparts assigned for Textbook Count. From DepEd, supply officers and/or principals accompanied the monitors as authorized receiving personnel at the school-level. From civil society, BSP’s and GSP’s school coordinators (frequently teachers), Parents-Teachers-Community Association (PTCA) authorities and local CSOs were usually in charge of the monitoring.

Textbook Count monitoring revealed that the final leg of distribution, i.e., from districts to schools, was a serious bottleneck. The suppliers were only responsible for delivering elementary textbooks to the district offices. In most cases, the textbooks were left in warehouses at DepEd’s district offices as they did not have the resources to pay the costs of distributing the textbooks to the schools, especially to schools in remote locations. This cost was supposed to be included in DepEd’s district budget, but the deliveries had to compete with other priorities (in a context in which the most remote schools had the least clout with district authorities). Early rounds of Textbook Count reported that 21% of the textbooks delivered to poor districts did not reach their intended elementary schools due to bad roads and lack of funds to transport the books (Government Watch report on Textbook Count 3).

In response to this situation, G-Watch and DepEd partnered with the Coca-Cola Bottling Company during Textbook Count 3 (2005) in order to extend the project’s efforts to distribute the textbooks from the district to the elementary schools. With its large fleet of delivery trucks, the company transported textbooks to every corner of the country, including schools located in very remote villages.

Textbook Count 4 (2006-2007) took additional steps to address the problem of undistributed textbooks, launching a program called Textbook Walk. This initiative mobilized community and school stakeholders to collaborate in the distribution of textbooks from district offices to elementary schools. In the face of resource constraints, a “bayanihan” (a Philippine tradition in which the community cooperates to support those in need) was staged to encourage local stakeholders to help deliver the books. Textbook Walk was also an opportunity to raise awareness on education issues and anti-corruption. Thus, its activities were designed to be festive and lively, and to involve the entire community. Schools organized different activities to catch people’s attention. Some organized an actual walk carrying the books to their schools, while others created chains of people that passed the textbooks down, transported them in farmers’ carts pulled by a carabao (water buffalo), or organized events open to everybody in public squares.
4.1.4 Reviewing Textbook Count results through 2007

Textbook Count has been widely recognized as a highly successful initiative. With modest international funding, it was able to organize a national initiative that was the first of its kind in the Philippines. The campaign contributed to reducing the unit price of textbooks from between Php80 and Php120 in 1999, to between Php30 and Php45 in 2006-2007. It also helped improve the physical quality of textbooks and shortened the procurement cycle from 24 months to an average of 12 months. Further, the initiative generated substantive savings in government resources by preventing corruption and leakages. The estimated savings from Textbook Count 4 in 2007 were Php151 million or around USD $3.6 million (Van der Linden 2008). Comparing the savings with the cost of Textbook Count’s CSO operations in that year (US$66,000: $22,555 from a PTF grant and $43,180 as a mostly in-kind counterpart contribution), the benefits of Textbook Count far outweigh the costs. A separate study concluded that “for every peso spent in monitoring, civil society monitors guaranteed that Php3.99 was not wasted” (Gregorio 2006).

The public perception of DepEd also improved, shifting from being considered as one of the most corrupt government agencies before 2000 to one of the least corrupt ones in 2009. Textbook Count was introduced during this period, along with other reforms to open up the procurement process through the passage of the Government Procurement Reform Act of 2003.

4.1.5 The changed governance context after Textbook Count (2007-2011)

In 2007, there was an informal handover of CSO coordination for textbook delivery monitoring from G-Watch to DepEd. At the time, there were pressures to make Textbook Count self-sustaining. After over five years of supporting Textbook Count, international donors decided that they would no longer provide funding for the initiative. Meanwhile, G-Watch also decided that it could not continue as the CSO coordinator for Textbook Count forever because the organization also had requests to monitor other services and programs.
When G-Watch concluded its participation, there was no structured process for transitioning to a new CSO coordination mechanism. Although the question of sustainability was raised in problem-solving sessions in 2006, no comprehensive approach was agreed upon by all stakeholders. The departure of Undersecretary Luz in 2005, who had championed the Textbook Count initiative, is one explanation for this. High-level support continued through 2007, but it lacked the leadership he had provided previously.

After Textbook Count 4, it became unclear as to how CSO participation would be coordinated in the National Textbook Delivery Program. The extent of civil society participation also declined. DepEd continued to invite G-Watch and some of the other Manila-based CSOs to the bidding for textbook contracts, as well as to warehouse inspections. The extent of this collaboration is hard to establish, but several sources, including those interviewed for this study, suggest that the participation of CSOs in overseeing government procurement has declined in DepEd and more generally.

G-Watch maintained its engagement with DepEd between 2007 and 2013, with sporadic participation in textbook delivery monitoring, as well as in other projects that covered critical services and addressed strategic challenges to sustaining CSO monitoring. Some initiatives included Local Hubs aimed at increasing civil society capacity at the subnational level in response to the gaps identified in Textbook Count processes. These capacity-building activities included local problem-solving sessions and decentralized facilitation of school-level monitoring. Other initiatives included the Protect Procurement Project (PRO) aimed at institutionalizing capacity-building programs for civil society on procurement monitoring, and the expansion of Bayanhinang Eskwela (Heroism in Schools) initiative that supported community-based monitoring of school-based projects.

In retrospect, it seems that the changing political climate of 2006-2007 explains why the role of G-Watch shifted from coordinating an independent and nationwide monitoring program to merely being a participant in sporadic, small-scale social accountability initiatives. During this period, the government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was confronting a crisis because of accusations of electoral fraud and large scale corruption. The opposition led several impeachment complaints in Congress. CSOs and social movements were staging almost daily demonstrations and campaigns, calling for the President’s resignation. Allegations against her family were the central topic of media coverage, taking the headlines of major newspapers and news programs.

In July 2005, a group of reform champions in the Cabinet, later known as the “Hyatt 10,” left the administration, and called for Arroyo’s resignation due to what they called its “politics of survival.” The complex political situation put the survival of government reforms in jeopardy (PCIJ 2005). In DepEd, the casualty of the political upheaval was Undersecretary Luz (PCIJ 2006), who was close to the Hyatt 10. In that context, a large anti-corruption drive like Textbook Count may not have been credible or even feasible. Most initiatives undertaken during this period were pockets of independent social accountability, done quietly and in alliance with middle managers who had worked with civil society in the past.

Meanwhile, DepEd reported that the Textbook Count process continued. However, it was the government that controlled both the recruitment of CSO monitors and the consolidation of the school-level reports. Between 2008 and 2010, using only government data, CSOs continued to cover between 70% and 85% of textbook delivery points. Only a small number of areas covered by subsequent G-Watch’s projects like Local Hubs and Bayanhinang Eskwela, and to some degree the schools covered by other education monitoring initiatives like Check My School, had independent sources of information to validate DepEd reports.

DepEd officials acknowledged the problem of the lack of validation. In an interview, Benjie Caburnay of IMCS, who had been involved in Textbook Count when it was still coordinated by G-Watch, remarked:

> The CSO box in the IAR can be signed by a CSO representative or a barangay official [village leader]. When we were checking the IAR, the box for CSOs for some IARs was signed. However, the organizational affiliation was not indicated. We do not know who signed it. We do not know the affiliation of the one who signed it – if it’s CSO or barangay. Sometimes, we only see a signature without any name (B. Caburnay, pers. comm.)

Under these conditions, after 2008, there was no longer any guarantee of independent oversight in Textbook Count. Unlike the rounds in which G-Watch coordinated CSO participation, there was no orientation for CSOs. The CSOs did not receive independent information about the details of the delivery representatives. Furthermore, there was no evidence that...
they were properly informed about what to check before signing. Currently, there are no available means to verify DepEd figures on CSO coverage, as CSOs copies of the IARs are not consolidated.

Similarly, there was no independent means to validate the average unit cost of textbooks. In response to a G-Watch inquiry in 2011, IMCS reported that the average unit cost had generally been kept at similar rates as those of 2006-2007 (Php30 to Php45). According to the data, the average unit cost of textbook printing and delivery was Php31 to Php43 in 2008-2009 and Php35 to Php60 in 2009-2010. The increase in the average unit cost of one title (HS I-IV, Science and Technology) to Php60 in 2009-2010 would be worth examining to establish whether the rising cost is an indication of backsliding from the gains of Textbook Count. Currently, DepEd has yet to provide textbook delivery data from 2011 to the present. 40 This situation raises the issues of whether the improvements in efficiency, transparency, and accountability achieved through the initiative were lost after G-Watch had left, and of how to make them sustainable.

Textbook Count, when it was G-Watch that managed CSO coordination, was a successful example of the vertical integration of social accountability initiatives. Vertical integration can take many shapes. It has different combinations of specific practices and levels of implementation, depending on the context and goals of the initiative. Tracking this variation is very important for understanding and evaluating these experiences. The next section introduces a mapping tool designed to capture these differences and applies it to the Textbook Count case.

4.1.6 Mapping Textbook Count: Unpacking vertical integration in terms of intensity and scope

Civil society strategies to influence policy across levels of government can involve a wide array of actions. Because strategic initiatives like Textbook Count can combine multiple types of action with varying degrees of intensity and scope (geographic coverage) at each particular stage, it can be useful to map them in a systematic way.

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Applying Jonathan Fox's Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix, the two figures below show the types of action undertaken by Textbook Count between 2002 and 2007. This matrix is intended to guide the documentation and analysis of vertical integration processes. Civil society processes that “connect the dots” across both administrative levels and geographical regions are almost inherently uneven. One goal of this matrix is to make explicit the variation in the reach of these initiatives.

The tool attempts to create an accessible way to map the scale, coverage and intensity of actions. Cells that are filled-in identify the type of action and the level at which it is executed. The color of the filling indicates the intensity of civic engagement at each level, for each repertoire of action, with darker tones signifying more intense engagement. In this way, the tool not only depicts civil society's countervailing power across levels of government, it also takes into account both the variation and intensity of their actions at each level.

The tool has two components, one addressing CSO constituency-building across scale and the other addressing the interface with the state. Here, Figure 3 traces Textbook Count's efforts to build constituencies, and Figure 4 maps its engagement with the government.

Constituency-building

As indicated in Table 3, Textbook Count's work on civil society constituency-building was more intensive at the national and local levels, where it involved 47 CSOs. There was less activity at the provincial level (which, as mentioned above, would be addressed later by the Local Hubs program). This was pointed out in an assessment of G-Watch's contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of DepEd's textbook delivery, which found that Textbook Count's weakest link was at the provincial level, while its strongest monitoring capacity was at local and national levels (Van der Linden 2008).

Cross-sectoral coalition-building took place at the national level, with G-Watch linking a wide variety of organizations, including NGOs working on transparency and accountability, development NGOs, sectoral organizations, an election monitoring CSO, and scouting organizations. On the local level, the scout organizations collaborated with parent-teacher organizations, barangay officials, community-based organizations, and others. While there were sporadic networking actions at the regional level, these were mainly for specific activities implemented by G-Watch, such as briefing-orientations. In later G-Watch engagements with DepEd, the
focus has been on these regional/subnational levels in order to foster the coordination of school monitoring at that level.

G-Watch’s awareness-raising and public education work was focused at the national level through mass media coverage of its public presentations and reporting at the end of each monitoring cycle. Although some communities sought local media coverage for Textbook Walk, no monitoring findings were made public during that stage. The most intensive public education work consisted of the briefing-orientations for coordinators and monitors at the provincial level.

The Interface with the State
Textbook Count served as an indirect advocacy initiative, supporting DepEd officials who favored enhanced participation, transparency, and accountability, while providing evidence they could use to constrain corrupt officials. The joint problem-solving sessions, as well as the media coverage at the end of the monitoring cycle, also put pressure on DepEd and other relevant agencies to make them respond to issues identified throughout the initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING approaches:</th>
<th>Barangay (Village)</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>District/Province</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>International</th>
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<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/awareness-building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
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<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
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<td>Public education strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
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<td>Horizontal exchange of experiences/deliberation</td>
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<td>Participatory process to develop CSO policy alternative</td>
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<td>Strategic use of ICT for constituency-building</td>
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**Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building**

**Constituency-Building**

- **Barangay (Village)**
- **Municipality**
- **District/Province**
- **National**
- **International**

**Intensity Key:**

- **High**
- **Medium**
- **Light**
### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Interface with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – executive authorities</td>
<td>Barangay (Village)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation in “invited spaces” [shared but government-controlled]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “claimed spaces” [shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with public accountability agencies (ombudsman, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**INTENSITY KEY:**
- **HIGH**
- **MEDIUM**
- **LIGHT**

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### 4.1.7 Future perspectives and lessons learned from Textbook Count

While G-Watch coordinated Textbook Count, the vertically integrated monitoring process validated the official reports on deliveries and coordinated civil society participation. Afterwards, DepEd did not undertake these tasks. The public officials argued that keeping away from CSOs would be critical to ensure independent monitoring.

G-Watch tried to convince DepEd to find ways to address the problem of making CSO participation sustainable without donor funding. G-Watch suggested giving oversight functions to DepEd units responsible for coordinating with civil society in order to monitor program implementation. It also pointed out the need for a more substantive role of the government in enabling CSO participation (G-Watch 2014).

As the administration of President Aquino had put emphasis on good governance and citizen participation, the bureaucracy began to recognize that government agencies could and should coordinate with civil society in areas like the monitoring of public programs. DepEd’s Procurement Service is expected to eventually perform this coordination function. G-Watch was supporting DepEd to do this and was facilitating the adoption of a strategy to institutionalize a comprehensive school-based monitoring campaign coordinated and facilitated by division-level bodies (G-Watch 2014).

In order to continue improving future actions in the field of transparency, accountability, and participation, it is extremely important to learn from the experiences of initiatives like Textbook Count and civil society engagement programs like G-Watch. As shown here, in accounting for the results and gains of a given initiative, it pays to go deep into the details of civil society participation in light of the changing governance context. The Textbook Count experience offers a series of important lessons for civil society collaboration to ensure the effective implementation of specific government programs.

**Constructive engagement can facilitate opening up the government**

As an alternative advocacy method, a civil society monitoring initiative can choose constructive engagement to open up critical government processes, like procurement and performance. A non-confrontational approach can persuade government officials – who are often wary of outsiders – to work with civil society and provide access to their processes and documents.
G-Watch used a constructive engagement strategy to identify and develop potential allies within the bureaucracy. G-Watch initially scanned DepEd to identify potential champions taking into consideration the public officers’ background, and in the course of exchanges (particularly problem solving sessions and follow-through actions), they became the go-to contacts for the organization. Later on, middle managers and staff involved in the monitoring also became allies who would inform G-Watch about opportunities to deepen engagement. Once these relationships were established, they developed into alliances that could deter specific cases of corruption. For example, DepEd officials discreetly informed G-Watch about politicians’ attempts to intervene in procurement processes to favor specific bidders. Later on, the support of these reformers inside the government could be tapped to sustain long-term efforts to enhance transparency and accountability.

High-level champions are vulnerable to changes in the political context (as was the case with Undersecretary Luz), therefore, alliances with reform-oriented middle-managers have proven more sustainable. For example, alliances with reformers like the director of Procurement Service (a middle manager) continue to deliver small but concrete gains.

**Vertically integrated civil society monitoring is difficult to sustain over time**

There are several reasons why civil society coordination was not sustainable in the Textbook Count experience. First, donors were no longer willing to support the same activities after four rounds of monitoring over six years. Second, there were other demands for G-Watch’s monitoring. Finally, the political context had become unfavorable for a highly visible government-CSO collaboration.

This raises the question of how to sustain effective and independent civil society monitoring. Since G-Watch stopped coordinating CSOs, no reliable independent confirmation of official textbook delivery reports has been available. G-Watch made attempts to convince GSP and BSP to provide national-level oversight since they are self-sustaining and have the geographical reach. However, advocacy work is not part of their core mandates and competencies.

G-Watch is continuing the search for alternative ways of sustaining nationwide civil society participation in monitoring DepEd. G-Watch’s sustainability proposal relies on establishing monitoring mechanisms in all DepEd divisions. Representatives from the government and CSOs would head these mechanisms. They would consolidate monitoring results and respond to recommendations. The Local Hubs would enable effective school-based monitoring by serving as a transmission belt for information and monitoring results, and by promoting a timely government response. The strategy has not yet gained definite support from the relevant stakeholders. The question also remains of whether such a strategy would effectively ensure CSO independence and autonomy.

**The strengths and limits of vertically integrated but bounded civil society monitoring**

Textbook Count showed how a targeted and bounded social accountability initiative (one covering a specific service for a given period of time) can deliver tangible results. Before its implementation, DepEd was perceived as one of the most corrupt agencies of the government. Today, it consistently figures as one of the most trusted government agencies as captured in opinion surveys. The prices of textbooks have been kept relatively low. Moreover, DepEd used to be inaccessible to civil society. But now, it proactively seeks civil society inputs to operationalize transparency measures, as well as establishes the general direction of open government policies.

However, this case also shows the limits of the approach. While independent monitoring succeeded in ensuring that the appropriate textbooks were delivered to schools on time, the sustainability of the project remains in question.

Maintaining the initiative’s gains would seem to require the repetitive, regular, and predictable action of civil society and government actors who follow the similarly regular processes of government. This pressure for mechanical and repetitive action raises concerns about the “bureaucratization” of civil society action, which in turn, can put into question civil society’s capacity for innovation and experimentation.

**The capacity of civil society to “pivot” is critical to address systemic issues through integrated approaches**

Vertical integration underscores the importance of being strategic and using an integrated approach (a combination of actions and approaches at multiple levels) for addressing the symptomatic and underlying causes of a problem (Halloran 2014). Understanding changes in strategy over time draws attention to the relevance of political context in explaining what...
happened and how and why it happened. This facilitates the designing of appropriate responses to that particular context.

The challenges Textbook Count faced in sustaining its gains can be partly explained by its limited work in policy or in system improvement and by the absence of linkages with broader constituencies (such as media, public oversight institutions, or international partners) capable of exerting pressure when needed. Actions such as these were outside the Textbook Count strategy as the latter was premised on constructive engagement. However, given the complex power dynamics underlying reform work, civil society action should be ready to make use of different approaches as contexts change. Civil society should maintain its capacity to develop its work as a continuum: from governance to political reform, from constructive engagement to pressure politics, from functional and instrumental reforms to transformative ones.

For initiatives like Textbook Count, a challenge is how to embed its work in a broader strategic agenda to ensure that root causes of the problem, not just its symptoms, are addressed, and that gains are sustained over the long term. This goal requires building alliances and coalitions that not only engage in monitoring work but also in advocacy campaigns. In a worthwhile coalition-building approach, “pro-empowerment institutional reforms are driven by mutually reinforcing cross-sectoral coalitions between state and society, grounded in mutually perceived shared interests” (Fox 2004).

The implementation of vertical integration strategies creates capacities and learnings that can be used to develop initiatives in other sectors or regions. G-Watch has moved towards dealing with the underlying causes of corruption and accountability deficits in the Philippines. Box 7 shows ongoing G-Watch projects at the local level that exhibit partial vertical integration. These involve monitoring provincial, city, or municipal processes (down to the barangay and community levels) that are connected to national level policy dialogues and are facilitated by G-Watch in collaboration with the Political Democracy and Reforms (PODER) program of the Ateneo School of Government.

However, it is not an easy endeavor to pursue effective accountability initiatives across levels of government. There are a multitude of challenges, such as the following: (1) How to best combine constructive engagement and pressure politics; (2) How to maintain tangible, immediate, instrumental gains, while at the same time contribute to substantive transformations and policy reform; (3) How to develop additional skills needed for policy advocacy, research, and communication; and (4) How to build linkages with the media, public oversight agencies, and international partners without alienating potential allies in a given agency or local government unit. It is also a question of what kinds of structures must be in place to identify when to persevere with, pivot from, or totally change the strategy.

Box 7. Local monitoring initiatives in G-Watch’s ‘integrated’ approach to accountability

- Medicine monitoring in Dumagute: from the government procurement at the city level down to medicine dispensation at the barangay level.
- Rice subsidy monitoring in San Miguel, Bohol: allocation of the subsidy at the municipal level and its use at the beneficiary level.
- Water monitoring in Bohol and Sibagat: water management at the district and barangay levels, and water projects and fee collection at the municipality level.
- Community-based sustainable tourism (CBST) monitoring in Puerto Princesa: environmental assessment processes at the city level and community management and operations at the CBST sites.
- Environmental users’ fee (EUF) monitoring in Samal: collection of EUF at the resorts as well as the allocation and utilization of these funds.
- Infrastructure monitoring in S. Leyte, Bohol and Dumagute: small projects at the province, municipality or city level in coordination with the barangay where the projects are located.
- Education monitoring in Naga: city level budget allocation and availability and use of textbooks, furniture and classrooms projects at the school level.

Learning is a critical element for any organization that aims for deeper and more substantive accountability work that would address the causes of corruption and government inefficiency. To improve civil society work, it is vital to establish spaces for periodically examining and critically reflecting on one's work and for harvesting learning and knowledge from past experiences.
Cross-country exchanges and collaborative interaction with progressive researchers seem to be promising venues for an effective learning process. Such innovative alliances and approaches to knowledge generation and usage not only contribute to local organizations’ strategic planning and direction-setting, but also influence norms, frameworks, and agenda-setting, even at the international level. Ideally, this learning processes will affect the decisions and actions of key international actors like donors, development partners, and international multi-sectoral initiatives, which in turn will influence government and civil society action.

References


4.2 Campaigning for agrarian reform in the Bondoc Peninsula

Francis Isaac and Danilo Carranza

4.2.1 Introduction

The aim of this Chapter is to briefly examine the agrarian reform campaign in the Philippines and its degree of vertical integration. As agrarian reform scholar Saturnino Borras explains, land has a “multidimensional character (that) interlinks political, economic and cultural functions” (2007: 4). For this reason, it is important for the rural poor to gain control of land and productive resources, since it is “crucial to their autonomy and their capacity to construct livelihoods and thus overcome poverty” (Borras 2008: 2).

By focusing on agrarian reform, we are, in effect, looking at its two dimensions: the first is technical in character, covering “programs which redistribute land ownership from large private landowners to small peasant farmers and landless agricultural workers” (Griffin 2001: 17). The second aspect is its political dimension, which involves the “curtailment of the power and privileges of the influential elements of society” (Riedinger 1995: 2). This is so because its redistributive character is only realized when “the power to effectively control a contested land resource is transferred from one actor to another...in such a way that the landlord loses that power, which is subsequently transferred to landless and land-poor peasants” (Borras 2004: 287).
Because of the large number of movements and organizations involved in land reform in the Philippines, this study will focus on the campaign undertaken by the Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services (RIGHTS Network) and its allied peasant federation, the Kilusan para sa Repormang Agraryo at Katarungang Panlipunan (Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice) or Katarungan. Since the actions of these two actors are often closely coordinated, they will be referred to in this paper as Katarungan/RIGHTS Network, whenever necessary.

The RIGHTS Network, which was formed in 2008, is a consortium of eleven locally based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on agrarian reform wherein “autonomy is a key characteristic.” Its establishment was prompted after several NGOs left the Philippine Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment (PEACE)—one of the country’s oldest agrarian reform networks—due to unresolved differences in strategy and tactics.

Katarungan was formed a year earlier, in 2007, by several provincial peasant formations. Its goal was to push for the extension of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), which was set to expire in June 2008. Shortly after its founding assembly, Katarungan initiated numerous protest actions that contributed to the eventual enactment of the CARP Extension with Reforms Law (CARPER).

One of the most important agrarian reform campaigns of the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network is found in Bondoc Peninsula, a far-flung district in the southernmost portion of Quezon Province that has a “deeply inequitable socio-economic structure based on ownership or control of land” (Franco 2005a: 116). It is a narrow strip of land with very hilly terrain that is approximately eight hours away from Manila. The area, which is largely dependent on the production of copra, is composed of twelve low-income municipalities: Agdangan, Buenavista, Catanauan, General Luna, Macalelon, Mulanay, Padre Burgos, Pitogo, San Andres, San Francisco, San Narciso and Unisan.

According to scholars, Bondoc Peninsula has a skewed system of land ownership. Large tracts are concentrated in a few elite families, such as the Reyeses, the Uys and the Matiases (Carranza 2011; Franco 2005). A Maoist insurgency led by the Communist Party of the Philippines is also present in the area, which opposes any independent effort of the peasantry to promote agrarian reform. This is based on their orthodox assertion that actual land redistribution can only occur after the victory of the revolution, and what the rural poor could hope for at the moment is the reversal of the sharing scheme called tersyong baligtad. The Quezon Association for Rural Development and Democratization Services (QUARRDS), which serves as the local NGO partner of the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network, spearheads the campaign. It also provides technical assistance to the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (Peasant Movement of Bondoc Peninsula) or KMBP—a district-wide peasant federation which is also a member of Katarungan.

The agrarian struggle in Bondoc Peninsula is of considerable interest for both scholars and activists alike for three interrelated reasons: First, the land campaign in said area is vertically integrated, with ordinary peasants placing pressure on the state at various levels of engagement.

Second, the rural citizens of Bondoc Peninsula have been “using state law in innovative ways, as part of a broader collective action repertoire” (Franco 2005a: 152). Operating at “the boundaries of legality,” the peasants in this area often use a variety of extra-legal actions (such as land occupation, boycott of tenancy sharing schemes and padlocking of government offices, among others) in order to compel the state to implement its own agrarian reform law.

Third, these autonomous peasant actions in Bondoc Peninsula have generated violent reprisal not only from hacienda owners but also from the armed Maoist movement. Such reactions have created an interesting dynamic in Bondoc Peninsula where we see “an entrenched relationship of mutual reciprocity (between) the region’s biggest landlords (and) the underground movement’s New People’s Army” (ibid.: 117).
4.2.2 Brief history of agrarian reform

Throughout its long history, the agrarian reform campaign has always been a grassroots-driven initiative, animated by peasants who are literally fighting on the ground. It is also arguably the first and oldest social movement in the Philippines. It is driven by land deprivation among the rural poor and their lack of voice in the political process.

The birth of the agrarian campaign coincided with the numerous episodes of rural unrest during the Spanish colonial period (Franco 2000; Putzel 1992; Constantino 1975). It was at that time that the concept of individual land ownership was first introduced, which resulted in the “gradual development of a highly-skewed distribution of ownership and control” (Franco and Borras 2005: 13). Because of this situation, Spain’s 300-year colonial rule was marked by more than a hundred armed revolts that culminated in the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

Filipino victory, however, proved to be short-lived, as the United States of America annexed the Philippines in 1901. To diffuse any lingering rural unrest, the American colonial government initiated a massive resettlement program, which opened large tracts of land in Northern Luzon and Mindanao for homestead use.

Unfortunately, the agrarian problem remained unresolved even after the Philippines was granted independence in 1946. This persuaded hundreds of landless peasants in Central Luzon to join the Huk Rebellion, which sought to end rural oppression by overthrowing landlord domination.46

By the time Ferdinand Marcos won his second presidential term in 1969, the country was on the brink of chaos. Massive student demonstrations in Manila were coupled with peasant unrest in the countryside. To crush the opposition and prevent the possible outbreak of revolutionary violence, Marcos declared Martial Law on September 21, 1972. He filled his military camps with hundreds of political dissidents. A month later, Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 27, which placed all rice and corn lands under agrarian reform.

But instead of ending rural discontent, Marcos’ actions had the opposite effect. His actions further inflamed peasant resistance. In fact, Martial Law is seen as the catalyst that gave birth to the modern peasant movement, which is characterized by:

- First, its national scope (unlike the during Huk Rebellion which was largely confined to Central Luzon); and
- Second, its demand for a comprehensive agrarian reform policy that is covers all types of landholdings, not only rice and corn lands.

This period also witnessed the emergence of several agrarian reform formations. One such NGO was the Philippine Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment—an agrarian reform network that provided technical and organizing assistance to grassroots peasant organizations. Formed in 1977 at the height of Martial Law, PEACE would eventually become the forerunner of the RIGHTS Network.

Given the context of that time, the campaign for agrarian reform became intimately connected with the struggle for democratization. Not only were peasants demanding a more responsive land reform policy, they were also campaigning for an end of the Martial Law regime. Unsurprisingly, the agrarian movement’s relationship with the State was largely adversarial, with most efforts concentrated on base expansion and constituency building.

When Marcos was finally ousted through the four-day People Power Revolution in February 1986, the peasant movement lost no time in pushing for a law that would ensure meaningful land redistribution. It did so by reminding the new President, Corazon Aquino, of her earlier campaign pledge to make agrarian reform “the centerpiece program” of her administration.

Efforts were also made to consolidate the various peasant forces and coordinate their initiatives. This led to the formation of the Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform (CPAR). CPAR eventually became the largest peasant coalition ever formed in the country. Adept in organizing work and pressure politics, CPAR proved vital in the eventual enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) on June 10, 1988.

Described as the most radical, comprehensive and thorough agrarian reform initiative in the Philippines, CARP was specifically designed to place...
Described as the most radical, comprehensive and thorough agrarian reform initiative in the Philippines, CARP was specifically designed to place under agrarian reform approximately 10.3 million hectares of farmland in favor of approximately 3.9 million direct peasant-household beneficiaries. The law also covers all public and private agricultural lands, regardless of tenurial arrangement and the type of commodity produced. CARP further stipulates that no landowner can retain more than five hectares of agricultural land. However, each of his children may be awarded three hectares, provided he is at least fifteen years old and is actually tilling the land or managing the farm.

Originally, CARP gave the government ten years to complete its land redistribution efforts. This was later extended for another ten years, thus resetting the deadline to 2008. However, when the law finally expired in December of that year, more than 1.2 million hectares of agricultural lands were still waiting to be redistributed by the government to thousands of farmer-beneficiaries.

Prompted by CARP's possible failure, peasants began calling for the extension of the program as early as 2006. This eventually led to the formation of Katarungan in 2007 and the establishment of the RIGHTS Network the following year. In addition, a larger network called the CARPER Coalition was established in November 2006, which became the umbrella coalition for all those advocating for CARP's extension. This was later renamed as the Reform CARP Movement (RCM), which gained open support from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), as well as other forces from civil society.

The countless protest actions and mass mobilizations of the peasant movement eventually impelled both the Senate and the House of Representatives to adopt a joint resolution in December 2008. This joint resolution provisionally extended CARP, pending the enactment of a new law. On 7 August 2009, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo finally signed the CARP Extension with Reforms (CARPER). CARPER extended the government’s agrarian reform program for another five years, i.e., from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2014.

4.2.3 Harvesting the gains

Our brief review of agrarian reform indicates that its contemporary history can be divided into two distinct periods: (1) the Martial Law years; and (2) the post-Martial Law era. During the Marcos regime, the campaign for agrarian reform went hand-in-hand with the struggle for democracy and an end to the dictatorship. Throughout the Martial Law period, peasant action took the form of protest politics and armed resistance, which contributed to the weakening of the regime. All these actions eventually culminated in the People Power Revolution of February 1986.

The agrarian reform community, however, quickly realized that the fall of the Marcos dictatorship and the restoration of formal democratic rule will not automatically lead to massive land redistribution. They also recognized that the “democratic space” that was created in the wake of the People Power Revolution gave the peasant movement the opportunity to organize and campaign for a comprehensive agrarian reform law. This was successfully done in 1988 with the passage of CARP. The peasants would repeat this success with the passage of CARPER two decades later, in 2009.

Apart from mandating the state to redistribute large landholdings in favor of the rural poor, the CARP law also had far-reaching consequences for the agrarian reform movement. With a comprehensive legal instrument at their disposal, most peasant groups began shifting their focus from regime overthrow to enabling poor farmers to actually gain control of the land.

Due to active organizing work and peasant mobilization, large tracts of land had been distributed to thousands of CARP beneficiaries despite bureaucratic inefficiency and stiff landlord resistance. Data from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for instance, indicates that by 2007, six million hectares of land (both public and private) had been redistributed to three million rural poor households. This number represents approximately two-fifths of the agricultural population. In addition, 1.5 million hectares of land has been subjected to leasehold, benefitting more than one million tenant households.

Similar gains were also reported in Bondoc Peninsula, thanks in large measure to the actions of QUARRDS and KMBP. In fact, the first major agrarian breakthrough in said area occurred in September 1998, when a 174-hectare property of the highly powerful Reyes family in the town of Buenavista was finally redistributed to fifty-six peasant beneficiaries (Franco 2005: 166-167). And this was just the beginning.
In a span of thirteen years, from 1996 to 2009, more than 10,000 hectares were effectively placed under the control of more than 3,800 farmer-tillers. Such lands cover those that were “formally reformed by the government…and lands controlled through peasant initiatives” (Carranza 2011: 410). These were done through consistent social pressure from below and alliance initiatives with DAR reformists and agrarian reform advocates. Part of these accomplishments includes the acquisition of around 3,000 hectares of titled timberlands, untitled lands and publicly owned lands. Such reform measures have posed a direct challenge to the landed elite by undermining their control over the province’s economic resources, and with it, the very foundation of their political power. In the town of Buenavista alone, more than 596 hectares were distributed to 197 farmer-beneficiaries covering Barangays Catulin, Wasay Ibaba, Siain and Bagong Silang. Most of these lands were parceled out from the landholdings of former Marcos crony and political warlord Domingo Reyes whose kin continue to hold sway over the political and economic order in Bondoc Peninsula.

Also in Mulanay, more than 3,000 hectares were distributed to 706 farmers, most of whom were former tenants of the Villarosas, Cuasays, Aquinos, Del Rosasrios, Mosaleses and Tesalonas; while another 4,274 hectares were acquired by more than 800 coconut farmers residing in Barangays Tala, Camflora, Talisay, and Mangero in the town of San Andres. Seven hundred and fifty-five hectares were also awarded to 218 tenants from the town of San Francisco covering four barangays, mostly owned by the Tan and Matias clans. And in the town of San Narciso, where most of the violence reported in this paper occurred, more than 400 farmers were able to gain control of 2,084 hectares of land, 381 hectares of which were expropriated from the powerful Uy family. With all of these victories, the momentum has now clearly shifted in favor of the rural poor. And despite the stiff resistance from the landed elite, we expect Bondoc Peninsula’s peasant movement to remain active in the foreseeable future.

4.2.4 Explaining the gains

For former Senator Wigberto Tañada, the success of the agrarian campaign in Bondoc Peninsula is due to the “collaboration, cooperation and partnerships of various agencies of the government, civil society and farmer organizations” (cited in Carranza 2011: 409). Such an approach is often described as the bibingka strategy, which was first used by Saturnino Borras. This framework asserts that, “the symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups from below and strategically placed state reformists from above provides the most promising strategy to offset strong landlord resistance to land reform” (Borras 1999: 125). The bibingka strategy further assumes that the successful implementation of land reform involves the “symbiotic interaction between autonomous societal groups from below and state reformists from above” (ibid.: 134).

As Borras explains in his book The Bibingka Strategy for Land Reform Implementation:

The outcomes of the land reform policy are not determined by either structural or institutional factors alone, or by the actions of state elites alone, but that the political actions and strategies of a wide range of state and societal actors also bear on the outcomes of the reform process (ibid.: 125).

However, this does not erase any potential and actual differences—and even clashing interests—between the various actors from “above” and “below,” thereby ensuring a terrain that is marked by dynamics, engagement and discourse. Eventually, the bibingka strategy became so influential that it is now often used to explain the “partial but significant successes in land reform” (Borras and Franco 2010: 70). Though redistributive efforts in the Philippines are often marred by “a lukewarm state response and government inertia” (ibid.: 69), this has often been overcome by “the peculiar nature of state-society interactions around national policy-making and implementation” (ibid.: 70).

Without a doubt, the bibingka strategy has been the most significant development in the discourse of agrarian reform for the past decade and a half. In the hands of practitioners, the bibingka strategy is seen as a useful approach in pushing for agrarian reform and for wresting power away from the landed elites in favor of the rural poor. Academics, on the other hand, see it as an analytical framework to explain the relationship and dynamics of various reform actors from both the state and civil society.

By focusing on both government action from “above” and peasant mobilization from “below,” the bibingka strategy refutes the assumption
that dismisses the rural poor as passive receptors of change. Instead, the latter are regarded as autonomous political actors who are capable of mobilizing around specific land rights claims while contributing to the overall process of democratization. The framework further maintains that actual reform work occurs at various levels of engagement, with numerous pro-reform actors interacting in each of these levels. Borras himself pointed this out by arguing that:

The alliance between state reformists and autonomous reformist societal groups can, under certain conditions, surmount obstacles, overcome limits, and harness opportunities to allow a redistributive land reform to occur. This alliance is achieved at various levels of the polity, but in a highly varied and uneven manner, geographically, across crops and farm types, across land reform policy components, and over time. (Borras 2007: 11-12)

With its clear set of premises, the bibingka strategy has been a useful tool in describing the reform dynamics and how gains are actually achieved. However, very little has been written on the inter-relationship among the different levels and how these various (and often simultaneous) engagements contribute to the overall reform process. There is very little detailed explanation regarding the inter-relationship of these different levels with each other. While the bibingka strategy can offer generally broad explanations on how reforms take place, such knowledge has yet to be unbundled in order to fully comprehend the complex political dynamics at every level of engagement.

However, such analytical lacuna can be addressed by adopting the concept of vertical integration, which can potentially provide an adequate explanation of the reform dynamics at every level of engagement. First used by American scholar Jonathan Fox, vertical integration refers to the systematic coordination of citizen-led monitoring and advocacy campaigns across various levels—from grassroots, to municipal, to provincial, to national and even international arenas (Fox 2001: 617). Meant as a strategy for civil society engagement in scrutinizing government performance, Fox argues that, “the vertical integration of policy analysis articulates processes of monitoring, evaluation, and analysis of all levels of official decision making at the same time, permitting civil society advocacy actors to develop strategies in real time rather than after the fact” (ibid.: 621). For this reason, vertically integrated initiatives can deliver more lasting and substantive governance reforms, since “systematic, coordinated monitoring of the performance of all levels of public decision making can reveal more clearly where the main problems are, permitting more precisely targeted civil society advocacy strategies” (ibid.: 624).

By applying vertical integration to the agrarian reform campaign in Bondoc Peninsula, we will be able to determine:

1. The actions that have been undertaken per level;
2. The intensity and scale of the said actions;
3. The mechanisms for integration; and
4. The constraints and limitations to vertical integration.

The succeeding sections shall discuss the initial findings of this paper using vertical integration.

4.2.5 Scale of initiative

On its website, the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network describes itself as a consortium of “grassroots-based organizations,” that is, “strategically located in major agrarian reform hotspots in the Philippines.” For this reason, the Network has targeted sixteen provinces “where landownership concentration is most pronounced,” covering more than 200,000 hectares of private and public agricultural lands. One of its most important reform campaigns is in Bondoc Peninsula, where the Quezon Association for Rural Development and Democratization Services (QUARRDS) serves as the local NGO partner of the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network. Operating throughout the province of Quezon, QUARRDS provides technical assistance to KMBP, which is composed of more than 40 hacienda-based organizations scattered throughout the district.

As a result of this partnership between QUARRDS and KMBP, rural citizens are able to assert their rights at the village and municipal levels, where actual land contestation occurs. QUARRDS also enable farmers to engage state agencies like DAR at both the municipal and provincial levels as they pursue their land cases. It also facilitates coalition-building efforts at the provincial level in order to gain the support of other vital institutions such as the Church.

For its part, Katarungan enables KMBP farmers to interact with rural citizens from other Philippine regions and provinces, and to share their experiences and forge common strategies. RIGHTS Network, for its part,
The Bondoc Peninsula campaign of Katarungan/RIGHTS Network is highly integrated. Rural citizens and their allies are able to engage both state and non-state actors at the village, municipal, provincial, regional, and national levels. There are also instances wherein the campaign gained significant attention at the international level.

However, while KMBP is an important actor in Bondoc Peninsula, it has little ability to track its membership. Its leaders cannot provide the exact number of their members. Documents regarding membership hardly exist. KMBP also has difficulty sustaining the interest of its members. Once a member is finally awarded his/her plot of land, he/she becomes inactive and rarely attends KMBP activities. The organization has yet to devise a program that would enable it to reach out to farmers who have already gained land.

The Bondoc Peninsula campaign of Katarungan/RIGHTS Network is highly integrated. Rural citizens and their allies are able to engage both state and non-state actors at the village, municipal, provincial, regional, and national levels. There are also instances wherein the campaign gained significant attention at the international level.

For example, as early as 2003, the Foodfirst Information and Action Network (FIAN) had organized a fact-finding mission in the village of Barangay San Vicente in San Narciso to “investigate the situation of agrarian reform implementation and identify possible violations of basic human rights and the right to feed oneself of landless tenants” (FIAN 2003: 3). The mission, which took place from November 8 to 10, involved FIAN members from Belgium, Germany, Norway and Sweden, as well as participants from QUARRDS and the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an agency of the Philippine government.

Prompted by alleged incidents involving the harassment of peasants by goons hired by landowners on the one hand, and communist guerrillas on the other, the fact-finding mission reported that, “since 1996 the families in San Vicente had filed various petitions for inclusion in the CARP, but had so far not been recognized as beneficiaries” (ibid.: 3). It then called on the state to put a stop to the violence and expedite the agrarian process in the area (ibid.: 12-14).

Three years later, in 2006, a separate International Fact-Finding Mission (IFFM) convened a coalition of different CSOs to “investigate the worsening trend of agrarian related human rights violations in the countryside” (IFFM 2006: 2). The investigation, which took place on June 2-15, 2006, covered a number of areas in the Philippines, including four landholdings in Bondoc Peninsula. In its report released on June 19, the IFFM concluded that big landowners “are engaged in a wide range of criminal activity that seriously undermines rural poor people's effective access to their human rights” (ibid.: 35). The document further stated that, “the Philippine state is failing abjectly to fulfill its obligations to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of the rural poor population, as signatory to the various relevant international human rights law conventions” (ibid.: 35). Describing the life of ordinary peasants as “extremely difficult” (ibid.: 18), the IFFM called on the Philippine government to stop impunity and hasten land redistribution in the areas that it visited.

This was followed by a petition with 60 signatories on 8 November 2008 that was addressed to both the Philippine government and the Communist Party of the Philippines’ political arm—the National Democratic Front (NDF)—which “condemned in the strongest possible terms the recent spate of killings of farmers and farmer-leaders in Masbate and Bondoc Peninsula” (Katarungan et al.: 1). The petition identified the slain leader from Bondoc Peninsula as Deolito Empas, “whose perpetrators are believed by community members to be members of the NPA (New People's Army)” (ibid.: 1). The petitioners further reminded the two parties that the victims were non-combatants and were supposed to be protected under international law.

4.2.6 Actions per level

The agrarian campaign in Bondoc Peninsula utilizes various actions at different levels that enable the rural poor to gain actual control of the land. Such actions can be broadly categorized as: (1) constituency-building; and (2) interfacing with the state.

Constituency-building

One of the main features of the agrarian reform campaign in Bondoc Peninsula is grassroots organizing and awareness-building, which is undertaken with a high level of intensity both at the barangay (village) and
municipal levels. This is often done by deploying community organizers (COs) to targeted barangays in order to organize the community around the issue of agrarian reform. In the case of Bondoc Peninsula, COs are provided by QUARRDS and RIGHTS Network. By doing so, the community is given the opportunity to organize themselves into a barangay-based peasant organization, which will then link up with other similar formations to establish a municipal-wide farmers’ organization.

Once these actions have been accomplished, the organized peasants can now engage in high intensity coalition-building efforts with similarly organized rural poor groups. This is done by establishing friendly relations with other municipal-based organizations in order to form a provincial, or even regional, federation. This is exactly how KMBP came to existence in 1998. A similar process then took place at the national level, which led KMBP to join Katarungan in 2007. Such scaling up actions are done as peasants come to grips with the strength of landlord power, prompting them to seek allies beyond the barangay or municipal level.

This was explained in an interview with KMBP Vice President Melchor Rosco:


(What’s important in any engagement is if it would trigger a campaign. If nothing is done at the municipal level, we elevate it to the DAR provincial office. If there are still no developments, we will then bring it to the national level. Once we bring our campaign to the national level, we are, in effect, telling the State that the province does not have the capacity to distribute the land, more so the municipal office.)

When pressed to expound on the seeming reluctance of DAR municipal officers to implement agrarian reform, Rosco’s response reveals the despotic nature of landlord power in Bondoc Peninsula:

Ang dahilan, trabaho lang ang kanila, at may mga pamilya din sila. Ayaw pa nilang mamatay nang maaga.

(It’s just a job for them, and they have their own families to think of. They don’t want to die prematurely.)

Apart from forming intra-peasant movement coalitions, QUARRDS and KMBP also undertake cross-sectoral coalition-building at the district/provincial and national levels with a high degree of intensity. According to QUARRDS executive director Jansept Geronimo, most of their allies either come from the Church or from the media. One example is the Diocese of Gumaca and its Social Action Center (SAC), which have been providing logistical assistance as well as sanctuary for displaced farmers. Geronimo also identified Bishop Buenaventura Famadico of the Diocese of San Pablo as one of the most vocal champions of agrarian reform.

QUARRDS has also been coordinating with provincial media outlets based in Quezon’s provincial capital of Lucena, to get their stories out to a wider public. In fact, several local radio stations interview Geronimo whenever he is in Quezon. Agrarian reform campaigners from QUARRDS and KMBP also consider television journalist Howie Severino of GMA News as an ally, as well as reporter Delfin Mallari of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, both of whom have written several articles on the land campaign in Bondoc Peninsula (Geronimo 2015).

The strategy of establishing broad cross-sectoral coalitions was specifically used in 2005 with the formation of Task Force Bondoc Peninsula (TFBP). Composed of various peasant and human rights groups, civil society allies, church formations and selected government agencies such as the Commission on Human Rights, TFBP was established to halt agrarian-related violence and improve CARP implementation in the said area. TFBP was able to do so by conducting a fact-finding mission and by engaging in public education and dialogues with other pertinent agencies.
### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING approaches:</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency-building approaches:</td>
<td>Barangay (Village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/ awareness-building</td>
<td>Deployment of community organizers and formation of village peasant organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
<td>KMBP organizational development and expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td>Alliances with church and provincial media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
<td>Share boycott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education strategy</td>
<td>Networking with media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
<td>Monitoring of developments in land redistribution at the village level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal exchange of experiences/ deliberation</td>
<td>Municipal-level exchanges among peasants from different villages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING LEVEL OF ACTION**

- **Barangay (Village)**
- **Municipality**
- **District/ (Province)**
- **National**
- **International**

**INTENSITY KEY:**

- **HIGH**
- **MEDIUM**
- **LIGHT**

Since agrarian reform is largely an advocacy campaign which often involves the use of pressure politics, QUARRDS, KMBP and the Katarungan/ RIGHTS Network also use mass collective action/protest at all levels, from the village all the way to the national, with a high degree of intensity. Collective protest at the village level is expressed through the on-going boycott campaign in Villa Reyes, which began in 2003.

As early as the late 1990s, tenant-farmers from San Narciso and San Andres had already submitted petitions asking the Department of Agrarian Reform to subject their areas to land redistribution. But before the formal agrarian reform process could begin, DAR would first have to locate the titles of the contested properties and verify whether they are indeed within CARP's coverage. Believing that it would take months, if not years, before the Department could finally take action, the peasants had begun conducting archival research at the DENR's regional management office, the office of the Tax Assessor, and the Land Registration Authority" (Franco 2005b: 36).

The farmers discovered that large tracts of land (10,000 hectares) claimed by the Reyes family were actually classified as public timberland. They promptly informed DAR of their discovery, but the latter refused to take action for unclear reasons. This prompted the peasants to launch a boycott campaign, as they refused to give the Reyeses any share in the coconut harvest. Initially, the boycott only involved two barangays in the town San Andres, and two more in San Narciso. At present, the boycott now involves 800 families and covering 4,000 hectares. The Katarungan/RIGHTS Network estimates that the shares that the Reyeses used to receive were approximately Php1,500.00 per hectare every two months. This means that the Reyeses lose Php 6 million every two months. With fewer resources at
the landowners’ disposal, the ongoing boycott campaign has contributed to the reduction of landlord power in Bondoc Peninsula.

Peasant-leaders believe that the Reyeses now have less money to pay for their lawyers and cover the salaries of their hacienda employees. Melchor even claims that, “kumulas na rin ang mga enkargado at mga goons” (even the farm managers and goons have abandoned the hacienda owners). As landlord power continue to weaken, more farmers (including hacienda employees and non-KMBP members) have also joined the boycott. The boycott campaign has also made DAR more vulnerable to farmer pressure. This allowed the Department to distribute 1,124 hectares of land in Sitio Aromahan located in the village of Barangay Tala in San Andres to KMBP members on 6 February 2015.

Mass protests from the municipal to the national levels take several forms, such as picketing, public marches, occupation of government offices and ouster campaigns against specific public officials. In 2003, two high-level protest campaigns involving QUARRDS and KMBP occurred when a broad coalition of peasant groups successful removed Hernani Braganza as DAR secretary. A year later, the same coalition forced the removal of Branganza’s successor, Roberto Pagdanganan. The success of these two “oust” campaigns was due to the presence of a strong tactical coalition composed of various peasant groups and cross-sectoral supporters.

In addition to the above-mentioned actions, QUARRDS, KMBP and the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network also undertake public education in order to communicate their agenda to a broader public. Public education is often carried out at the provincial and national levels using both mainstream media, especially radio and newspapers, with a medium degree of intensity. The groups also monitor DAR’s CARP implementation from the municipal up to the national level, with a high degree of intensity. However, these are not done to help the bureaucracy improve their performance, but to inform the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network’s advocacy. Spaces are also created to ensure horizontal deliberation and exchange of experiences from the municipal up to the national level. Done with a high degree of intensity, such horizontal deliberations are intimately connected with organizing work for they allow grassroots peasants to form larger collectives.

In addition, horizontal exchanges provide rural citizens with a participatory process to develop their own policy alternatives. Such processes occur with a high degree of intensity when done at the village and municipal levels. However, they become moderate when it they are undertaken at the provincial and national levels. QUARRDS, KMBP, and the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network also utilize information and communications technology (ICT) for constituency building. However, this is only done at the national level, with only a medium degree of intensity, through the shared website of the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network.

**Interfacing with the State**

For the most part of its history, the campaign for agrarian reform has largely been characterized by conflict and political contestation. Unsurprisingly, the peasant movement’s engagement with the state has often taken the form of protest actions and other similar activities involving pressure politics. This is also true for the case of Bondoc Peninsula.

QUARRDS, KMBP and the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network, however, also undertake policy advocacy with local executive authorities, albeit with a medium degree of intensity. But since local chief executives are not responsible for CARP implementation, the policy advocacy done by the Rights Network is only meant to expand their base of support. The same is true for the policy advocacy that is being done with the municipal and provincial legislative bodies.

The farmers of Bondoc Peninsula rarely participate in “invited spaces.” When they do, their participation is limited in the national level with a medium degree of intensity, particularly with the Farmers’ Sector of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC). It also has very limited engagement with state accountability institutions. Geronimo indicated that their only engagement is with the Commission on Human Rights, and with only a medium degree of intensity (Geronimo 2015). In fact, the only form of action in which they have a high degree of intensity is legal recourse, wherein QUARRDS, KMBP and the Katarungan/Rights Network go to the courts in order to address specific agrarian-related cases.
### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Interface with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>Barangay (Village)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)</td>
<td>(Moderate Intensity) Engagement with allied barangay officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
<td>(Moderate Intensity) Engagement with allied barangay officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
<td>(High Intensity) Filing of legal cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in &quot;invited spaces&quot; [shared but government-controlled]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in &quot;claimed spaces&quot; [shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Engagement with public accountability agencies** (ombudsman, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)

**Engagement with Commission on Human Rights (CHR)**

### INTENSITY KEY:

- **High**
- **Medium**
- **Light**

#### 4.2.7 Mechanisms for integration

Danny Carranza, acting Coordinator of Rights Network, argues that successful agrarian reform implementation requires both vertical and horizontal integration. Given the degree of landowner control over land at the village level, pro-reform actors must not only contest land at the village and municipal levels, but they must also use means and resources at the provincial, regional and national (and even international) levels to push for successful land redistribution.

For Carranza, horizontal integration refers to the extent and spread of the support base of the peasant organizations and their allies. It can also be understood as simultaneous engagement with various state agencies, such as DAR, DENR, DND, DILG, AFP, PNP, etc. As a result of landlord resistance, Carranza asserts that DAR alone cannot successfully implement agrarian reform. It would have to seek the assistance of other state agencies to neutralize the landowners’ hired goons, install the farmer-beneficiaries in their assigned plots, and ensure the farmers’ subsequent safety.

One hindering factor for integration occurs at the village level. Often peasants are not geographically concentrated. This poses a challenge for community organizers who are tasked to gather them to address collective action problems. Another hindering factor occurs at the national level, where dynamics among existing civil society groups and social movement actors hamper convergence and integration of action.
4.2.8 Challenges and limitations

From the above discussion, we can conclude that agrarian reform has been one of the longest campaigns in the Philippines. Also, the broad peasant movement has a high degree of vertical integration, with presence and coordination from the grassroots up to the national level. However, despite these attributes, agrarian reform implementation remains problematic due to the failure of DAR to satisfactorily fulfill its mandate. This situation indicates the following:

- The Philippine state remains weak since it cannot prevent its rural elites from hindering agrarian reform implementation;
- The state has very little capacity to implement its own laws and legal mechanisms;
- Agrarian reform implementation is not only an administrative problem but it is also a political problem that is rooted in the monopoly of power and economic resources.

Therefore, a high intensity of mass action with allies is needed to get DAR to even partly carry out its mandate.

Another finding is that peasant organizations, especially those aligned with the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network have focused on advocacy work and have given little attention to the “invited” governance spaces that could serve as mechanisms for voice and citizen participation. In addition, while the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network has engaged the state’s accountability institutions in the past, it has yet to explore how they can be further utilized in the campaign for land redistribution.

This is probably the best time to give it another look.

References


Interviews/ Focus Group Discussions

Key Informant Interview (RIGHTS/Katarungan Office, 27-A Matapat St., Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City; 7 March 2015)
• Danilo Carranza – Acting National Coordinator, RIGHTS Network

Focus Group Discussion (Alex III Grill, Matalino St., Barangay Central, Quezon City; 28 April 2015)
• Maribel Rosco – President, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)
• Melchor Luzara – Vice President, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)
• Jansept Geronimo – Executive Director, Quezon Association for Rural Development and Democratization Services (QUARRDS)

Focus Group Discussion (Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)-Central Office, Elliptical Road, Quezon City; 4 May 2015)
• Alma Ravena – member, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)
• Leonila Sobreo – member, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)
• Amalia Ortega – member, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)
4.3 Empowering communities for housing and community services

Benedict G. Nisperos and Federick Vincent Marcelo

4.3.1 Introduction

In 2014, the Philippine population reached a hundred million, and has a population growth rate among the highest in the world (National Statistics Coordination Board 2015). This population growth increased the need for housing, which is expected to reach 5.8 million housing units in 2016. The Philippines already could not meet this demand, and therefore, the country faces a massive housing problem. The number of families in slum and squatter colonies has increased, especially in key cities where social services are more accessible. Overall, the Philippines’ urban housing dilemma is characterized by informal housing arrangements, substandard structures, congestion, lack of access to social services, rising criminality in overcrowded spaces, land use conflicts, and inadequate supply (Monsod 2010).

In the 1990s, the government utilized a range of strategies to respond to the housing crisis (Ballesteros 2005). To enact these strategies, the government pursued several key reforms. One of the most significant reforms was the shift from a centralized system managing housing to a decentralized and participative approach to housing. This was done through the passage of pro-poor housing legislation, including the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992 and the Comprehensive
Shelter Finance Act (CISFA) of 1994 (Ballesteros 2007). Both laws aimed to realize housing provisions that had been included in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which state:

> That the State will make available at affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas... and that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. (1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 13, Sec. 9)

However, even with these legislative commitments, widespread demolitions displaced many informal settlers in Metro Manila in the 1990s. As a response to these demolitions, victims and their families organized themselves. Among those that organized early was Damayan ng Maralitang Pilipinong Api (DAMPA, Philippines Poverty Relief). DAMPA was created to demand housing and relocation services from different levels of government, as well as social services that should go with the housing infrastructure. Through lobbying, coordination, and constituency building at different levels of government and the international level, DAMPA was successful in winning victories that secured housing for the urban poor.

DAMPA was created to demand housing and relocation services from different levels of government, as well as social services that should go with the housing infrastructure. Through lobbying, coordination, and constituency building at different levels of government and the international level, DAMPA was successful in winning victories that secured housing for the urban poor.

In the Philippines, the story of a people's organization rising to make claims in newly opened political spaces and collaborating with the government is not new. Following the 1986 People Power Revolution that overthrew the Marcos dictatorship, a new era of democratic openness started. It inspired the creation of many active and secular grassroots-oriented NGOs dedicated to community organizing. The post-Martial Law administration of President Corazon Aquino experimented with pro-poor policy frameworks, laws, ordinances, and institutional structures that increased the participation of civil society organizations (ACHR 1999). This created an opening for CSOs working to improve housing conditions for the urban and rural poor.

Despite initial distrust between the government and CSOs, the latter became more engaged with the former in addressing housing issues. Bureaucratic officials from national and local governments, elected and career officials slowly, and often reluctantly, opened political spaces for civil society participation. This legitimized the increased power-sharing with the people under the rubric of ‘good governance.’ NGOs cautiously tested the waters through ‘critical collaboration’ with the government (Ballesteros 2010).

Even with recognized successes, there is not much literature covering the stories of community organizations led by the urban poor to address urgent housing needs. This lacuna can be attributed to the “relatively low priority given by NGOs and People’s Organizations (POs) on housing concerns to documenting and disseminating information on their activities” (Ballesteros 2010: 3). In an effort to add to the literature, this case study seeks to document how DAMPA evolved into one of the largest urban and rural poor networks in the Philippines and how it worked across the government to establish both housing and related basic services for the poor.

The housing problem in the Philippines is confounded by many factors at the national and local government levels. Under the Urban Development and Housing Act, housing became primarily the responsibility of local governments. However, most local government units (LGUs) lack the capacity and resources to manage construction of shelter, urban management, and housing maintenance costs. With their high dependence on the national government, LGUs have limited resources to provide social services or promote economic opportunities. Moreover, there is a lack of coordination between the lead national and local agencies on resettlement, i.e., the National Housing Authority (NHA), LGUs, and other national agencies, which further hinders the success of resettlement projects. The abandonment and/or transfer of beneficiaries out of the home-lots given them are perennial problems due to the lack of opportunities and services in the relocation community. Tracking down those who have been awarded housing units has also proven difficult since most LGUs lack any monitoring or database system. Bureaucratic and technical legalism and valuation issues also delay the awarding of home lots.
The establishment of eviction guidelines and the recognition of the rights of informal settlers have been two highlights of national government policy. However, these rights are sometimes disregarded, specifically on private lands. Overall, there is a lack of coordination among agencies involved in housing from the national level to the local level. Lastly, housing finance programs have limited outreach. Private sector funds remain considerably untapped. The UDHA intends to promote private investment in housing through tax exemptions and regulation. However, the exact incentives and benefits are not clear. And even though UDHA mandates that housing projects approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) must provide 20% of its capacity as low-income housing, compliance with this provision has not been adequately monitored. It is in these situations that intervention and participation from the civil society is needed.

4.3.3 Historical background on the campaign for housing

Two Philippine community-based organizations that fought for housing rights laid the foundation for DAMPA's work: Manila-based Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO) and Sama-sama (Joining Together) from Quezon City. ZOTO was formed in 1970 when 30,000 informal settler families, or 180,000 people, were faced with impending demolition, eviction, and distant out-of-city relocation to make room for a new container port. The first mobilization arose in the aftermath of a severe typhoon that hit the community. A religious group known as the Philippine Ecumenical Council on Community Organization (PECCO) called on the community to build a mass-based democratic organization to resist the plans of the government and some 65 community leaders representing twenty local organizations. Tired of the corrupt usage of funds allotted for housing the urban poor, the group organized, mobilized, demanded, and received their direct share intended for housing, the bulk of which are foreign sources (Ballesteros 2010).

Sama-sama started as a religious-focused organization founded by local parish priests in 1975. It began to focus on housing issues as demolition and eviction plagued parishioners. In the early 1980s, the Community Organization of the Philippines Enterprise (COPE, formerly PECCO) joined Sama-sama to help people resist eviction in non-violent ways, including claiming their land rights and learning how to deal with the government (Murphy et al. 2001).

DAMPA was organized in December 1995 in response to massive demolitions in an area called Smokey Mountain and other areas in Metro Manila. These demolitions left hundreds of urban poor families in need of adequate basic services and social protection. Like Sama-sama, DAMPA was created through the help of COPE, but it separated itself from the latter after realizing that years of negotiation with the government, conflict-prone confrontations, and mobilizations are not the only methods of engagements. DAMPA wanted more concrete programs and projects that could directly help its members (Varona 2006).

At present, DAMPA has twelve founding chapters and four expanded chapters, with 90,000 households in six regions in the Philippines. In terms of scale of projects, DAMPA has helped about 5,000 families secure land and housing tenure since they started. DAMPA has been able to set up 40 community pharmacies in 30 poor communities, providing low-cost generic medicines to an estimated 50,000 poor families. It also has an Income Restoration Program that has provided low-interest loans amounting to PhP5,000 to PhP10,000 to 252 families to enable them to initiate income-generating activities (Virginia Gandia, pers. comm.). As stated by DAMPA, the organization aims:

To contribute viable solutions to basic poverty problems endemic to the urban poor, such as adequate and affordable housing, evictions and relocation which comply with both international and local laws and standards, provision of basic services, and literacy and livelihood development. (DAMPA, n.d.)

DAMPA seeks to achieve this goal through organizing poor communities around common basic issues, building partnerships with the government, enhancing community-based self-help initiatives, and initiating pro-poor legislation at the local and national government levels. For DAMPA, the aim is to contribute to the reframing of how the government should resolve the gaps in housing for the urban poor, and changing the paradigm from one of violent massive demolitions to participatory negotiations and dialogue. Overall, DAMPA wants to promote a more inclusive approach to the resolution of the housing problem, while at the same time, demanding that
the strategies of the government should be aligned with the aspirations of the constituents affected.

4.3.5 Winning the campaign on land acquisition and relocation

DAMPA has achieved a number of key victories as a result of its organizing work. In 2009, DAMPA helped settle a dispute between 31 informal settler families (ISFs) from Sitio Krusher in the municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan province on the one hand, and the owner of the 2,694-square meter lot on which they lived on the other hand. The landowner wanted the settlers evicted but DAMPA intervened by organizing a dialogue between the concerned parties. The dialogue resulted in a “land sharing” agreement in which the owner donated the plot to the settlers, and the latter committed to pay the property taxes. Residents view the dialogue as a success. To date, DAMPA continues to provide capacity-building trainings to the families in Sitio Krusher.

Another success story involved 2,000 informal settlers in the areas of Bangkal and Magallanes in Makati City. The government planned to relocate in order to develop several government infrastructure projects. DAMPA brokered a deal with both the national and local governments, which enabled the residents to acquire land through a ‘negotiated relocation.’ This means that the government provided replacement land for the community. Under this agreement, the government identified a barren lot in Cabuyao City, Laguna province for their relocation and gave the relocated people PhP50,000 to construct their houses. The area is now known as Southville I. Despite the meager fund, DAMPA assisted the residents in developing their new community and provided training on solid waste management and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). According to beneficiaries, DAMPA continued its accompaniment until all the basic social services, such as schools, roads, potable water, and electricity, were set up for the community.

In addition, DAMPA has been collaborating with a group of architects and engineers specializing in alternative housing design called TAO Pilipinas in conducting land surveys and in drafting subdivision plans. It also assisted ISFs in Barangays Payatas and Bagong Silangan in Quezon City acquire land, the former through direct buying and the latter through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP).

DAMPA recognizes that, as a national umbrella organization, it is necessary that it facilitates internal agreements on issues and solutions prior to dialogues with the government. The organization itself pointed this out in a paper that was presented at the Grassroots Women's International Academy in Barcelona, Spain. The goal is to make engagement a dialogue focused on organizational, and not individual, interests. The environment which allows government to sit in dialogue is also an opportunity to educate and to present grassroots organizations with a chance to lobby for the urban poor agenda (DAMPA 2004).

Indeed, with this process, DAMPA is reframing how the government can approach the country’s housing issues.

4.3.6 Gender and development component

One of DAMPA’s greatest successes involves the women who advance their housing rights. Early on, DAMPA recognizes that the issues of the poor are also women’s issues. DAMPA officials assert that the women’s traditional role as primary caregivers of the family is mirrored in how they are involved in community concerns. This, paradoxically, is a logical extension of a long-standing patriarchal tradition. Therefore, since women are left to care for the house while men leave the community to seek employment, women are more exposed to the workings of community life and its corresponding issues and concerns (Ibid.).

For this reason, the organization emphasizes that respect for the rights of women, children, and the family, are the basic foundations of community development. To achieve this goal, DAMPA sets two goals that relate to its operational procedures:

1) To link basic community issues to gender and development; and
2) To broaden community program initiatives to include specific responses to gender issues and child and family concerns. (DAMPA 2004: 3)

4.3.7 Actions per level and intensity of actions

Constituency-building

As the years progressed, DAMPA moved from a singular housing focus to engage in other contingent campaigns linked to housing. These included disaster, health, finance, gender, and development, among others. While the primary strategy remains community organizing around basic community issues, a strong networking strategy (from the local up to the national and
As the years progressed, DAMPA moved from a singular housing focus to engage in other contingent campaigns linked to housing. These included disaster, health, finance, gender, and development, among others. While the primary strategy remains community organizing around basic community issues, a strong networking strategy (from the local up to the national and international levels) is also integral to DAMPA (DAMPA 2004). Through continuous engagement and active participation in opened spaces for collaboration, DAMPA was able to build a wide network at both the local and international levels. Furthermore, while DAMPA strategies are primarily community-led, its alliance-building and networking efforts have also generated a wide support network of groups that provide technical and political support (Emma Manajares, pers. comm.). These various organizations have assisted local communities in their advocacy work and in crafting solutions, which include in-city housing solutions and financing income restoration and health programs.

DAMPA's networking and coalition-building is very strong at each level. It reinforces its strength through the network it builds at each level of engagement. An example of this can be seen as early as 1995 when the Pasig River Rehabilitation Program (PRRP) was being implemented. This government initiative would have led to the dislocation and relocation of those living along the riverbanks traversing the cities of Mandaluyong, Pasig, Caloocan, Malabon, and Manila. To address this issue, DAMPA used a series of mobilizations and dialogues with government agencies to negotiate for the affected communities' housing needs (Emma Manajares, pers. comm.). They coordinated with other organizations, such as the newly organized community group Powerful Alliance of Affected Families along the Pasig River (ULAP), to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the government (Karaos 2003). DAMPA's large mobilizations increased the network's credibility and earned it a seat on the PRRP Board. This case is emblematic of DAMPA's experience across its areas of intervention.

### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency-building approaches:</th>
<th>Very local (community/school)</th>
<th>District/municipality</th>
<th>State/Province</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grassroots organizing/awareness-building</strong></td>
<td>DAMPA's membership extends up to the grassroots level, down to the communities with Community Organizers designated at this level</td>
<td>Coordination with nationally established organization addressing basic sector concerns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</strong></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Coalition-building with national organizations like Akbayan, Saligan, COPE etc.</td>
<td>Examples of organizations linked up with are the Huairou Organization, UN Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass collective action/protest</strong></td>
<td>Mass mobilizations during violent dispersals</td>
<td>Mass mobilizations during violent dispersals</td>
<td>Mass mobilizations during violent dispersals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public education strategy</strong></td>
<td>Community organizers go house-to-house and conduct community congregations to discuss issues</td>
<td>Municipality- and city-wide education campaigns on pertinent issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</strong></td>
<td>Monitoring of GAD fund</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
State engagement
DAMPA uses a multipronged approach to housing and relocation. It does not only focus on securing shelter, but also on obtaining the social services that should accompany housing. This approach “take[s] into account not only a new settlement’s physical location but also the security of housing tenure, basic services, employment opportunities and community’s ownership of the proposed solutions.” (Duka et al. 2011: 43).

DAMPA uses a range of strategies to confront, engage, and partner with the government to find alternative solutions to issues of the urban poor. It directly engages with line agencies at the national level, such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the Department of Health (DOH), and other public agencies to ensure direct assistance to their members.

DAMPA uses mass action to advocate for the urban poor. Local leaders engage in community-driven participatory research that has resulted in government agencies recognizing their concerns. In 1998, for example, after learning that DPWH and NHA were the agencies tasked with implementing relocation projects related to infrastructure projects funded by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), DAMPA used mass mobilizations and protest actions to target these institutions. The mass mobilizations gained the attention of the Japanese government’s aid agency and highlighted the potential violations of international standards for voluntary relocations. After the protests, DAMPA wrote to Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), stating their demand that Japan must compel the Philippine government to comply with loan guidelines regarding the relocation of informal settlers. Twelve leaders from Manila-based communities affiliated with DAMPA met with senior officials of Japan’s OECF in 1996 to demand that the aid agency improve the relocation process, even if they had to withhold funding for the projects. DAMPA eventually won its demands through negotiation and compromise. As a result of this action, DAMPA was not only able to get the attention of the government at both the national and local levels, it was also recognized by the Japanese OECF as a representative of the urban poor affected by Japanese-funded infrastructure projects. DAMPA became an ally of OECF in ensuring that Philippine government housing agencies adhere to OECF guidelines in the resettlement of urban poor families affected by OECF-funded projects.

DAMPA helped communities access the Community Mortgage Program which enables organized communities to secure mortgages at interest rates of six percent per annum for uses such as collectively purchasing land, building houses, and developing the sites by improving access to basic services. It engaged with the NHA and other housing agencies and bargained to lower the costs per home loan. One good example is the Samahang Pagkakaisa sa Sitio Kumunoy, a member organization of DAMPA, which was able to use the CMP to negotiate a community mortgage with the Quezon City government. This resulted in the acquisition of a 9,000-square meter plot to house 105 families (Emma Manjares, pers. comm.).

To address problems faced by families relocated due to the government’s flood control projects, DAMPA collaborated with the Income Restoration Subcommittee of the Department of Public Works and Highways, the CAMANAVA Flood Control Project and the National Housing Authority (Duka et al. 2011: 45).

DAMPA Community Pharmacies have acquired funds to purchase and make available affordable generic medicines. DAMPA coordinated with NGOs and government agencies, such as the Department of Health’s Community
Health Program, the Bureau of Food and Drugs, and barangay-level local government units to pursue this project:

The success of the Community Pharmacies prompted the Department of Health to seek DAMPA assistance in implementing their own Botika ng Barangay (Barangay Pharmacy) Programme, which was conceptualized to provide national access to essential drugs. This partnership provides DAMPA with access to government officials to press for pro-poor policies and programs related to health services. (Duka et al. 2011: 45)

In 1995, DAMPA worked with communities along the Pasig River being forced to relocate. They engaged with the local government of their relocation site, Cavite, and the local government of their origin, Mandaluyong City. The organization was able to coordinate these two LGUs to address their concerns and agree on areas of collaboration in delivering basic services to their community. As a result, basic needs like water, electricity, and later, schools, were built on their relocation site (Virginia Gandia, pers. comm.).

At the grassroots, DAMPA used the barangay as a government executive channel and as an avenue for the direct participation of the people, having a “quasi-grassroots” nature. DAMPA actively engages the barangay to allocate resources and assist in service delivery to its members. It also accesses the Gender and Development Funds of the barangays where it operates (DAMPA 2004).
4.3.8 Analysis and mechanisms for integration

DAMPA considers its network of constituents, members, and partners as their greatest resource for integration. Their relationships with the government, civil society, and other professionals strengthen the organization’s ability to access knowledge, information, and financial resources, and to advocate for government programs that are responsive and accountable to the urban poor, particularly to women living and working in these communities. For DAMPA, their greatest impact has been “the capacity development of 500 urban poor leaders and volunteers in 95 communities to address local problems more effectively. These leaders sit on various local development and planning bodies organized at the local government level, where they actively participate in local governance and development planning activities” in their localities (Duka et al. 2011:46; Castillo 2006). DAMPA has 19 community organizers and local volunteers trained in community organizing, and maintains a pool of 10 people’s organization (PO) trainers for volunteer training and education. DAMPA also has its own training design and manual for volunteers training and education, and maintains its own data bank on infrastructure projects, government housing programs, and other urban poor related data (DAMPA n.d.).

DAMPA member organizations are involved in the design of projects, both as implementers of programs and as program beneficiaries. One example is the action plan for a “disaster resilient housing” of DAMPA fisherfolk communities in Socorro, Surigao Del Norte province and Tanuan, Leyte province where the latter was devastated by typhoon Haiyan. This gives local organizations considerable stake in the success of projects and programs, and promotes a high degree of volunteerism. This results in a “higher degree of credibility for the organization in terms of delivering concrete program results, making DAMPA an attractive partner for government.” (DAMPA n.d.). DAMPA has created a ‘brand of service’ which makes its affiliated members credible partners of national and local governments in their projects (Marietta Espuerta, pers. comm.).

DAMPA makes it clear that they are not soliciting handouts or other kinds of assistance. There should be a recognition that all the parties in dialogues with the government are stakeholders. In other words, “it is necessary to define the basis of partnerships by sharing of perspectives on common problems and the identification of workable solutions. It is important to have the role of everyone discussed openly and collectively agreed upon” (DAMPA 2004). DAMPA ensures that in any program they implement or participate in, the organization is able to actively engage and play a vital role. DAMPA recognizes that Memorandums of Agreement formalize their participation and protect their interests.

DAMPA has been able to disprove the government’s idea that grassroots organizations are too process-oriented and prone to inefficiencies. The organization has done so by showing that it is efficient and effective. To integrate actions at different levels, it is necessary that grassroots organizations invest more time and energy in establishing efficient systems, mechanisms, and procedures. This helps maximize their engagement with the government, though based on DAMPA’s experience, such efforts can be too bureaucratic.

Technology has assisted DAMPA in communicating to its wide network of members. E-mail and text messaging facilitate faster communication between and among members and the delivery of documents has been made easier. According to Juvy Letada, a DAMPA community organizer in Bulacan, the responsible utilization of “social media helps DAMPA to share its advocacy and to gain more support from its constituency in Metro Manila and in the provinces.” (Judy Letada, pers. comm.). DAMPA has a national secretariat that coordinates activities nationwide, and maintains a website for its members and funders to have easy access to information about its activities.

DAMPA is able to expand its network by building credibility and, in turn, achieve scale. Organizations have sought to be affiliated with DAMPA to have easier access to projects and programs. This provided DAMPA credibility to have a wider reach.

DAMPA has helped LGUs realize that the entry of local grassroots organizations into service-delivery has actually “provided government with a more direct and efficient medium for the flow of governmental services and projects” (Castillo 2006). This means effective service delivery, less work for government, and more opportunities for devoting governmental efforts to other tasks. DAMPA helps overcome the problem of clientelism, which foregoes existing institutionalized channels and reinforces existing
power relations (Angeles 2000). DAMPA is able to build trust with the government and send the message that their members not only desire to live dignified lives, but are also willing to work for it. DAMPA is able to prove that it can offer solutions and that it has to be empowered in order to create more impact (DAMPA 2004; Racelis 2003).

4.3.9 Challenges and limitations

DAMPA emphasizes that it is important to have large numbers of constituents and to maintain a healthy appreciation of the government in order to encourage government-CSO partnerships. Politicians generally engage with grassroots organizations with an eye for votes. Therefore, they engage with organized groups with a large membership base. As some say, politically, if you have the number, you get the attention. Thus, for DAMPA to be effective in vertical integration, it has to have the numbers. DAMPA knows what the system wants: a large number of organized citizens, and responds accordingly. But as Marietta Espuerta points out, DAMPA also understands that “political patronage is prevalent especially among those who are allies of whoever is the incumbent.” There is also the issue of the “absorptive capacity [of government and politicians] in recognizing and assimilating the idea of the DAMPA.” (Marietta Espuerta, pers. comm.).

As an organization of organizations, it is necessary for DAMPA to facilitate internal agreements on issues and solutions prior to dialogues with the government. The goal is “to make engagement a dialogue that is focused on organizational, and not individual interests”(Virginia Gandia, pers. comm.). Before members attend any meeting, the agenda is made clear and assigned speakers are prepared. They take advantage of shared spaces for dialogue about how to present the urban poor agenda (Emma Manjares, pers. comm.). They believe that the same stance on issues should be represented at all levels, or else the organization will lose its credibility and integrity.

To increase cross-sectoral relevance and visibility, DAMPA lobbies for local and national legislation and local community-based and national projects. For housing and relocation issues, DAMPA is one of the organizations that lobbied for amendments to the Urban Development and Housing Act by using both invited and claimed spaces. At the national level, these spaces included the People’s Summit and National Housing Summit, the campaign for the Reproductive Health Bill, and the campaigns for the National Land Use Act and Disaster Risk Reduction Law, among others. At the local level, DAMPA has also been lobbying for seats in the local development councils and for it to be recognized in the Urban Poor Affairs Office in the local government of Quezon City.

For DAMPA, vertical integration is a chance to learn and improve itself. In DAMPA’s experience, engaging in dialogue with the government at different levels, as well as with other stakeholders, affords leaders and ordinary members of grassroots organizations the opportunity to acquire skills and knowledge and to hone their expertise. They become more knowledgeable about local government processes, like planning and budgeting. They are also able to enrich their experience through networking, communication, financial management, and capacity-building (Virginia Gandia, pers. comm.). Leaders and members are exposed to the intricacies of organizational development and management. The global arena has opened up many learning experiences for DAMPA, with increased interest from global funders and multilateral institutions like the UN and other agencies.

DAMPA recognizes that it was able to vertically integrate because it understands its own strengths and weaknesses and of how institutions operate. It aims to strengthen its communication and networking. It has developed its own training pool to train leaders, members and others. The training it provides includes ways to respond to different contexts and scenarios.

Another challenge for DAMPA is gaining the trust of decision-makers in government at all levels. The organization believes that it has been able to turn around the idea that the government and grassroots organizations are threats to each other. This idea is supported by the fact that DAMPA’s institutional arrangements with the government translated to more efficient and effective implementation of government programs and more pro-poor outcomes.
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1987 Philippine Constitution.


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• Emma Manjares – Secretary-General, DAMPA, March 26 and April 17, 2015.
• Marietta Espuerta – Community Organizer, DAMPA, May 5, 2015.
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• Charlyn Estrella – Federation Secretary, Socorro, Surigao del Norte (DAMPA - Municipal), May 5, 2015.
• Janith Paja – President, Barangay Rizal Socorro Surigao del Norte (DAMPA-Barangay), May 5, 2015.
• Evelyn Rivas – President, Barangay Navarro, Socorro, Surigao del Norte (DAMPA-Barangay), May 5, 2015.
• Judy Letada – Community Organizer, DAMPA-Bulacan, March 26 and April 17, 2015.
4.4 Intensifying the anti-mining campaign

Benedict G. Nisperos and Rhia Muhi

4.4.1 Introduction

The Philippines boasts a wide variety of mineral resources that can sustain a mining industry. This is due to its location along the Pacific Rim of Fire, an area with significant seismic activity. The country has rich reserves of minerals and quarry resources. Thus, there is aggressive interest among mining firms to exploit the country's resources (Mines and Geosciences Bureau 2004; Cavanagh and Broad 2013).

In the early 1990s, mining was among the seven growth areas included in the government's development strategy. To address the issue of declining mining contributions to the economy, the government under the Ramos administration pushed for the passage of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Other policies in favor of mining were also introduced as part of economic programs (Holden and Jacobson 2013: 44).

Mining activities pose serious threats to the environment and affect the ecosystems around mines. This is because, “mining involves the use and creation of highly toxic substances and can have impacts on both water quality and water quantity; mines, being limited by the location of ore deposits, cannot be moved once developed”
Although the Philippines’ Mining Law includes some provisions on environmental protection, only a few address mining’s socio-cultural consequences, specifically for the rights of indigenous peoples (IPs) (cultural communities in their ancestral domains), as well as health, sanitation, and environmental issues that are affecting the entire country. Furthermore, even with the environmental provisions, the Mining Law does not provide adequate environmental protection for Philippine lands and the communities within them. The law allows forest clearing, free water exploitation, easement rights, and the use of explosives. It imposes low fees and penalties. Moreover, it does not provide adequate protection of the rights of mining-affected communities, particularly related to IPs’ ownership of natural resources.

In 1996, irresponsible practices of Marcopper Mining led to an environmental disaster in the Marinduque province. This further galvanized efforts against mining, uniting communities organizing against large scale mining in several locations throughout the country.

Through the years, the anti-mining campaign has achieved considerable results in national and local fronts. At the national level, the campaign advanced a policy regulating mining through Executive Order No. 79, which President Benigno Aquino issued to establish a moratorium on mining in different areas of the country.

At the local front, the campaign was successful in upholding the environmental rights of citizens, with grassroots communities able to assert and advance their rights and prevent abuses and human rights violations by mining companies. For example, for a decade, a community in the municipality of Placer, Surigao del Norte province resisted the entry of mining firms into their area. The community organized themselves into ABAKATAF, which stands for the Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task Force, in order to fight the efforts of mining firms to mine on their lands.

The sites of struggle in the anti-mining campaign increased through the years as more communities opposed mining in their areas. The campaign also led to an increase in awareness on mining industry issues (both local and national) and sparked additional interest and involvement from other development players (both domestic and international). The campaign produced “sound documentations, local baseline researches information and education materials and other advocacy tools, and provided focus and synergy among advocates, especially in creating ‘centres of attention’” as rallying points for advocacy in the sites of struggles” (PIPLinks n.d.).

Existing literature attributes the successes of the anti-mining campaign to the efforts of a multi-sectoral coalition against mining and the extensive coordination from the local to the national among organizations and decision-makers (Rovillos et al. 2003). The use of the alliance’s specific expertise (in areas such as communications, organizing, law, and strategic planning) delivered results (Tauli-Corpuz et al. eds.) 2002). Strengthening grassroots support and involving the communities in the struggle ensured that the campaign had local roots. Maximizing existing legal and political mechanisms also contributed to the success (Gobrin and Andin n.d.: 5).

This case study examines ABAKATAF’s grassroots anti-mining campaign and how, through vertical integration, it elevated its struggle against mining to reach the national level. It documents how ABAKATAF gained support from different anti-mining organizations, civil society, and the media, as a result of simple acts of defiance utilizing sit-down community rallies and mobilization.

There have been several studies investigating the anti-mining campaign. However, most of these studies focused on the adverse effects of mining,
mining disasters, and mining policy. They neglected the community-based campaign and its engagement mechanisms that achieved success. Therefore, this study documents the historical context and presents a micro view of the process by which ABAKATAF organized its members, strategized, and engaged at the different levels to stave off the entry of mining firms. In addition, it shows how a grassroots campaign inspired and contributed to a national campaign against mining in the Philippines. Finally, it explores the limits of vertical integration in this particular aspect of the anti-mining campaign in the Philippines.

4.4.2 ABAKATAF: From grassroots to national consciousness

To stop mining firms from entering their community, ABAKATAF organized mobilizations and rallies at the community level, which then grew to reach the municipal seat of power, and then to the provincial capital.

The members of the organization were aware of the possible adverse effects of mining on their lands because of the mining-caused environmental disaster in Marinduque in 1996. They did not want this to happen to their communities because they live off their land through farming, raising livestock, and other livelihood activities that are dependent on the land.

To stop mining firms from entering their community, ABAKATAF organized mobilizations and rallies at the community level, which then grew to reach the municipal seat of power, and then to the provincial capital. They marched through the main streets of Placer, which caught the attention of onlookers and passersby. As a result, ABAKATAF officials from Anislagan pushed the barangay council for a resolution to stop the entry of mining firms in their area. Their organization also issued a resolution upholding the protection and preservation of the rights and lands of the people of Anislagan. To strengthen their claim, ABAKATAF officials wrote to the municipal mayor and provincial governor, stating their opposition to the mining projects. They argued that there had been no community consultation before a mining permit was issued for Philex Mining Company. They expressed their opposition directly to their political leaders, who, however, only promised to address their concerns.

The residents of Anislagan quickly voiced their objection when on 26 September 2000, Manila Mining Corp. (MMC) announced its intent to conduct mining explorations in the area. A few months later, the local government units (LGU) and their constituents were dismayed upon learning that, in spite of their opposition, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), had issued a temporary environmental permit on 29 December 2000 in favor of MMC. The following year, the Sangguniang Bayan of Placer passed an ordinance to protect the watershed and communal forests found in the whole municipality. In support of this, the LGU of Anislagan approved a barangay resolution declaring the Anislagan watershed as a protected area. Notwithstanding local legislation, the MGB issued environmental permits to MMC, Kalayaan Copper Gold Resources (KCGR), and Silangan Mindanao Mining Inc. (SMMC) for an exploration in another town, Tubod, Surigao del Norte.

When the mining firms pushed for their entry into the community, ABAKATAF organized sit-down picketing and hunger strikes at the intersection of their village road and the entry to the mining site. They formed human barricades and took turns ensuring that the barricade would remain in place to prevent the mining firms from entering. At least one watchman was present 24 hours at the area to alert the community by ringing the nearby church bell if mining trucks attempted to enter. The ringing of the bell proved to be an effective rallying cry for the community. Leaders shared that community members would wake up even in the wee hours of the morning when they heard the church bell. They would then knock on each other’s doors to wake their members, congregate, and create a human barricade to prevent the entry of the mining trucks. These efforts captivated the attention of the nation and other communities facing the brute forces of mining firms. For a time, Philex Mines delayed its entry to the area and re-strategized.

The mining firms’ power and seemingly limitless resources made it difficult for the grassroots community organizations to sustain their victories. When Philex Mines was forced to delay its entry, it resolved to use other means of accessing lands rich in minerals. It pursued a legal strategy, filing cases against those who had prevented their trucks from entering the mining area. Several cases were filed against specific members of ABAKATAF. However, the community group did not buckle. Leveraging its initial victory, ABAKATAF sought the help of national organizations in their fight. This is where Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center–Kasama
In 2000, with the help of LRC, ABAKATAF filed a petition for a mandamus with a prayer for injunction against MMC, KCGR, SMMC, and the regional office of DENR, which included some of its top officials in the Caraga region. The filing of this petition served as a test case of the Supreme Court's then newly-promulgated environmental case proceedings and Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.

In the suit, ABAKATAF claimed that the DENR Regional Office XIII granted permits to MMC to explore the mineral-rich Anislagan without proper legal consultation with area residents. MMC, a subsidiary of Lepanto Group of Companies, was issued two exploration permits (EPs; XIII-014 and XIII-014A) by the DENR-Caraga, which also granted an environmental permit to KCGR and SMMC. KCGR is a joint venture of MMC and Anglo American, a British mining company. In their 14-page petition, ABAKATAF stated that the DENR had given environmental permits to these mining companies despite the community's strong opposition.

With the high costs of legal fees and the technical nature of the legal process, grassroots organizations welcomed technical, legal, and financial support from national organizations. At the same time, the struggle used a people-led legal strategy. This means that community members filed the cases themselves with technical and legal help from LRC and ALG. This was to ensure that the community had ownership over the cases and supported them as they went through the legal process. For example, when ABAKATAF received legal representation from LRC, it did not mean that LRC took over. ABAKATAF still led the filing process for the cases, while LRC managed the preparation and supported the cases at every stage, from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. LRC also supported other local-level facets of the anti-mining campaign, such as the media engagement and other cross-sectoral coordination.

Much of the attention to the campaign was generated through coordinated local and national media campaigns. At the local level, LRC helped ABAKATAF in its media campaign by providing savvy coordination with the media and continuous press releases. Through this mechanism, the regional media picked up and aggressively pursued the story of ABAKATAF. This created national interest, thus, turning the plight of Anislagan into a national issue (MindaNews 2010).

LRC’s active involvement in ABAKATAF’s struggle included mobilizing its international network to focus on the plight of the community. Together with ALG, LRC submitted regular reports on the community struggles to Friends of the Earth-International and Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links (Piplinks), a UK-based organization supporting indigenous peoples in the Philippines, which then fed this information to the international community for its fight against mining.

4.4.3 Legal Rights Center and Alternative Law Groups

As discussed above, LRC and ALG were two instrumental forces in ABAKATAF’s campaign. LRC served as the median point that linked integration between the grassroots and the national levels by utilizing a multi-faceted approach to resolve legal and technical issues throughout the duration of the legal proceedings. As the locus for service provision for marginalized and oppressed sectors of society, LRC recognized the importance of vertical integration in maximizing the inputs and capacities of organizations involved in the campaign against mining.

For its part, ALG advocated for the government to scrap the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and Executive Order 270-A, which promoted large-scale mining. The proposal to repeal these laws was common among the anti-mining organizations. Moreover, ALG and LRC also advocated for the passage of an Alternative People’s Mining Act, the revocation of EO 270-A, the rejection of the National Minerals Action Plan, and the imposition of a nationwide moratorium on large-scale mining operations.

The anti-mining campaign’s national strategy included turning to powerful and influential champions to help the cause gain recognition. Such national-level champions who facilitated the campaign included Senator Sergio Osmeña, Congressman Rufus Rodriguez, Attorney Marlon Manuel, the National Coordinator of the Alternative Law Groups, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Marvic Leonen (then the Executive Director of LRC), Father Edu Gariguez of the Council of Elders, Social Section Center, Attorney Christian Monsod, an independent expert, and Attorney Mayo Alda of Environmental Legal Assistance Centre (ELAC). It is important to note that most of these legal luminaries were members of the ALG network. Later in the campaign, as progressive party-list groups entered the legislature while old allies remained, the number of champions in the Congress increased.
The anti-mining campaign became more active following the creation of the massive coalition against mining, Alyansa Tigil Mina (ATM) in 2004, in which ALG is one of 100 organizational members. ATM campaigned against the 1995 Mining Act, and condemned the potential impact of large-scale mining operations to the environment. As the years progressed, more interest groups joined the alliance and contributed to the campaign. Each member organization has its own expertise in the anti-mining advocacy. For example, ALG specialized in giving legal assistance at the sites of struggle across the Philippines. The organizations’ areas of struggle are scattered around the three main island groups in the Philippines: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Most of its members are involved in the following areas: Luzon: Albay, Cagayan valley, Catanduanes, Marinduque, Mindoro, Nueva Vizcaya, Palawan, Zamboales; Visayas: Eastern Samar, Guimaras, Masbate, Romblon; Mindanao: Agusan del Norte, Davao oriental, South Cotabato, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, and Zamboanga del Norte.

As discussed above, the anti-mining campaign intensified after the Marcopper tailings disaster, which polluted the water sources of Marinduque province (Coumans 1995: 42). The disaster provoked protests from the country’s Catholic clergy, church-based organizations, civic-oriented groups, conservation and environment activists. In January 1997, partly as a response to the disaster, and alarmed by the influx of foreign mining companies into the country, Bantay Mina, a group of civil society organizations (CSOs), filed a petition with the Philippine Supreme Court. Known as the La Bugal-B’laan case, the petition questioned the constitutionality of the Mining Act and its implementing rules and regulations (Chaloping-March 2011). The individuals named in the petition were community members so the community had ownership over the filing. The case garnered the support of different anti-mining groups and individuals.

Bantay Mina carried the campaign in the years that followed while subsequent cases were also filed against other mining firms. This somehow checked the activities of mining firms in the country. The Marinduque disaster became the ‘face’ of the mining campaign both locally and internationally. It still haunts the mining industry up to the present day because of various issues left unresolved, such as from payment of taxes and the rehabilitation of affected areas.

As the campaign progressed, ALG diversified its actions into other areas, including information, education, and communication campaigns using various media platforms, technical studies to support the claims made in policy dialogues, and using existing legal frameworks to pursue its goals. In 2010, as more spaces for CSO involvement in governance was opened with the election of President Benigno Aquino, ALG had become actively involved in the crafting of policies and laws at the national and local levels.

Simply put, the anti-mining campaign is a stratified web, with inputs coming from the grassroots up to the national level. The national organizations provide assistance to the grassroots communities that cannot fend off the aggressive strategies of the mining companies, and expose them to a wider audience that otherwise would be unreachable due to their limited resources.

On the one hand, ALG had an important role in raising consciousness and awareness of the issues on the ground and in coordinating actions to achieve the successes of its campaigns. On the other hand, LRC directly responded to the needs of the grassroots community in their request for legal and technical help.

### 4.4.4 Actions per level and intensity of actions

#### Constituency Building

At the local level, ABAKATAF facilitated public discourse and engagement among its community members. It sent members to provincial and regional assemblies to share their on-the-ground experiences. It expanded its constituencies by sharing the campaign with other communities that faced the same problems.

ABAKATAF delegated the national level work to LRC and ALG given their greater technical experience. ABAKATAF’s rich experience in grassroots campaigning and community organizing had been a source of inspiration to communities around the country as members shared their experiences beyond their regions.

On the more technical side of the campaign, ALG worked extensively in cross-sectoral coalition-building with other ATM members. ATM, as one of the widest CSO coalitions against mining, as discussed above, provides many platforms where anti-mining advocates discuss effective measures to engage and address these issues. This horizontal exchange that involves discussion of experiences and identification of strategies has also taken
place at the regional and interregional levels, especially in Mindanao where sites of struggles are scattered in different regions.

ALG’s constituency-building strategies involved education and communication efforts to showcase the abuses by mining firms. The strategies included the production of documentaries and other forms of media, conducting community educational discussions and campaigns, and film showings, among others. ALG accomplished this from the grassroots to the national levels by working through its member and partner organizations. These efforts have been most intensive at the grassroots level so that the communities themselves understand the adverse effects of mining.

ALG also conducted capacity building for grassroots-level members and paralegal trainings for community organizers and volunteers. Moreover, ALG uses participatory processes to develop CSO policy alternatives to the Mining Law, like the Alternative Minerals Management Bill (AMMB), which it later took on as one of its priority bills and campaigns. This strategy served as a component to overcome the difficulty of winning community-level struggles against mining companies.

LRC also had a leadership role in the drafting of the AMMB, as well as in the constituency building, campaigning, research, and consultations for the AMMB.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constituency-building approaches:</td>
<td>Very local (community/school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/awareness-building</td>
<td>Community-led education campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
<td>Coordination with other anti-mining efforts from the church and other civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td>Coordination with religious, media and academic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
<td>Mobilizations and rallies, hunger strike and sit-down strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education strategy</td>
<td>Community education on the adverse impacts of mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
<td>Mines impact documentation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building
Participatory process to develop CO policy alternative

Dialogue set and letters sent to the provincial government and regional environment offices

Inter-CSO consultation and policy research on mining policies

Strategic use of Information Communication Technology for constituency-building

| INTENSITY KEY: | HIGH | MEDIUM | LIGHT |

Interface with the State

ABAKATAF, its members, and partners actively engaged local, provincial, and national governments in their struggle, and did so by employing legal, communication, and advocacy strategies. They continually met with local officials at the municipal and provincial levels in order to voice concerns about the entry of mining companies into their areas. As early as 1999, ABAKATAF worked to create a higher profile for its case with letters to then President Joseph Estrada and subsequently to President Gloria Arroyo.

In 2002, ABAKATAF engaged the barangay council of Anislagan to issue a resolution banning mining in their area. The barangay council later issued said resolution. In 2005, in order to make the resolution stronger, ABAKATAF lobbied for the passage of a barangay ordinance imposing a 25-year moratorium against mining. Further resolutions banning mining were also subsequently issued in 2007 and 2009. The network also solicited the provincial governor to stop mining in their area. From 2000-2010, it held dialogues with the provincial Sanggunian, which remanded the issue to the municipality.

In 2010, ABAKATAF advocated with the Sangguniang Bayan of Placer for the passage of an ordinance that would protect the watershed and communal forest of Placer. The ordinance was later passed. However, notwithstanding local legislations, the MGB continued to issue environmental permits to MMC and other affiliated mining firms.

In addition to ABAKATAF’s efforts as a network, ALG conducted policy advocacy at each level of the government. It served as a resource center for policy discussions in both houses of Congress. ALG also contributed to the crafting of an executive order of President Aquino promoting responsible mining and protecting vulnerable areas. Meanwhile, LRC engaged in policy work at the local level by providing technical expertise to local government units to, for example, craft policies and ordinances banning open pit mining in South Cotabato.

ALG lobbied for the approval of the Alternative Minerals Management Bill. It continues to do so with the present Congress. Moreover, one of the proponents of the bill is Congresswoman Kaka Bag-ao, the former Executive Director of BALAOD, another peoples’ organization, who is expected to push for the bill. Both ALG and LRC took advantage of other avenues that were available for consultation on the proposed policy.

Prior to the issuance of Executive Order 79 by President Aquino in 2012, ALG participated in policy dialogues and technical studies. Executive Order 79 sought to rationalize mining rules and reform policies that would ensure environmental protection for communities directly affected by mining. The executive order declared protected areas against mining and proposed ways to ensure responsible mining. Attorney Manuel from ALG shared that the issuance of EO 79 was a victory, saying that this moratorium on new mining permits may not be the ultimate goal “but is a step towards what we want for mining.” (Marlon Manuel, pers. comm.).

ALG, with LRC and other affiliated legal organizations, spearheaded the case filings on constitutional grounds, which began before the Regional Trial Court and were eventually heard by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, based on mining operations’ violation of human rights, ALG filed cases before the Commission of Human Rights. In 2010, LRC financially supported the case filed by ABAKATAF. Eventually, the cases were heard by the Court of Appeals, where it is currently awaiting a decision. By the time the cases were filed, ABAKATAF had been able to hold-off massive entry of mining firms in their area for about ten years (Ronnie Ormega, pers. comm.).
### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Interface with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very local (community, village, neighborhood)</td>
<td>District/ Municipality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>State/ Province</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
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<td>International</td>
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- **Policy advocacy – executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)**
  - Advocacy for adoption of barangay and municipal ordinances by the executive
  - Alternative Minerals Mining Bill and EO 79 lobbying
- **Policy advocacy – legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)**
  - Barangay Ordinances against mining
  - LGU Ordinances
  - Sangunian Resolution against mining
  - Alternative Minerals Mining Bill
- **Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)**
  - Regional Trial Court case filed for TEPO
  - Court of Appeals case on TEPO
- **Participation in ‘invited spaces’ (shared but government-controlled)**
  - Consultations and policy recommendations in national DENR consultation
- **Participation in ‘claimed spaces’ (shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative)**
  - Consultations and policy recommendations in national DENR consultation
- **Engagement with public accountability agencies (ombudsman, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)**
  - Filing of cases by ALG against violators of human rights

**INTENSITY KEY:**
- **HIGH**
- **MEDIUM**
- **LIGHT**

### 4.4.5 Analysis and mechanisms of integration

Both ALG and LRC utilized efficient mechanisms of integration for the anti-mining campaign. The coordination capability of ALG to take action with its members and partners contributed to the success of their campaign because, when ALG receives a case, the case is referred to the member organizations most suitable to handle the requirements. LRC recognizes that vertical integration is vital in achieving the victories it seeks. The variety of actions and its multi-level integration gives the organization an advantage in its advocacy work. According to LRC’s Attorney Grace Villanueva, the organization employs what it refers to as “strategic progressive legal intervention.” This means that it maximizes the spaces available within the legal fora, and then creatively builds from this to move within the legal system. She said that among those available, there is no such thing as the one best strategy, but instead “all the strategies, if used together, will achieve somehow a desired result. The different strategies must complement each other in engaging the lowest courts to the highest.” (Grace Villanueva, pers. comm.). She said that evidence-based studies at the local and national levels lead to integration, thus, the levels of advocacy must cover the local and national levels.

Attorney Marlon Manuel of ALG also recognized that vertical integration is key to campaign success. He explained that ALG needed to vertically integrate because anti-mining efforts can reap results both at the local and national levels, (Marlon Manuel, pers.comm.). There has yet to be any final determination on the powers of LGUs to control mining. Therefore, engaging at the local level can prove to be beneficial.

LRC demonstrates Attorney Manuel’s point. In the South Cotabato case, where LRC advised government officials on the imposition of a ban against open-pit mining, the local government recognized that the powers enshrined in the Local Government Code gave it the power to implement such a policy.

Attorneys Manuel and Villanueva shared that that both ALG and LRC understand the crucial role of vertical integration. Attorney Manuel added that the work on the ground serves as the source of ALG’s advocacy at the national level because it is the grassroots level that provides the information the national actors need in order for the latter to make better informed policy suggestions and decisions. According to Attorney Villanueva, it is important to integrate vertically because mining policies are crafted at the national level. Therefore, the technical expertise is available at the national level, while the supporting pieces of evidence come from the grassroots level. The on-site experience is the best evidence that can be presented to inform policies against mining (Grace Villanueva, pers comm.). She added that it is this integration between local and national organizations that would allow local organizations to resist the actions of powerful mining...
firms. In turn, the local and national organizations strengthen each other’s roles in the campaigns.

The anti-mining campaign heavily uses evidence of environmental disasters, which helps in nurturing a shared understanding of a common cause among the constituencies. The campaign relies on actual evidence of the ill effects of mining. Social and scientific research, including technical studies on the effects of mining, also affect policy-making. Internationally published and recognized studies are also presented in dialogues.

ABAKATAF recognizes that integration at various levels and collaboration with national-level partners facilitates the organization's struggle. For example, it attributes its success in filing the first environmental case under the new Supreme Court, “Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases” in Mindanao, and its having been granted a temporary environmental protection order (TEPO), to the multi-level collaboration. It acknowledges that it would not have been successful in gaining the TEPO if not for the help of national organizations like the LRC.

### 4.4.6 Challenges and limitations

Through the years of struggle, the campaign has become more difficult, especially when the mining firms use their enormous resources to advance their corporate interests. According to ALG, there are “deliberate efforts of the government to sell the Philippines as a mining haven without regard to the rights of the communities for their lands and without considering existing laws protecting the environment and promoting sustainability.”

Although much of ALG’s success can be attributed to cross-sectoral coalition-building at all levels, the organization is limited by the capacity of its members to expand and scale up. At the local level, ABAKATAF networked and coalesced with other peoples’ organizations in Mindanao to strengthen its stand and gather support, but a lack of resources for transportation and communication limited their ability to participate in hearings and public consultations. The mining companies’ costly legal reprisals hindered LRC’s ability to support this kind of grassroots-level work.

Resources are always a challenge for any organizational structure. In the case of ALG, this is being addressed by networking with local and international sources. ALG is one of the organizations that submitted annual shadow reports to the UN Human Rights Commission regarding the state of mining and human rights in the Philippines. They networked with ATM and other technical and donor agencies to increase support for its cause.

Dealing with the bureaucracy is also a constant challenge (Marlon Manuel, pers. comm.). At the local level, it is hard to contend with the mining companies’ strategies for undermining grassroots campaigns, such as filing baseless cases and (allegedly) using money to influence decision-makers at the local level. Mining firms are also said to undermine family and community relationships by employing activists’ relatives and bribing community leaders. There is also a challenge in dealing with government officials who are alleged to have received bribes from mining companies. Court cases are filed against erring officials, with the hopes that legal arguments will win over the influence of money.

Attorney Villanueva added that there are misconceptions about the different strategies available to grassroots organizations, especially those practiced in the international arena. As a result, domestic organizations are not informed of the ways that international support can be accessed to further their respective causes. She added that, for example, the UN special rapporteur can be invited to investigate human rights violations with regard to mining, but not all organizations are informed of this. Thus, even if there are avenues to vertically integrate, much has to be improved regarding the sharing of information among grassroots organizations and how they can engage at different levels with civil society and the government.

There are issues related to conflicting local and national policies. For example, there are times when an LGU opposes mining based on local rulings, but mining companies still pursue their operations citing national law. This creates confusion about what are the allowed and appropriate approaches at each level of government.

Overall, coordination and synergy among organizations against mining is still a challenge. Vertical integration engages this challenge and provides an alternative way of streamlining efforts and ensuring that targeted support is given where it is needed, and that the most effective and efficient strategies are employed to win the struggle.
References:


Interviews:

• Atty. Grace Villanueva – Executive Director, Legal Rights Center- Friends of the Earth Network, April 7, 2015.
• Ronnie Ormega – Chairman, ABAKATAF, May 4, 2015.
• Jeana Dapar – Secretary, ABAKATAF, May 4, 2015.
4.5 Campaigning for the rights of Indigenous Peoples

Benedit G. Nisperos and Romeo Saliga

4.5.1 Introduction

Indigenous peoples (IPs) comprise about 15% of the total Philippine population. Yet, they remain to be one of the most marginalized sectors in the country.

Scattered around the archipelago’s 7,107 islands, these groups face varying degrees of state neglect and non-recognition. Human rights violations and other abuses by state forces also threaten their survival. Found in the mountains of Luzon, Palawan, parts of the Visayas, and inhabiting around two-thirds of Mindanao, the IP’s geographic distance makes it difficult to consolidate their interests. Although there are common campaigns that all IP groups share, each group still has specific interests that are independent from the larger campaign. Each IP community has its own beliefs, systems, and interests, making the Philippines much like a nation of nations (Brigida Hamada, pers. comm.).

The IP rights campaign in the Philippines can be described as pioneering and longstanding. It is pioneering because the Philippines is one of the first countries to adopt a law protecting the rights of indigenous peoples. It is longstanding because the efforts made to pursue IP rights were evident as
Indigenous peoples’ demands for self-governance and the usage of their ancestral lands have been the driving force of their continuing struggle. Corollary to this campaign are other rights-based campaigns, including environmental protection, participation in governance, gender equality, and peace. Some of the country’s IP groups advance more specific IP interests, one of which is the Tëduray Lambangian Women’s Organization (TWLOI). The group operates in the Maguindanao province, which forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The province is also a known stronghold of the Muslim struggle for autonomy. It serves as the current regional center of ARMM.

In the context of the longstanding fight for autonomy by Muslim groups in the region, the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights in Mindanao has unique difficulties. Within this layer of struggle is another sub-layer that TWLOI has to face – the fight for women’s rights in a traditionally patriarchal society.

Indigenous peoples’ demands for self-governance and the usage of their ancestral lands have been the driving force of their continuing struggle. In the case of Cariño v. Insular Government, the high tribunal recognized that the indigenous peoples of the Philippines have primary rights to their ancestral lands since these territories were never part of the public lands of the state.  

In this context, TWLOI fought for IP rights in general and IP women’s rights in particular. Their campaign included the day-to-day struggle for basic services. Through its efforts, TWLOI was able to claim spaces for representation to voice IP issues and concerns from the local to the national level. 

For instance, the implementation of the Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act (IPRA) in the ARMM has been difficult because of the autonomous nature of the ARMM government. In fact, the Regional Legislative Assembly–ARMM first needs to pass a parallel law to implement IPRA in the autonomous region. This is further aggravated by the decades-long conflict rooted in the struggle of the Bangsamoro people that sometimes overshadows the struggle of indigenous peoples.

Another example of the challenges that IPs have faced is their quest for recognition of their ancestral domain title in the ARMM region. The national government is pursuing a peace agreement with the Moros in the region, hence, the IP claim has taken a backseat. The Congress prioritized the harmonization of the existing laws with the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law, which will affect the rights of the IPs.

In this context, TWLOI fought for IP rights in general and IP women’s rights in particular. Their campaign included the day-to-day struggle for basic services. Through its efforts, TWLOI was able to claim spaces for representation to voice IP issues and concerns from the local to the national level. As a result, TWLOI could represent IP interests in key decision-making bodies by taking advantage of shared spaces with the government. It succeeded in lobbying for the passage of local ordinances advancing IP rights and allotting resources for services to IPs. One of its key successes was the inclusion of IP women’s rights in the Magna Carta of Women enacted in 2009. TWLOI was able to maximize its networking with the government, from the local to the national, for the services to which IPs were entitled.

4.5.2 The IPRA campaign

The campaign for IP rights intensified during the latter half of the Marcos regime in the late 1970s. At the time, the Marcos administration had introduced several large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams and energy plants. These infrastructure projects claimed forestlands and domains occupied by IPs. Opposed to these projects due to their adverse effects on the environment and their communities, IPs organized themselves...
with the help of the Church and leftist groups to prevent the devastation of their ancestral lands (Brigida Hamada, pers. comm.). However, given their explicit challenge to the dictatorship, many opposition groups’ leaders were martyred.

After the overthrow of the Marcos regime in 1986, the call to recognize the rights of IPs grew louder. The most sweeping response to this demand was the inclusion of several provisions protecting IP rights in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This was followed by the inclusion of the IP agenda as a priority social reform for the administration of President Fidel Ramos (Bennagen 2015).

In 1997, through the continuing efforts of champions in Congress, civil society groups, and other stakeholders, the Indigenous Peoples’ Right Act of 1997 (IPRA) was enacted into law. IPRA is considered a landmark measure—a first in Southeast Asia, and the first law in Asia to use the term “indigenous peoples.” Indigenous peoples themselves, through their community leaders, were part of the preparation, discussion, and decision-making process for the passage of IPRA. Moreover, “the impact of civil society participation on the making of the IPRA was quite substantial and positive” (CIPRAD 1999). It was estimated that “about 70% to 80% of the contents of the draft bill still found their way into the final law.” Among the communities that took part in the process from Mindanao were the Tédurays—the subject of this case study (Bennagen 2015).

Yet, two decades after the passage of IPRA, its vision has yet to be realized. Critics assail the continuing inability of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) to advance the interest of IPs. There are also provisions in IPRA that conflict with other domestic laws, such as the Mining Act (Republic Act No. 7942) and the Organic Act Creating the ARMM (Republic Act No. 9054). This prevents the efficient granting of ancestral domain titles to IP claimants (Tauli-Corpuz 1998). However, despite these criticisms, some sectors still believe that IPRA and the NCIP remain the “best chance” for IPs to voice their concerns (IAG 2011).

Amidst all these challenges and struggles, TLWOI optimized the space provided by the state to make their campaigns effective. The organization found ways to network and coordinate across organizations and levels of governance to address its concerns (Molinitas 2007). Despite its limited resources and its difficult struggle as a women’s organization working in traditionally patriarchal societies, TLWOI was able to claim spaces for political expression and governance participation.

This case study describes the government and stakeholder engagement strategy of TLWOI. It looks at TLWOI’s actions at various levels of government, from the grassroots to the national level, thereby leading to the success of its campaigns.

There are numerous written sources on the struggle of IPs in the Philippines, but none of these sources details how a single organization had used various mechanisms and strategies at different levels to engage its constituency and the State. There are only a few IP organizations that have been able to navigate policy spaces at different levels with ease. These are the IP organizations that take advantage of the spaces given by the government at the regional and national level, such as the National Anti-Poverty Commission, the Department of Interior, as well as LGUs, and the local councils, where their representation has been guaranteed through local laws or ordinances. TLWOI is one of those organizations. Yet, to date, there is no case study to document its work. This paper uses, as its framework, the concept of vertical integration to present and explore TLWOI’s struggle to advance IP rights in general and IP women’s rights in particular.

4.5.3 TLWOI

TLWOI believes that Téduray and Lambangian women are effective forces in advancing the rights and welfare of women in their quest for social justice and empowerment.

The Téduray Lambangian Women’s Organization Inc. (TLWOI) is a federation of 35 community-based Téduray and Lambangian women’s organizations in the municipalities of South Upi, North Upi, Cotabato City and Ampatuan—all in the province of Maguindanao (Froilyn Mendoza, pers. comm.). TLWOI was formerly part of the Mamalo Descendants Organization (MDO), a federation of several multi-sectoral people’s organizations. In 1994, with the assistance of the MDO Council and some local teachers, the Téduray Women’s Organization (TWO) was formed. Owing to the common historical lineage of the Téduray and Lambangian peoples, it later evolved to become TLWOI. Today, TLWOI is one of the hundreds of IP organizations in the country that is actively engaged in various activities and works in partnership with development agencies, including the government (De Vera 2007).

TLWOI believes that Téduray and Lambangian women are effective forces in advancing the rights and welfare of women in their quest for social
justice and empowerment. The move to create a separate and distinct organization espousing the rights of women was meant to address the limited sphere given to women in IP tribal communities (Perlita Landigan, pers. comm.). This is important because it demonstrates the active involvement of women in organizing and asserting their rights within a community traditionally and culturally dominated by men.

TLWOI's advocacy focuses on the recognition and participation of women in community affairs and in governance. Although there are women leaders in IP communities, most communities are still led by men who make the majority of the community decisions. In most cases, women do not have any significant involvement in decision-making (Jamisolamin 2012). Thus, TLWOI was organized to give a voice to women regarding IP concerns. TWLOI believes that a wider space should be provided for women so that they can directly benefit from development, since they are the most vulnerable group when it comes to development issues (Froilyn Mendoza, pers. comm.).

TLWOI focuses its programs in the far-flung areas of South Upi, North Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Odin Sinsuat and along the coastal areas of Datu Blah Sinsuat. These village communities are separated by mountains and secondary growth forests. Access to modes of transportation is extremely limited. It takes from five hours or more to get from one town to another, depending on the distance. For these communities, ‘development’ is mostly empty rhetoric used by powerful and rich politicians (TLWOI n.d.).

To accomplish its goals in these difficult geographical zones, TLWOI has a broad base of active support groups that cover a wide spectrum of organizations representing the academe, civil society, and religious community. The forms of assistance extended by these support groups include policy advocacy, community development, capacity building, technical-financial assistance, and education.

### 4.5.4 Actions per level and intensity per action

#### Constituency-building

TLWOI has conducted multiple constituency-building activities at different levels to support its advocacy and agenda. It established a solid network of advocates that supports its cause including, as discussed above, academia and the religious sector. Among its key allies is Notre Dame University, an academic institution based in Maguindanao that is also involved in development work and good governance efforts.

To tap into resources at the national level, the organization partners with national organizations like the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (PKKK–National Federation of Rural Women). This cross-sectoral alliance helps strengthen TLWOI’s technical knowledge of policy advocacy and project management. At the international level, the organization maintains strong partnerships with development institutions, such as The Asia Foundation (TAF), the UN Human Rights Commission, Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the European Union. These institutions supported TLWOI’s projects involving human rights, health, peace, and security.

Because of its accomplishments in advancing IP rights, TLWOI is now being engaged by the European Commission to implement projects in jurisdictions outside its base in Maguindanao, such as Jolo in Sulu province and Zamboanga City. This opportunity enabled the organization to expand its reach in Mindanao.

TWLOI conducts public education as an organizing strategy and consciousness-building tool. Capacity building strengthens its membership and makes it relevant to the government and other civil society organizations. Community organizing is strongest at the local level. This is strengthened by ongoing constituency visits made by the organization’s village point person. TWLOI’s system ensures that communities are consulted and represented in its regular monthly meetings. With the use of modern technology, like SMS (short messaging system) and cellular calls, TWLOI accesses immediate feedback from the grassroots level.

TLWOI uses available technology to communicate internally and reach out to its constituents. Internally, members communicate with each other through SMS. With the declining costs of cellular phones, a middle-income member from Têduray can now afford a PhP400 ($10) phone, which she can use to communicate with her leaders. The same is true with the leaders of the organization. SMS technology makes it easier to communicate about programs and advocacy efforts among the members of TLWOI and more broadly among the members of the community. However, even with the increasing popularity of SMS, especially among the younger generation, community conversations and backyard chats remain important channels of communication. This indigenous communication system is particularly useful in making collective decisions or articulating local issues at the village level (Arquiza 2007).
TLWOI also has programs on several radio stations, including DXUP, DXMS, and DXMY, because radio is still the number one source of information for IPs. This expands the organization’s reach, particularly to far-flung areas. TLWOI leaders have also been invited as guests in TV shows, both in regional and national TV, to articulate IP and IP women’s rights. Newsletter publications also help disseminate vital information to its constituents and advocates.

As a women’s organization, the group also conducts mass collective action during Women’s Month. This creates awareness among its member communities and the larger society regarding the causes for which IP women are fighting. The organization conducts these activities in coordination with the municipal and provincial governments, and with the help of other CSOs such as PKKK and We Act 1325. TWLOI also sends resource speakers on women’s rights to the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly.

**Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very local (community/school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/awareness-building</td>
<td>Community organizers visit constituency on a regular basis. Project officers also have direct access to ground level support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
<td>Village organizations, aside from TWLOI organizations are also consulted and approached especially in village concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td>Active participation in regional summits on IP rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
<td>Women’s month protests and IP rights religious mobilizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Alliance with national organized women’s and IP groups like PKKK
- Active participation in international summits and conference on IP and women’s rights
- London march on women and change
### Interface with the State

The work of TWLOI resulted in a claimed space for representation wherein issues and concerns could be voiced. At the national level, the organization was able to represent the cause of IP communities in the deliberations regarding the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), which was “a certified urgent bill proposed to Congress by the President to be the Basic Law of the new Bangsamoro political entity that will replace the current Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” (BTC: 8). The Executive Director of the TLWOI, Froilyn Mendoza, was appointed as the representative of the indigenous peoples in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC).

TLWOI also pushed for the effective implementation of IPRA despite its perceived flaws. Mendoza asserts that IPRA, even with its provision to fasttrack the granting of ancestral domain titles, still fails to deliver on its promise due to its institutional limitations. The organization supports the efforts of the Téduray Lambangian Dulangan Manobo Ancestral Domain Claim (TLADMDAC) to apply for the unified ancestral domain titles of the Téduray, Lambangian, and Dulangan Manobo IP communities, despite the inaction of the NCIP on their respective applications. Now that the discussion has evolved into recognizing the IPs in the proposed Bangsamoro entity, TLWOI represents the concerns of the IPs at the national level. This policy space is also a chance for TLWOI to advance the inclusion into the proposed Bangsamoro Law the bundle of four rights included in the IPRA law, namely, the right to their ancestral domain, the right to self-governance, the right to social justice, and the right to cultural integrity.

For IP women’s rights, TLWOI successfully lobbied for women’s eligibility to access multi-donor trust funds for the normalization process, and the establishment of the Bangsamoro Gender and Development Plan. This is especially difficult in a region where men traditionally and culturally dominate. TWLOI had to explain the need for the inclusion of gender-related provisions, specifically on the protection of women and their physio-biological and socio-economic needs in a largely patriarchal society.

TLWOI also actively participated in the crafting of the Magna Carta for Women, which was signed into law on 4 August 2009. TLWOI fielded its contribution in the discussions held in Davao in 2008 to 2009. This measure is a comprehensive women’s human rights law that seeks to eliminate discrimination against women by recognizing, protecting, fulfilling, and promoting the rights of Filipino women, especially those from the marginalized sectors. The law represents the Philippines’ commitment to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), an international treaty adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly.

At the national level, TLWOI was invited to represent IP women at various congressional hearings and consultations. This resulted in the inclusion of provisions regarding the right to representation and participation of IP women, the recognition and preservation of cultural identity and integrity, peace and development, and the protection of children (Arquiza 2007).

To build its credibility, TLWOI has conducted studies to convince policy makers and local chief executives to pay attention to their cause and fund

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public education strategy</th>
<th>Municipal level consultation is conducted with village leaders and representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
<td>Regional exchange of best practices is conducted through the help of national organizations like PKKK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal exchange of experiences/deliberation (inter-tribal)</td>
<td>Inter-tribal exchange at the national level, especially those organized by national partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory process to develop CSO policy alternative</td>
<td>Participation in provincial and regional assemblies of IP CSOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic use of ICT for constituency-building</td>
<td>Village-level coordination and communication system works with use of modern technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INTENSITY KEY:**
- HIGH
- MEDIUM
- LIGHT
their projects. At the municipal level, the group was able to use one of their studies about early marriage to lobby in the Sanggunian (legislative council) of South Upi for the passage of an ordinance providing for, and funding, marriage counseling for those people who plan to marry at an early age. This was done in coordination with the Notre Dame University. The study was later published by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. This publication eventually became a source book for other IP groups facing the early marriage issue (Jamisolamin 2012). The Téduray-Lambangian leadership has expressed appreciation for these processes because they offer an opportunity to mainstream their cause.

Between 1997 and 2010, TLWOI lobbied for the allocation and use of the gender and development fund of the barangay, which is 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of a village, at the barangay level in South and North Upi, Maguindanao. TLWOI presented the barangay council with plans for the use of these funds. Due to their detailed and practicable plans, the village council released the funds to TWLOI for projects intended for village constituents. For transparency, they then submitted the accounting and audit reports for the funds that were allocated to them.

On the judicial front, TLWOI is encouraging women to serve as arbiters in community-level conflict resolutions, which is one of the implementing guidelines of the Magna Carta for Women. These women arbiters, aged 53 to 77 years old, settle conflicts and perform roles, such as traditional birth attendants, officiators of rituals, farmers, community workers/organizers, wives, and mothers (Jamisolamin 2012). This promotes peace in the IP communities.

As the ancestral territory of the Téduray and Lambangian people is situated within the ARMM, they are subject to the laws, policies, and programs of the autonomous region. In May 2008, the ARRM regional government enacted Muslim Mindanao Act No. 241, which was a law designed to “recognize, respect, protect and promote the rights, governance, justice and customary laws of indigenous peoples.” TLWOI, as a member of the regional council, was very active in the deliberations for the Implementing Rules and Regulation (IRR) of this ordinance. The recognition of their system as stipulated in policy issuances was seen as an opportunity to mainstream Téduray socio-cultural, political, and economic issues (Arquiza 2007). This passage, however, was eclipsed by the deliberations of the Philippine Congress on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. The playing field has now been elevated to the national front. Mendoza, meanwhile, shared that, for concerns affecting the Téduray communities in general and not only specific communities, the organization raises issues to the regional assembly in Cotabato City, which is more geographically and strategically accessible than the provincial seat of government (Froilyn Mendoza, pers. comm.). TLWOI took advantage of these shared spaces provided by the government to advance IP rights.

Meanwhile, TWLOI also engaged in electoral processes by fielding its own candidates. At the local level, in the municipalities of North and South Upi, individual Tédurays regularly win elections for the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council). The members of the Piang family are among the Tédurays who regularly win these elections. TLWOI sees supporting and endorsing the electoral run of these Tédurays as an opportunity to lobby and get champions in local governments. Every election year, TWLOI actively engages with the different tribes, hoping that they can help advance their concerns in the political sphere, a sphere where their voices are the least likely to be heard.

Apart from the electoral process, the Local Government Code and other national government issuances provide areas of representation for various sectors and marginalized groups in local government councils and special bodies, from the village level up to the regional level. In 2012, national line agencies created teams, including the Local Poverty Response Action Team (LPRAT) and its regional counterpart. The LPRAT provides an avenue for marginalized sectors in society to be active agents in addressing poverty in their areas. The Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) convened it through the local chief executives, with the participation of other sectoral representatives. TLWOI Vice Chairperson Elsie Mokudef said that TWLOI was invited by local governments to be involved in ongoing local poverty reduction action planning, where the municipalities of South Upi and North Upi are priority areas. She views this as an avenue to raise their yet unheard concerns to the municipality and the province (Leonora Mokudef, pers. comm.).

Because rural poor and indigenous women’s access to resources and income remain low, TWLOI has been lobbying in the regional government for the allocation of resources to their communities. TWLOI focused its lobbying on the regional level due to the limited funds available at the barangay and municipal levels. The organization served as the IP voice in the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly so that funds could be directed to their communities. TLWOI was able to secure funds for their mini-stores.
and livestock for livelihoods. They were also successful in lobbying for plant supplies from the Philippine Coconut Authority (Leonora Mokudef, pers. comm.).

### Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Interface with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>Very local (community, village, neighborhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)</td>
<td>Advocacy for basic services support and Gender and Development services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
<td>Advocacy for basic services support and GAD services – linked with lobbying with elected village council officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “invited spaces” (shared but government-controlled)</td>
<td>LPRAT and local development council participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “claimed spaces” (shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with public accountability agencies (ombudsman, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)</td>
<td>Referral of issues to the Commission on Human Rights on IP killings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### INTENSITY KEY:
- **HIGH**
- **MEDIUM**
- **LIGHT**

#### 4.5.5 Analysis and mechanisms for integration

TLWOI is actively engaging the communities with which it is involved, and is optimizing the spaces for dialogue and coordination. The need to elevate women’s voices given the patriarchal nature of IP communities is seen as a key motivation for the organization to achieve results.

It is important to note that the gains of TLWOI are due to its success in implementing projects that are responsive to the needs of IP communities. TWLOI has been in existence for the past 20 years and it has proven its mettle in dealing with IP needs in its project areas. Its track record is built on its credibility as a partner organization. By producing results, TLWOI has been able to gain the trust of partners at the different levels of government and civil society.

Mendoza said that the appointments of TWLOI officers and members to positions where they can voice their concerns and influence policy debates is due to the recognition that different sectors give of their commitment to serve the interest of IPs. As she explains: “Our Mayor and Governor recognize our work, that is why they easily appoint or invite us to positions where we can actively participate in policy-making and decision-making for our concerns.” (Froilyn Mendoza, pers. comm.)

However, the inaction of the NCIP regarding the Tèduray’s application for their Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) has been a serious concern for TLWOI (Deonato Mokudef, pers. comm.). Mendoza believes that the inaction could be due to the ongoing discussions on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law, such that delineating the lands for the Tèduray, Lambangian, Dulangan and Manobo tribes may pose further conflict in the territories to be included in the proposed territory covered by the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Because of the lack of response from the NCIP, TLWOI explores other avenues to raise their concerns, such as the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. Mendoza said that if there are avenues where they can publicize their claims to their ancestral land, these avenues should be maximized. As she further explains:

> It’s difficult to just wait for the action of a government agency. We have to be proactive in achieving our desired results. Our
participation in the Bangsamoro talks would guarantee that our claim for our ancestral land will not be set aside and the recognition of the rights of the IPs in the region will not be forgotten and overshadowed by claims for autonomy of our Muslim brothers, due to the lack of recognition indigenous rights within the autonomous region. (Froilyn Mendoza, pers. comm.)

Their participation in the peace process is a way to raise IP concerns to the executive and legislative branches of government. To legitimize their position, the organization conducted several community consultations among the Tëduray, Lambangian, Dulangan Manobo and Higaonon regarding the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law. They then submitted a position paper which they presented during the public hearings of the Bangsamoro Transition Commission and Congress. It is yet to be seen how this advocacy will translate into actual policies by Congress and the President.

Due to the high number of members in village-level organizations, TLWOI federated to include the provincial level, extending to nearby towns of Cotabato City like South Upi, Sinsuat, and Ampatuan. To better serve its constituents, there is now a functioning secretariat based at the organization’s headquarters in Cotabato City. Managed by a Board of Trustees, TLWOI formalized its existence by registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission, thereby making itself a registered taxable entity.

TLWOI believes that grassroots organizing is the best way to expand its base, and cover all communities where there are Tëdurays and Lambangians. They have dedicated community workers who travel to communities and organize people. They also have assigned leaders in every village-based organization who coordinate with the TLWOI secretariat and vice-versa. For special projects, the organization has project managers and community organizers who are experts in project management and organizational development to ensure that the projects of the organization are implemented according to plan.

TLWOI actively coordinates with different branches of government at different levels, which makes it more effective in achieving its desired result. Their Executive Director is the IP representative in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. Their Chairperson represents IPs in ARMM and in the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) IP Sectoral Assembly. Their vice president represents the organization during congressional hearings on bills related to IPs. One of their members was a nominee for Sectoral Representative in the NAPC IP Sectoral Council.

### 4.5.6 Challenges and limitations

Even though it is an advantage to represent IP needs in both the local and national levels in government bodies, TLWOI still faces the challenge of sufficiently integrating at different levels. The technical capacity of their members is limited. They need more experts among their ranks to attend policy deliberations and policy advocacy meetings, project and programs coordination, and other government engagements. There are continuing efforts to train members to represent the cause of IPs in general and IP women in particular. This will hopefully increase their reach as it opens up more spaces for dialogue with government and create more opportunities for advocacy. It is also hoped that more funding agencies will become interested in their advocacy.

As it expands its membership, TLWOI sees that more resources are needed to reach their members. The lack of resources remains a concern for this province-based organization. It recognizes that networking with other organizations elevates their level of discourse, but reaching these organizations with their limited resources becomes an added challenge. Another concern is dealing with the bureaucracy, especially since some organizations are not fully informed about the political spaces now available to IPs. Indigenous peoples must assert their right to participate in these shared spaces that have opened to them. However, at the same time, more members must be further trained and become more acquainted with how the government works in terms of its culture, systems, and processes.
References:


Interviews:

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• Froilyn Mendoza – President, Tëduray -Lambaingan Women’s Organization (TLWOI); Commissioner, Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC), April 28 and 29, 2015.
• Perleta Landigan – Chairperson, TLWOI; ARMM Sectoral Representative, National Anti-Poverty Commission-Indigenous Peoples Sectoral Council (NAPC-IP), April 22.
• Leonora Mokudef – Vice Chairperson, TLWOI, April 29, 2015.
• Ronie Ampok – Project Area Coordinator, TLWOI, April 29, 2015.
• Haydee Mokudef – Secretary, TLWOI, April 29, 2015.
• Deonato Mokudef – Member, TLWOI; and Council Member, NAPC –IP.
• Gloria Tumalon – Katribumu, CARAGA Regional Sectoral Representative, NAPC-IP Sector, April 23, 2015.
• Rodrigo Imag –Tribal leader and past president, Nagkakaisang Tribu ng Palawan, April 22, 2015.
4.6 Advancing reproductive health rights

Marlon Lara Cornelio

4.6.1 Introduction

Giving birth is life threatening in the Philippines. In 2011, at least fifteen women died daily due to pregnancy and childbirth-related causes. The maternal mortality ratio stood at 221 per 100,000 live births.

In 2000, the Philippines filed its first reproductive health bill. Despite previously having been a signatory to various international conventions on Reproductive Health (RH), including the 1979 Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW (ratified in 1981), and the 1994 ICPD Programme of Action, the Philippines had not implemented a comprehensive program on reproductive health prior to the passage of the RH law.

Constant shifts in family planning policy and the long delay in the institutionalization of a more effective family planning and reproductive health program are attributed to the strong opposition of the Roman Catholic...
Constant shifts in family planning policy and the long delay in the institutionalization of a more effective family planning and reproductive health program are attributed to the strong opposition of the Roman Catholic Church (Acosta-Alba 2013; Ocampo 2014). Consequently, popular support was not readily available during the early period of lobbying for a reproductive health law.

In 2012, or twelve years since the first reproductive health bill was filed in Congress, and after fifteen years of lobbying from multi-sectoral groups, the Philippine Legislature finally enacted the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act (Republic Act No. 10354), widely known as the RH law. The law guarantees universal access to methods of family planning (both natural and modern), age-appropriate reproductive health and sexual education, maternal health, and reproductive health services. While the law recognizes that abortion is illegal, it mandates the government to ensure that women needing care for post-abortive complications are provided treatment and counseling in a humane, non-judgmental, and compassionate manner.

The RH Law is a landmark law in the Philippines, particularly because Catholics compose about 80% of the population. Sylvia Estrada-Claudio (2015) considers it a major victory for women’s groups in the Philippines and a resounding defeat for the hegemonic Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP).

But before the new law could take effect, the Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order (SQAO) on 13 March 2013. The status quo ante order stopped its implementation for 120 days. On 8 April 2014, the Supreme Court finally issued its ruling, which described the measure as “not unconstitutional,” but nevertheless struck down 8 provisions partially or in full. However, despite the struck down provisions, advocates believe that the government could still implement an effective reproductive health program.

This case study looks at the struggle of civil society organizations for the passage and implementation of the Reproductive Health Law, employing the lens of vertical integration.

Vertical integration refers to “the systematic coordination of policy monitoring and advocacy between diverse levels of civil society, from local to state, national, and international arenas” (Fox 2001: 617). It is an approach/strategy that emphasizes the integration/inter-connectedness of actions taken at all/almost all levels of action: community/grassroots, subnational (municipal, provincial), national and international, to deliver results.

In vertical integration, interrelated actions at different levels taken by civil society organizations (CSOs) are categorized primarily as “constituency-building” (which includes: grassroots-organizing/awareness-building; coalition-building among an already organized, shared constituency; cross-sectoral coalition building; mass collective action/protest; public education; independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation; horizontal exchange of experiences/deliberations; participatory process to develop CSO policy alternatives; and strategic use of ICT for constituency-building) and “interface with the state,” which includes: policy advocacy with the executive and legislative bodies; legal recourse; participation in “invited spaces” and in “claimed spaces”; and engagement with public accountability agencies.

The RH campaign demonstrated effective policy advocacy to uphold the rights of women and young people. The relentless advocacy by various CSOs, coordinated through the Reproductive Health Alliance Network (RHAN), proved critical for the passage of the RH Law. Early on in the campaign, RHAN worked with various champions inside the Executive and the Legislative branches. It spearheaded various mobilizations at the national and local levels that developed, harnessed, and demonstrated national support that created pressure for the passage of the bill.

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Through sustained policy research and active public opinion-making targeting the general public, key stakeholders, and the members of Congress, the campaign was able to shape public opinion in its favor. Multi-sectoral groups from the academy, medical and scientific communities, religious groups, and the business sector also expressed their support for the RH law. RHAN also engaged the Catholic Church in tit-for-tat in different venues. The passage of the bill received overwhelming approval from the public, with the Social Weather Stations (SWS) surveys in 2011 and 2012 showing 8 out of 10 Filipinos favoring the passage of the bill.
Tipping the balance in favor of RH was the strong leadership of President Benigno Simeon “Noynoy” Aquino III, who certified the bill as urgent and personally lobbied in Congress for its passage (Acosta-Alba 2013; Ocampo 2014; Melgar 2015).

The success of the RH campaign can be viewed from what is popularly known as ‘bibingka’ strategy, coined by Saturnino Borras, from the experience of the peasant movement (Borras 1999: 8).

While the bibingka strategy can be instructive for framing and understanding the success of the RH campaign, it also has limitations. These limitations relate to how it accounts for actions taken at different levels of policymaking, and how context interplays with these actions, particularly the phasing of the campaign across time.

The succeeding section will highlight the essential initiatives and victories at various levels of the campaign. While there was a deadlock at the national level, the campaign was being fought and won at the local levels. Further, it accounts for the scale of the campaign by covering all levels, and accounts for the role of international actors and influences.

4.6.2 Actions per level and intensity of actions

The campaign for the RH Law was diverse, broad, and multi-sectoral. Within the Reproductive Health movement are various networks and organizations that took the cudgels to the campaign.

The campaign for the RH Law was diverse, broad, and multi-sectoral. Within the Reproductive Health movement are various networks and organizations that took the cudgels of the campaign. This paper focuses on the story of Likhaan Center for Women's Health (LIKHAAN), within RHAN, and in close working relations with the Pinagtasang Lakas ng Kababaihan at Kabataan (PiLaKK).

Women's Health (LIKHAAN), within RHAN, and in close working relations with the Pinagtasang Lakas ng Kababaihan at Kabataan (PiLaKK).

RHAN, the oldest network advocating for RH, was formed in 2001 by several organizations including the Population Commission (PopCom), the Family Planning Organizations of the Philippines (FPOP), the Philippine Legislators’ Committee on Population and Development (PLCPD), and the Philippine NGO Council of Population, Health, and Welfare, Inc. (PNGOC). RHAN is a network composed of CSOs active in information and education campaigns (IEC), with clinics (on HIV, maternal health, primary women's care, and family planning). It also included multi-sectoral groups like lawyers, academics, and members of the media (Melgar 2015). Having the ultimate mission of enacting an RH Law, RHAN was created alongside the filing of the first RH Bill at the 12th Congress. It encompasses more than 300 organizations of various identities, including health service providers, women’s organizations, people’s organizations, party-lists63, and academic organizations (Ocampo 2014). As the campaign progressed, RHAN drew in various other organizations and sectoral formations.

Established in 1995, Likhaan is a non-governmental organization composed of grassroots women and men, health advocates, and professionals who are engaged in providing health education and services to women and young people in marginalized communities. In 2004, Likhaan became the RHAN’s Secretariat. Likhaan’s work ranges from providing health services, organizing and providing education in poor communities in Malabon, Manila, Pasay, Quezon City, Bulacan, Bohol, and Eastern Samar, to, more recently, national actions and campaigns to change policies and programs. Initially, Likhaan’s core work was focused on “provid(ing) reproductive health services for women in poor urban communities” (Estrada-Claudio 2015: 106). However, it eventually began to undertake legislative advocacy in response to the “massive violations of women’s rights…in various local government units.” These violations included bans on all forms of modern contraceptives, as well as denial of emergency obstetric care and post-abortion care to women (ibid.: 106).

Likhaan’s organizing work led to the creation of women’s health associations in each community. These later federated into PiLaKK, joining mass youth, women and LGBT organizations in 16 areas of Luzon and Visayas. PiLaKK works on issues of “health and rights, particularly sexuality and reproductive health and rights, education, environment, politics and governance.” According to Estrada-Claudio (2015), 40–60% of attendees of RH related mass mobilizations were from the federation.
Constituency-building

Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District/ municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State/ province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/ awareness-building</td>
<td>Women, youth are organized at grassroots level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizing in adjacent communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognized as an overall strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
<td>Influencing and partnering with homeowners associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federating homeowners association; federating grassroots organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Federating local organizations; forming campaign coalitions (CNGORH, RHAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td>Active collection of support from various sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active collection of support from various sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tapping academic, scientific community, other religious groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass collective action/protest</td>
<td>Mobilizations, creative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilizations, creative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobilizations, creative action; Occupy for RH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public education strategy (media)</td>
<td>Radio program, media recognition, TV ads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent CSO monitoring of policy implementation</td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizontal exchange of experiences/deliberation (across some geographic level)</td>
<td>Experience exchange among leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience exchange among leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity building of community leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory process to develop CSO policy alternative</td>
<td>Modeling/ operation-alizing local RH clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modeling/ operation-alizing local RH clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Articulation of local experiences in the proposed legislation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Philippines has a vibrant civil society movement, including organizations that focus on women and the youth. Within Philippine civil society, grassroots organizing/awareness building, coalition building, and mass collective action are common approaches for organizing. Such is the case of Likhaan, which started organizing and education campaign for community women as part of their provision of health services. From 1998-2000, a Likhaan organized women's group in Malabon started lobbying in their barangay for the creation of a women's center/birthing clinic and allocation of Php 2 million for women's health services. Realizing the need to get more people involved and gather support for their advocacy, the women's group actively worked with various homeowners' associations, which they later helped to federate. Consequently, the women's group endorsed a candidate from their ranks for the position of village councilor to ensure that they would have a champion within the government. In 2003, it helped federate women's and youth groups from its different communities into PiLaKK. PiLaKK then served as a common platform for different community groups advocating for reproductive health, among other issues.

After becoming RHAN's Secretariat, Likhaan focused on consolidating community support for RH through intensive IEC and community meetings. It conducted capacity-building training for community women to engage in the RH policy debate. It also assisted in formulating ideas on how RH clinics would work based on the experience of other locally-based RH clinics.

In 2008, the NGO Consortium on RH, through the initiative of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), was convened to reenergize the RH Campaign after years of failing to pass the law. Different organizations within the consortium had different tasks for various RH campaign activities: the Forum lobbied with influential personalities from the government, academe, and business sector; PNGOC led local campaigns and media engagements; PLCPD built a coalition of legislators supporting RH and lobbying from within; and, the RHAN Secretariat constituted the organizations lobbying outside the Congress. The network intensified their campaign for the passage of RH, soliciting support statements from
different groups and sectors. The academic community, led by professors from the University of the Philippines and Ateneo de Manila University, released statements in support of RH and other groups/sectors followed suit.

Aside from lobbying, the RH coalition participated in public opinion-making. The coalition used the mass media to air commercials supporting RH and to feature RH champions on TV programs to defend the bill. A RH radio program was launched, while PLCPD paid tribute to journalists who reported on RH through their annual POPDEV media awards.

Beginning in 2004, RH was introduced as an electoral issue at the local and national elections. Women’s groups like Likhaan and PiLaKK, as well as other members of RHAN, campaigned for candidates supporting RH and a no-vote campaign against anti-RH politicians. This carried on into the 2007 mid-term elections and through the 2010 presidential elections. In 2010, at least two presidential candidates included RH in their respective platforms, showing how RH had become a part of the national agenda. According to Ramon San Pascual, the head of the PLCPD, by that time, several leaders came out in favor of the reproductive bill, including then Sen. Benigno Aquino III, evangelical Christian leader Eddie Villanueva, and former President Joseph Estrada (Santos 2010).

From 2011 to 2012, intensified mobilization campaigns were held at both local and national levels. In 2011, the Purple Ribbon campaign launched the ‘Occupy for RH’ campaign with its inaugural rally taking place in front of Congress. The concept was borrowed from the popular and successful ‘yellow ribbon campaign’ against the dictatorship in the Philippines and the Occupy Wall Street movement adopted all over the world.

Estrada-Claudio (2015) recalls that when the RH bill was first filed, it did not pass out of the congressional committee on health. Its non-passage indicated the low support for the bill. Yet, when both Houses of the Congress eventually passed the bill, the majority of the population already knew the bill’s provisions and supported its passage. Estrada-Claudio sees this as “a testament to the capacity of the social movements and allies in other social institutions (media, the academy, certain government agencies) to undertake mass education leading to attitudinal change” (ibid.). The legislative advocacy campaign culminated with the passage of the RH Law in 2012 but the ‘real’ work was just starting.

While a vast and varied network of organizations have been mobilized in the campaign and majority of the population support the law, it is still to be seen how the support will affect the implementation of the law. Estrada-Claudio points out that “it will be interesting to track whether the general public, made aware of its reproductive health rights by the legislative struggle, will demand services from the government”.

Interface with the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>Very local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – executive authorities (mayor, governor, etc.)</td>
<td>Soliciting support for budget and project implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy – legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
<td>Lobbying for local ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “invited spaces” (shared but government-controlled)</td>
<td>Participation in consultations and planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “claimed spaces” (shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative)</td>
<td>Campaigning for local post; engaging local government units</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The RH campaign interfaced well with different government agencies from the local to that national, and even at international levels. The main arenas for contestation were the legislative bodies at local and national levels. The Executive branch under the Aquino administration was supportive and actively campaigned for RH. At the local levels, legal recourse was taken against local ordinances and national Executive Orders that were contrary to reproductive health rights and women's rights.

Before it was framed as such, the RH campaign drew heavily from international influences, particularly from international conventions, including CEDAW, and the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Program of Action, to which the Philippines was signatory. While CEDAW specifically focused on discrimination against women, the ICPD Program of Action recognized that reproductive health rights, as well as women's empowerment and gender equality, were cornerstones of population development programs. Another key international influence was the UN Fourth World Conference on Women 1995, which included the development of the Platform of Action, an agenda for women's empowerment. Likhaan, represented by Dr. Junice Melgar, participated in the 1995 World Conference on Women.

It was in the ICPD that the RH framing was first introduced. This influenced stakeholders in the Philippines to effectively shift the framing from population development (known as PopDev) to reproductive health (Ocampo 2014). In the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), four Filipino delegates (Congresswoman Bella Flor Angara-Castillo, Roberto Ador, Ramon San Pascual, and Dr. Demeterio-Melgar) played critical roles in the building and brokering of a coalition of RH advocates which persistently campaigned for RH at every Philippine Congress (ibid.). Prior to the introduction of RH bills in Congress, bills relating to population and development were being debated, but none were passed.

In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were launched. This reinforced local groups’ campaign for RH, particularly in relation to the promotion of gender equality, reduction of child mortality, and the improvement of maternal health. Catalyzed by these developments on the international front, some women's groups lobbied for the filing of the first RH bill, which was sponsored by Rep. Angara-Castillo during the 12th Congress. The shift from PopDev to RH led a wider range of women's group to identify with the campaign, and eventually own it as their primary advocacy goal (Ocampo 2014).

The RH campaign faced a backlash in the restrictive RH policy environment under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was backed by the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. During Arroyo's term, the passage of a national legislation saw no movement, and therefore, RH advocates focused their attention at the local levels. Local RH ordinances were lobbied and passed in several cities and provinces in the country, like Quezon City and Aurora Province.

The original RH champion, Angara-Castillo, went on to become Governor of Aurora Province. The proposed national legislation was essentially adopted as the province's RH code. Years later, Quezon City adopted its own RH code and the struggle for its passage mirrored a significant amount of the national work. According to Estrada-Claudio (2015), even before the passage of RH Law, there were many local government units that had their own RH codes. RHAN-Likhaan provided technical assistance in the crafting of these local ordinances, while local members vigorously lobbied their local councils.

While local RH ordinances were gaining ground in other areas, restrictive local ordinances and executive orders were being passed elsewhere. For example, in Manila, RHAN members highlighted the unspoken policy of banning contraceptives and preventing family planning trainings. In 2004, local members discovered a 'secret' Executive Order (E.O.) issued by Mayor Lito Atienza in 2000. RHAN documented cases of the harassment of family planning/RH NGOs and workers, such as the non-renewal of permits of NGOs on HIV and family planning, and a local woman leader being stopped while giving a session on HIV.

In 2009, RHAN publicized a report on RH violations in Manila. RHAN lawyers attempted to secure complainants from Manila, but people were afraid to come forward to testify. It was only in 2009, when Mayor Atienza had already ended his term, when a formal legal complaint was lodged against the subject local Executive Order. RHAN, with women complainants from Manila, challenged the legality of E.O. 003 in the Supreme Court. The case was also raised to the Commission on Human Rights as a violation of CEDAW and the recently legislated Magna Carta of Women.
A similar situation arose in Brgy. Alabang in Muntinlupa City, when the village council passed an ordinance that effectively banned contraceptives. Similarly, RHAN staged local mobilizations and questioned the legality of such ordinances. Simultaneously, local actions were undertaken while the lobbying continued at the national level. Melgar (2015) describes the situation as “firefighting on different fronts.” For RH advocates, these local cases highlight the need for a comprehensive national framework on reproductive health.

After the passage of the RH law, representatives from RHAN, including Likhaan, took part in crafting the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the RH Law. However, before the law could be implemented, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order. RHAN-Likhaan filed a Motion to Intervene, which the Supreme Court granted. While RHAN-Likhaan champions were inside the Supreme Court during the oral arguments, various groups also picketed outside the court.

While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the RH Law, the case had nonetheless effectively delayed the implementation of the law. After this win at the Supreme Court, RH advocates, once again, turned their attention to the actual implementation of the law. For example, at the national level, Likhaan is part of a multi-departmental committee created by Department of Health, the National Implementation Team (NIT), which also includes several CSO representatives, to monitor the implementation of the RH law. Likhaan is the CSO representative to the national secretariat, which coordinates CSO engagement with and inputs to RH implementation, including the reporting of CSO outputs.

To provide support for the immediate implementation of the law, Likhaan and PiLaKK, along with other organizations, conducted mass education campaigns in their territories to stimulate demand for access to RH services. In 2015, the campaign aimed to reach at least 10,000 women, and print and disseminate about 20,000 education and information campaign (EIC) materials. Aside from massive information campaigns demanding the implementation of the law, there was also the need to ensure that the government was ready on the supply side. In this sense, Likhaan also provided technical assistance to the local government of Manila to train its health workers in providing RH services, which had been restricted for about ten years.

### 4.6.3 Drivers/mechanisms for integration

Prior to the RH campaign, Likhaan was a self-contained and small-scale organization providing health services for women in marginalized communities. In fact, it had not been involved in legislative lobbying before the RH campaign. What forced Likhaan to expand its programs beyond the communities was the realization of the need for a national RH legislation, given the restrictive policy during the Arroyo administration and restrictive local policies, as in the case of Manila (Estrada-Claudio 2015).

Likhaan engaged in the national campaign for RH through its membership in RHAN to support a consistent advocacy message. Similarly, it facilitated the federation of its local partner women's organizations into PiLaKK for coordinate efforts to pass the RH bill and at the same time to address shared concerns at the local level. After the passage of the RH Law, the mechanism that the Department of Health had created provided a platform for Likhaan to integrate its local initiatives to the national implementation and monitoring of RH law.

At the international level, Likhaan is part of the International Initiative on Maternal Mortality and Human Rights, which monitors MDGs, particularly maternal mortality. Likhaan has an extensive network of international alliances at various levels of formality. It has worked with regional organizations like ARROW, a Malaysia–based organization that conducts research and advocacy for the realization of the ICPD Program of Action and the RH and gender empowerment MDGs. It has also worked with Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights. It has relationships of solidarity with organizations, including Hampshire College’s Civil Liberties and Public Policy Program, Interpares in Canada, and the Center for Reproductive Rights in New York. The common national and international struggle for RH serves as a driver for integration.

### 4.6.4 Challenges and limitations

Vertical integration is costly. There is cost in building and maintaining a network. Without resources, organizations will be forced to go back to their respective territories and levels. The RH campaign could integrate vertically because of the funding coming from UNFPA, as well as from local and international efforts to support the advocacy work of key RH NGOs. However, once such funding is exhausted, the network may suffer. According to Melgar (2015), this can be countered when there are established mechanisms for cost-free engagements, e.g. through social media or through volunteer work, which is still common in many communities and organizations. While funding support from local and international partners is important, Estrada-Claudio (2015) sees this as
miniscule compared to the sweat equity investment put in by committed activists and, more importantly, grassroots women who sustain their activism using minimal means.

Melgar (2015) points out that the RH campaign experience underlines a failure in the system where even with a majority of people supporting RH, the legislators in Congress delayed the passage of the bill because of the objections of the minority Catholic officials. The campaign had to deal with a dysfunctional system that both the elite and the conservative church have captured. Vertical integration was facilitated by RH advocates, including RHAN, who tediously brokered the coming together of powerful officials in Malacañang, the Cabinet, Senate and House of Representatives, and academic institutions with the grassroots. This was a movement of different groups and individuals, not political structures, blending together for a common cause.

The RH campaign, as RH advocate and scholar Estrada-Claudio (2015) argues, is post-modern because it goes with the flow rather than permanent structures. To a large extent, Estrada-Claudio attributes this as a factor in the success for the RH campaign. However, for her, vertical integration is centered on the idea of structure. The RH campaign was “not designed to be vertically integrated,” but it adapted to opportunities and challenges that brought it to engage different levels at a given time depending on the conjuncture. The campaign could not be encapsulated by the experiences of a single or a few organizations. The campaign was owned by many and, at the same time, by none.

Estrada-Claudio (2015) further characterizes the RH campaign as “rhizomatic.” This is a concept of Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, which refers to the rhizome in biology that grows underground and horizontally, sending out bulbs in all directions that grow into new plants. Therefore, a rhizomatic network is a complex network of intersecting and non-intersecting roots that allows transfer and recombination of similar and disparate locales and elements. For Estrada-Claudio, rhizomatic politics can include vertical integration as one level of integration, although it is far more encompassing as to include horizontal integration, as well as going beyond the binary of horizontal and vertical integration completely. However, other theorists would say that vertical integration represents more of an “arboreal” pattern (a tree and its roots) that is hierarchical. Usually, politics is seen as unidirectional (roots to leaves, grassroots to international) or bidirectional (from grassroots to international from international to grassroots.) Vertical integration may also not fully capture long and protracted campaigns. Such was the difficulty in framing and capturing the RH campaign.

References


Interviews

• Sylvia Estrada-Claudio – Board Member, Likhaan, Quezon City, February 26, 2015.
• Junice Demetrio-Melgar – Executive Director, Likhaan Center for Women’s Health (LIKHAAAN), Quezon City, April 7, 2015.
• Lina Bacalando – President, Pinagsamang Lakas ng Kababaihan at Kabataan (PiLaKK), Manila, May 8, 2015.
4.7 Building disaster resilient communities

Marlon Lara Cornelio

4.7.1 Introduction

The Philippines is prone to multiple recurring hazards, such as cyclones, floods, earthquakes, and landslides (COA 2014). According to the 2012 World Risk Report, the country is ranked 3rd out of 173 countries in terms of disaster risk. Compounding the country’s exposure to this range of natural hazards is the persistent vulnerability of large sections of the populations due to poverty (Scriven 2013). According to the World Bank (2012), although the country’s poverty rate has fallen in recent years, around a quarter of the population is still living below the official poverty line. This is particularly acute in urban centers, where rapid urbanization has led to the proliferation of unplanned settlements, particularly in hazard prone areas (GFDRR 2009). In addition, the country’s vulnerability to natural calamities is further compounded by human-made disasters, where long-running conflicts between the state and rebel groups (particularly in Mindanao) have created a persistent humanitarian need (Scriven 2013).

Prior to the passage of the Disaster Risk Reduction Management Act (DRRM Law) in 2010, the primary law covering disaster management in the country was an outdated law, Presidential Decree No.1566 (P.D. No. 1566), which dictator Ferdinand Marcos enacted in 1978. According to Eunice Agsaoy-Sano (2009), “numerous studies conducted over the years assessing the Philippines’ DRM system showed it as largely ‘reactive,’ ‘response-oriented,’
and a top-down system of operations. This clearly underscored the inadequacy of P.D. No. 1566, a 31-year old law that merely covered disaster control and focused on emergency response (2009).

In 2010, the DRRM law was enacted. It is the key legal statute relevant to disaster risk reduction (DRR) and response. It represents a paradigm shift: from an approach limited to reactive disaster management to a wider recognition of the need for a holistic approach to reducing risks and responding during emergencies.

The passage of the law took 10 to 15 years of patient and persistent engagement with the legislative process. The law includes a provision for a disaster risk management (DRM) fund, which also covers climate change adaptation (CCA) initiatives and civil society participation in disaster risk reduction management councils (DRRMC) from the national, regional, local, and grassroots/village levels. According to Loreine Dela Cruz (2015), Executive Director of the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP), the law is an international model that is compliant with the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA).

The passage of the law took 10 to 15 years of patient and persistent engagement with the legislative process. While there had been earlier legislative campaigns by various groups, the Disaster Risk Reduction Network of the Philippines (DRRNetPhils) was widely credited as being a crucial advocate for the passage of the DRRM Law (Scriven 2013) because it functioned as a strong, broad, persistent, and consolidated network that influenced policy. Champions inside the government, both in the Executive and Legislative branches, are also recognized to have played a critical role in the passage of this legislation (Agsaoay-Sano 2009; Scriven 2013; Dela Cruz 2015; Dator-Bercilla, 2016). Other observers argue that Mother Nature was the game changer for the passage of the law. Typhoon Ondoy/Ketsana, which hit the Philippines in 2010, provided a shock effect, demonstrating the urgent need for such a measure (Scriven 2013; Dela Cruz 2015). International agreements, such as the HFA, also strongly influenced the passage of the DRRM law.

There are several case studies and short papers on the advocacy campaign for the passage of the DRRM Law. Among these, the piece by Agsaoay-Sano (2009) is the most comprehensive study to date. With this in mind, this case study builds on the existing literature as it looks into the advocacy campaign for the passage of the Philippine DRRM Act, its implementation, and review process. Specifically, this examines the interaction of various initiatives at different levels of policy-making, from the local to the national, using the vertical integration approach.

The focus of this study is on the initiative of DRRNetPhils. The following sections will provide an overview of the network, actions, and approaches it undertook at various levels, from the drafting of the law up to its implementation and monitoring.

4.7.2 Actions per level and intensity of actions

DRRNetPhils was borne out of a shared commitment of pursuing the legislative advocacy to realize the dream of a DRRM law. DRRNetPhils is a national network of more than 300 CSOs, communities, practitioners, and advocates supporting the HFA on DRRM and implementing Community-Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM). It includes members from academic institutions and government agencies like the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), local government units (LGUs) and the various LGU leagues. DRRNetPhils sees itself as a network of Filipino organizations built from grassroots organizations advocating for change at the national level (Scriven 2013).

DRRNetPhils was borne out of a shared commitment of pursuing the legislative advocacy to realize the dream of a DRRM law (Agsaoay–Sano 2009). No single organization can be credited with having convened the network. It began as a collective effort of community-based, national, and international organizations, as well as government institutions (Dator-Bercilla 2016). The focus on a common aim helped the network's membership build agreement and consensus and, in turn, collectively advocate for change. The concrete nature of this target was crucial in creating cohesion within the network, which, if otherwise, would be a disparate group of heterogeneous actors (Scriven 2013).

DRRNetPhils advocated for transforming the once dominant emergency-oriented and reactive paradigm to a paradigm of risk-reduction, participatory
DRRNetPhils advocated transforming the once dominant emergency-oriented and reactive paradigm to a paradigm of risk-reduction, participatory community-based and proactive disaster-risk management. It called for a firm and effective policy that underscores the importance of DRRM in achieving sustainable development, while addressing issues of governance, risk assessment, knowledge management, reduction of vulnerabilities and risks, disaster preparedness, as well as strengthening people’s capacities. It also sought to “institutionalize disaster risk reduction and management through partnerships with national and local government units and communities in reducing vulnerabilities and enhancing capacities for disaster resiliency in the Philippines” (Agsaoay-Sano 2009).

**Interface with the State**

DRRNetPhils’ interface with the state has been consistent at the local and national levels. Before the national law’s passage, community-based organizations had been actively engaging their local government units and national government agencies for disaster preparedness and response. They built local cases, undertook modeling as part of their lobbying for local ordinances, and supported the national lobby.

At the national level, the concerted efforts of network members to pass the DRRM Law were critical. After the passage of the legislative measure, members of the network became part of the national and local DRRM Councils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFACE WITH THE STATE</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO interfaces with the state:</td>
<td>Very local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - executive authorities</td>
<td>Collaboration of budget support and policy implementation; membership in local DRRM councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy advocacy - legislature (town council, state legislature, parliament)</td>
<td>Lobbying for passage of local ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal recourse (case-based or strategic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “invited spaces” (shared but government-controlled)</td>
<td>Participation in local DRRM councils; NAPC; attendance in consultations and meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in “claimed spaces” (shared with government, created in response to CSO initiative)</td>
<td>Engaging in DRRM Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with public accountability agencies (ombudsmen, audit bureaus, human rights commissions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Scaling Accountability Mapping Matrix: Constituency-Building**
There is a mechanism within the government to provide a voice for marginalized sectors in policy-making. Republic Act No. 8425, otherwise known as the “Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act,” which took effect on June 30, 1998, mandates the creation of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) that is to be under the Office of the President. R.A. No. 8425 institutionalizes the government’s Social Reform Agenda (SRA), which enjoins NAPC to strengthen and invigorate partnerships between the national government and the basic sectors. Victims of Disasters and Calamities (VDC) is one of the 14 sectors represented in NAPC. NAPC-VDC has been trying to convince government agencies to allow civil society participation in disaster response and management as stipulated in P.D. no. 1566. NAPC-VDC did not advocate for a change in legislation but for a change in government practice (Masagca 2016).

From 1998 to 2009, a proposed legislation on disaster management was filed in Congress, but this languished and died in the legislative halls. There was a clear lack of buy-in by both houses, especially by senators, the senators’ staff (even among sponsors of the bill), with regard to the paradigm shift that DRRNetPhils espoused, specifically with regard to the participation and engagement of CSOs in the DRRM process (Agsaoay–Sano 2009). This is explained in terms of the general problem of bureaucracy that is resistant to change and the lack of a sense of urgency among legislators to change an existing law. Agsaoay–Sano added that, while the people of the Philippines are very familiar with disasters, it has been a serious challenge to educate the public about a new paradigm to effectively address disasters.

In 2001, the Philippine Disaster Management Forum (PDMF), which is a network of disaster management practitioners, engaged in advocacy to push for an enabling legislative and policy environment for CBDM. The Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) assumed the role of anchor organization for the said forum (Victoria 2012). In 2002, PDMF organized the First National Conference on Community Based Disaster Management, which was attended by community-based organizations, national agencies, and local government agencies.

The PDMF drafted and proposed a Disaster Risk Management bill in 2004, but like other similar proposed legislation, it suffered the same fate. Nonetheless, Agsaoay–Sano (2009) noted that there were gains achieved at the executive level, such as the integration of disaster management in the 2004–2010 Medium Term Priority Development Plan (MTPDP), and the adoption of a development tool for disaster integration in the development process of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which NAPC-VDC championed inside the NAPC En Banc (Masagca 2016).

Two key developments at the international front contributed to the push for a new DRRM law. First, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) was adopted in 2005 during the World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Hyogo, Japan. Second, at the regional level, member–states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the Agreement of Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in July 2005 in Vientiane, Laos, which was enacted in 2009. As a signatory to the 2005 HFA, the Philippine government had to review its DRR policies and strategies to ensure their consistency with the internationally recognized standards (Agsaoay–Sano 2009). Additional proposed legislation was also filed following the HFA and AADMER.

Unlike the PDMF, the DRRNetPhils’ lobbying efforts were anchored on these two new international agreements. At the national level, DRRNetPhils held meetings and conferences with policy makers to enable the latter to understand the complexities of DRRM and the need for it to be incorporated into development policy and planning. This was linked to giving them buy-in for the bill and engaging them to be its champions.

As part of lobbying at the national level, the DRRNetPhils’ activity ranged from being directly involved in crafting the DRRM bill and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), to attending committee hearings, and to protesting actions outside of Congress. Information, education, and communication materials were produced, targeting both local communities and national actors. Efforts were also made to convince legislators and executive officials, including the President and the Defense Secretary, to give urgent attention to the bill. The stance of key policymakers on the bill were also constantly monitored. DRRNetPhils also consolidated support from local governments, as well as different sectors, including business, media, academia, faith–based groups, local and national NGOs and people’s organizations (POs). The Network was conscious to bring in practical experience from grassroots organizations in the legislative discussions. Furthermore, the scientific community was also engaged in providing evidence to the committee hearings.

However, other more “urgent” concerns, like the budget hearing and the incoming elections, overtook the legislative process.
In September 2009, Typhoon Ketsana/Ondoy led to massive flooding and destruction. This led to the increased interest of legislators and the general public for a strengthened response to disasters. DRRNetPhils became more aggressive in lobbying with key legislators to support the bill. Governor Joey Salceda of Albay Province played a critical role in enlisting the support of key politicians (Dator-Brecilla 2016). The pending DRRM bill was eventually passed, but the network’s main proposal to launch a separate entity for DRRM was not carried out. After the passage of the law, DRRNetPhils and its member-organizations turned their attention to implementation and roll out.

The law opened up mechanisms for CSOs to participate in the DRRM councils, from the national level down to the grassroots/village levels. DRRNetPhils members filled this space and joined the councils. However, the extent of CSO participation in the regional and local councils cannot be ascertained. Loreina Dela Cruz (2015) reports that around 50% of the local councils have been convened; councils with CSO participation are much lower.

**Constituency Building**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUENCY-BUILDING</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ACTION:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots organizing/ awareness-building</td>
<td>Very local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District/ municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State/ province</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter-national</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition-building among already-organized, shared constituency</td>
<td>Tapping homeowners and other organized groups</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building of coalitions (POMF, DRRMNet Phils)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-sectoral coalition-building</td>
<td>Coalition building</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Engaging academe and scientific community</td>
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Coalition-building, both among the shared constituency and cross-sectoral formations, was a key strategy used in building constituency for the passage of the DRRM law. As a coalition, DRRNetPhils served various purposes. It provided a unified public education strategy, a venue for shared learning and exchanges between local and national organizations, and a forum for information dissemination, consultation and synthesizing of issues and positions.

The main driver of the DRRNetPhils is the Philippine International NGO Network (PINGON), a coordinating body formed in 1997 that is composed of at least 21 international NGOs working in the Philippines focused on humanitarian response and disaster risk reduction. PINGON serves as an informal venue for information exchange, collaboration, sharing of opportunities and resources, collective minimum standards and benchmarks in humanitarian response and disaster risk reduction.

In 2007, in compliance with the HFA, the Philippine government, through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and with support from the UNDP, convened a national conference for the formulation of the Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction (SNAP). PINGON mobilized its partners to participate in this conference.
On 12 June 2008, following the SNAP convening, members of PINGON, and representatives of 31 CSOs, communities, and individuals involved in and advocating for community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) met for an urgent consultation to discuss the DRRM bill pending in the Senate. They planned ways of pursuing legislative advocacy to ensure the enactment of an enhanced DRRM bill under the 14th Congress and before the 2010 elections. Among the consensus points reached during the consultation was the creation of “an umbrella formation to work initially as a lobby group in pushing for a DRRM bill in Congress up to the crafting of its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) and the bill’s implementation.” As a result, DRRNetPhils was born (Agsaoay-Sano 2009).

Through previous work with Christian Aid, the Ateneo School of Government (ASoG) eventually became part of DRRNetPhils and spearheaded the legal aspect of the advocacy and lobby work for the DRRM bill. ASoG’s engagement as a member of DRRNetPhils also resolved the network’s potential legal impediment because, as a loose organization of DRM and CBDRM practitioners, it had lacked a legal personality.

With the support of Christian Aid, DRRNetPhils undertook a project to “elevate the importance of disaster risk management at the policy level and to develop a DRR national policy and mainstream DRM/DRR into development policy and planning” (Agsaoay-Sano 2009). The project covered three areas of intervention: (1) the synthesizing of position of DRRNetPhils on different pending bills; (2) capacity building of communities in DRR as well as legislative lobbying; and (3) lobbying for the passage of DRM law. The project consisted of two components, namely: (a) policy support for communities to engage in the legislative process; and (b) policy advocacy with policy makers.

At the community level, awareness raising and capacity building on DRR and policy making were undertaken. This capacity building included sharing learnings and best practices among different communities. Local communities were also involved in the preparation of local and national development plans. They provided input for the draft of the DRRM bill. The network across the different regions also supported DRRM localizations. Furthermore, the Network has pushed for local ordinances and modeled community-based disaster risk management through the efforts of its member-organizations. Buklod Tao (People Unite), a community-based mass organization in Barangay Banaba in the town of San Mateo, Rizal province, which is also a member of DRRNetPhils, is a grassroots model for raising awareness on DRRM. It had set up early warning systems and rescue units, engaged local and national government agencies to lobby for the DRRM bill, took part in the consultations, and provided inputs based on their local experience to the revisions of proposed bills.

Constituency-building continued even after the passage of the Law. Dela Cruz (2015) points out that the DRRM Law had major gaps in its implementation. These included (1) the limited information dissemination and awareness of the measure, (2) the lack of training and capacity of local government units, concerned national agencies, and local CSOs, (3) the absence of any enforcement mechanism for local implementation (characterized by the lack of office, career civil service position, funding), and (4) the fact that there were only a few DRRM mechanisms in place. Through its member organizations, DRRNetPhils aimed to address these gaps.

As of this writing, another member of DRRNetPhils, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO), with support from Christian Aid, has started mapping their members’ capacities on DRR-CCA. This included conducting ongoing capacity building for partners, building partnerships with LGUs and other local CSOs, and pushing for the establishment of functional local DRRM offices.

At the national level, CODE-NGO is undertaking the following tasks: (1) review of the DRRM Law, (2) review and upgrading of the Seal of Good Local Governance–Seal of Disaster Preparedness, (3) equitable access to the DRRM Fund and People’s Survival Fund, and (4) reform procurement policies in times of disaster.

The Center for Disaster Preparedness, through the support of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), conducted an assessment covering four regions, and within each of the four, two provinces, four municipalities, and a sampling of barangays. It is also in the process of developing actor-specific modules and a generic module. The generic module has been completed.

CDP conducts trainings and provides assistance to LGUs in setting up their councils, coming up with plans, and engaging CSOs. For instance, in Camarines Norte, CDP moved to pass a municipal code that contains all DRRM-related ordinances to ensure continuity. CDP continues to engage
the LGU and lobby for local ordinances to support the implementation of the DRRM Law.

Buklod Tao, in partnership with CDP, led a training-seminar on DRR with 15 other barangays in San Mateo, with the aim of replicating their initiative and scaling it up to the municipal level. After the passage of the law, Buklod Tao applied for membership in the municipal DRRM council. However, due to differences with the mayor, it was not granted. Similarly, its application at the provincial level was denied because the municipality did not accredit the same. This limitation, however, has not stopped Buklod Tao from working with the regional offices of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and the Department of National Defense (DND) to support their local projects. At the national level, Buklod Tao is a member of the Sectoral Assembly of Victims of Disasters and Calamities of the National Anti-Poverty Commission.

At the international level, members of DRRNetPhils had participated in international conferences, like the ADRRN Assembly in Phnom Penh in 2012, to boost the exchange of knowledge and experiences.

Super Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, which hit the country and left catastrophic destruction in November 2013, had heightened awareness on DRRM, as it exposed the weakness and gaps of the country’s DRR System. In its report, the Commission on Audit (COA) found that “despite a solid and functioning disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) structure, the government’s response still came across as reactive and not proactive, insufficient, inefficient and for the most part, too slow” (COA 2014: 4). It added that the government’s response and recovery efforts in Yolanda-ravaged areas clearly showed that its implementation of R.A. 10121 still leaves a lot to be desired.

Approaching the fifth year since the passage of the DRRM law, DRRNetPhils and its member organizations are focused on a “sunset review” to assess the implementation of the law and to propose possible amendments.

**Mechanisms for integration**

DRRNetPhils has served as the primary mechanism for horizontal and vertical integration. Internally, it organized itself to build muscle for its legislative advocacy, both at the local and national levels. Externally, the network mirrored the coordination of local and national initiatives.

The passage of the DRRM law had provided for the institutionalized mechanism for vertical integration. Members of the Network optimized the spaces for CSOs provided for in the law, albeit with limitations in terms of scope and coverage.

**4.7.3 Challenges and limitations**

The DRRM law provides a classic example of vertical integration of different actors at different levels. Applied to actual government practice, the big challenge is coordination. On the one hand, Dela Cruz (2015) laments that the experience of civil society in working with the government shows that “government agencies do not coordinate” with CSOs. She added that, “the various agencies are only concerned about their mandates and not look at the complete picture.” This comment is resonant with the COA Report, which states that, “while R.A. No. 10121 provides for vertical coordination between the regional, national and local levels, it is difficult to ensure smooth coordination among these government agencies given the complexity of large scale disasters when following regular disaster response procedures do not always work” (COA 2014: 9). The Report expounds:

Given the multi-sectoral, multi-organizational structure of the NDRRMC and the complexity and magnitude of the disaster, the Council’s key players and stakeholders had difficulty coordinating, collaborating and making timely decisions, which came across as unreadiness and ineptitude to respond to a host of emergencies and crippling crisis. It is evident that whenever authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed and resources are scattered, emergency management, command and control can hardly operate in an expedient manner (COA 2014: 39).

On the other hand, Scriven (2013: 8) raises the issue of capacity at both national and local levels, which are “doubtlessly impeding the speed at which these new structures become fully functional.” Force majeure accounts for the biggest push for the passage of the DRRM law. There are situations that catalyze swift actions and changes. While Mother Nature was the biggest factor, it was the advocacy efforts of the network that primarily shaped the law. It would not have been possible to immediately come out with a policy or to start from scratch. A push could be very strong, but even then, the resulting legislation may not be as sound without previous efforts by campaigners.
The DRRM law is a relatively young law. In theory, it is an exemplar law. However, in actual practice, it needs to be tested and sharpened. While the law itself is only about five years old, the history of its passage is long and marked by milestones and shaped by various milieus. There is a challenge for the vertical integration framework to completely capture the nuances across time/period of a continuously unfolding campaign.

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Interviews

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5
Synthesis: Lessons from vertically integrated reform campaigns in the Philippines
Francis Isaac and Joy Aceron

5.1 Introduction
In the preceding Chapters of this book, we have examined a number of vertically integrated, citizen-led campaigns that have achieved significant reform victories in the Philippines. These cases were scrutinized in order to better understand the factors that had enabled these ‘successful’ initiatives to attain their objectives at specific periods in time.

To recap, the seven selected initiatives (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) focused on monitoring textbook delivery, agrarian reform, housing for the urban poor, halting corporate mining operations, protecting and promoting the rights of indigenous peoples, advancing reproductive health rights, and supporting disaster-resilient communities. They were selected for the following reasons:

1. They had multiple levels of engagement involving a variety of actors employing a broad set of strategies, including grassroots organizing,
collective protests, coalition-building, civil society organization (CSO) monitoring, policy advocacy and legal recourse.

2. They had been relatively successful in achieving concrete and tangible reforms through passing progressive policies, monitoring government performance, or ensuring the representation of marginalized groups in decision-making bodies.

3. They had attained national prominence.

4. They were willing to participate in the study.

5. In total, they provided a cross-section of Philippine society by offering a diverse range of issues, featuring a wide array of actors that employ different modalities of engagement.

To better understand these seven campaigns, we used vertical integration (discussed fully in Chapter 2) as an analytical tool to uncover the complex dynamics involved in each citizen-led reform effort. This synthesis chapter reflects on vertical integration:

• As an analytical framework,
• As a strategic approach to accountability, and
• As a critique of mainstream practices in the accountability field.

It concludes by looking across all seven case studies and discussing their common features.

5.2 Vertical integration as an analytical framework

Vertical integration encourages a focus on the scale of an initiative, and how societal groups engage various state actors at different periods in time. By scale, we refer to the interaction of the different levels of decision-making – from the local to provincial, national and international arena – for both the public sector and for civil society.

While studies of successful campaigns often attribute reform victories to either ‘champions’ on top or to social mobilization from below, vertical integration encourages a focus on the scale of an initiative, and how societal groups engage various state actors at different periods in time. By scale, we refer to the interaction of the different levels of decision-making – from the local to provincial, national and international arena – for both the public sector and for civil society (Fox and Aceron 2016:3).

This can be seen in the case of Textbook Count, which mobilized as many as 47 civil society organizations (CSOs) at the national and provincial levels. Though this initiative was jointly implemented by the Department of Education and Government Watch (G-Watch), the actual monitoring work was done at the school level by volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) and the Girl Scouts of the Philippines (GSP).

Further local support was generated by linking up with Parent–Teacher Organizations (PTAs), barangay (village) officials, as well as community-based organizations, to assist volunteers in their monitoring activities. BSP and GSP chapters at the city, municipal, and provincial levels also assisted in the efforts by facilitating the recruitment of volunteers and the dissemination of information.

At the national level, G-Watch provided overall coordination, while simultaneously undertaking cross-sectoral coalition-building by “linking up a wide variety of organizations, including NGOs working on transparency and accountability, development NGOs, sectoral organizations, an election monitoring CSO, and scouting organizations” (ibid.: 37).

This is also the case in the agrarian reform campaign in the Bondoc Peninsula that is being spearheaded by the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (Peasant Movement of Bondoc Peninsula) or KMBP, a district-wide peasant federation composed of more than 40 hacienda-based organizations. KMBP receives assistance from the Quezon Association for Rural Development and Democratization Services (QUARDDS), a local non-governmental organization (NGO) that provides technical support to rural poor groups operating in the province of Quezon.

KMBP is also a member-federation of the Kilusan para sa Repormang Agraryo at Katarungang Panlipunan (Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice) or Katarungan, which is a broader confederation of several province-based peasant formations. For its part, Katarungan works hand-in-hand with the Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services (RIGHTS Network), a consortium of 11 local NGOs working on agrarian reform.

By forging multiple partnerships, KMBP is able to sustain a highly integrated campaign that enables rural citizens to engage both state and non-state actors at the village, municipal, provincial, regional, and national levels. Its member organizations, for example, are able to effectively assert peasant rights at the village and municipal levels where land contestation occurs.
KMBP is being assisted by QUARDDS in pursuing its land cases by engaging state agencies at both the municipal and provincial levels. Katarungan/RIGHTS Network then bring up these cases to the national level. These groups also support KMBP by facilitating dialogues with pertinent government agencies, establishing civil society allies, and organizing international fact-finding missions.

The campaign for the passage of the Reproductive Health (RH) law was vertically integrated. It involved national and local organizations, including health service providers, women’s organizations, sectoral groups, political parties, and academic institutions. These organizations later formed the Reproductive Health Alliance Network (RHAN), which launched a massive media campaign at the national level, while organizing public information activities at the community level. While it actively lobbied in the national legislature to pass the measure, RHAN also made similar efforts with local governments, resulting to the enactment of local RH ordinances in Quezon City and in the province of Aurora.

Similarly, the campaign for the passage of the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) law was spearheaded by a broad advocacy coalition called DRRNetPhils, which included more than 300 national and grassroots-based CSOs. In addition to lobbying efforts in Congress, the DRRNetPhils also engaged key departments of the Executive branch, including the Office of Civil Defense, which is the agency primarily responsible for disaster response, management, and risk reduction. As it was engaging the government, DRRNetPhils sought the support of other civil society forces, such as business groups, media organizations, academia, and faith-based groups. At the local level, DRRNetPhils launched intensive public information campaigns and organized numerous forums in different schools and universities. It also engaged with several local governments, urging the latter to support the DRRM bill.

When the law was finally enacted in 2010, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was soon created to develop a comprehensive, community-based approach to climate change adaptation and to disaster risk reduction and management. Chaired by the Secretary of Defense, the Council is a multi-agency and multi-sectoral body that includes representatives from the government and civil society. DRRNetPhils is one of several civil society groups represented in the Council.

Another vertically integrated initiative is the campaign to prevent mining operations in Anislagan, a village in the municipality of Placer, located in the province of Surigao del Norte. This effort began with the formation of the Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task Force (ABAKATAF), after the villagers learned that the corporate mining companies were planning to begin operations in the area.

They immediately sought the support of the local church, and began organizing protest actions in front of the municipal hall and in the provincial capital. They also formed human barricades at the mouth of the road going to the mining site in order to prevent the entry of bulldozers and other heavy machinery. The village council responded by issuing a resolution banning mining operations in their area. For its part, the municipal government passed an ordinance placing the watershed and communal forest under their protection.

ABAKATAF sought assistance from several CSOs based in Manila, such as the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center, Alyansa Tigil Mina (Stop Mining Alliance), and the Alternative Law Group (ALG). The plight of Anislagan’s residents was also projected abroad through ABAKATAF’s links with international groups, such as Friends of the Earth and Piplinks.

The Téduray Lambangian Women’s Organization Inc. (TLWOI) adopted a vertically integrated campaign to promote the rights of indigenous women. Operating in six municipalities and in the provincial capital of Maguindanao, TLWOI is a federation of 35 community-based Téduray and Lambangian women’s organizations that undertake community organizing at the grassroots level. It also conducts public education and awareness-raising activities at the municipal, provincial, and regional levels.

In addition, TLWOI is actively broadening its base of support by establishing allies at various levels. Notre Dame University, for instance, has been assisting the federation in the latter’s advocacy at the provincial level. It is also affiliated with the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (National Federation of Rural Women), which provides technical support for policy advocacy and project management. At the international level, TLWOI maintains close links with foreign groups and institutions, such as The Asia Foundation, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, and the European Union.
Apart from alliance-building and organizing work, the federation is engaging the State at various levels. This enabled TLWOI to convince several barangays to allocate more resources to gender and development. It has also been assisting several municipalities in crafting their own local poverty reduction action plans.

At the regional level, TLWOI has a seat in the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly, the legislative branch of the government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In addition, TLWOI Executive Director Froilyn Mendoza has served in the Bangsamoro Transition Commission. The Bangsamoro Transition Commission is the body authorized to draft the Bangsamoro Basic Law for the new Bangsamoro political entity, as agreed in the peace deal between the Philippine Government and the Muslim rebel group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Like the other six initiatives, Damayan ng Maralitang Pilipinong Api (DAMPA, Philippines Poverty Relief) has been waging a vertically integrated campaign to protect the housing rights of the poor. Operating in at least 6 regions of the country, DAMPA has been organizing poor communities around several common issues, while building partnerships at both the local and national levels.

It has, for instance, assisted 31 informal settler families in forging a ‘land-sharing’ deal with a large subdivision in the province of Bulacan. DAMPA has also enabled other informal settlers in Quezon City to acquire land through a variety of schemes. At the same time, it has successfully built a wide network of CSOs at both the national and international levels. To better secure the housing rights of their members, DAMPA has been engaging a number of local governments, as well as pertinent national government agencies.

5.3 Vertical integration as a strategic approach to accountability

By looking at the cases, we are able to affirm vertical integration’s main insight that pro-accountability initiatives achieve more substantial victories and gain better tangible results system-wide if the approaches they use are strategic, multi-level, and grounded on the actual power dynamics that are present in any accountability relationship.

While tactical approaches are often characterized as highly localized ‘society-side’ efforts to access information and project voice (Fox 2014: 10), strategic approaches “combine information access with enabling environments for collective action that can scale up and coordinate with governmental reforms that encourage actual public sector responsiveness to voice” (ibid.: 19). This means mobilizing societal forces in order to address an issue, while engaging the state at all possible levels.

The implication of such an approach, as seen in all seven cases, is clear: by acquiring scale, the campaigns were able to generate broad support from societal forces, while influencing the decision of important state actors, which then resulted to substantive reform gains.

5.4 Vertical integration as a critique of mainstream practices

While vertical integration allows us to understand how reforms are won, it also serves as a critique of mainstream practices in the accountability field. We have identified a number of these practices that the following sections will discuss individually.

5.4.1 The search for ‘best practices’

There has been a tendency among accountability scholars, donors, and practitioners to look for ‘best practices’ from other countries and replicate them in the Philippines. However, the specific circumstances that gave birth to these ‘models’ are not fully understood, and the conditions that led to their subsequent developments are not adequately discussed. As Fox points out, “social accountability processes and outcomes are heavily context-dependent,” which is why “one-size-fits-all, easily replicable tools” seldom offer strategic solutions (ibid. 9).

This is evident in the seven cases featured in this book. Reading through the cases, we find that each campaign was intended to address a specific issue or accountability gap, and that the strategies that were adopted were based on the results that each campaign wanted to achieve. On the one hand, Textbook Count, for example, which is concerned with the timely delivery of the right textbooks to the right schools, focused on monitoring. On the other hand, KMBP, which was engaged in the struggle for land rights, used collective protest actions to pressure the Department of Agrarian Reform to implement land redistribution.
5.4.2 Transparency + participation = accountability

State–society engagements are always embedded in power relationships. In most instances, state officials try to escape accountability by ‘squeezing the balloon’. The idea that ‘transparency + participation = accountability’ is now a standard principle in the good governance community. Simply put, this formula means that accountability is achieved when information regarding government resources, procedures, decisions, and transactions are made readily and publicly available (transparency), and when ordinary citizens actively take part in existing decision-making processes (participation).

However, this notion is now being assailed for its ‘linear’ and ‘simplistic’ logic, disregarding the complex processes involved in accountability, and for failing to take into account the reality of power dynamics (Halloran 2015). As the cases attest, state–society engagements are always embedded in power relationships. In most instances, state officials try to escape accountability by ‘squeezing the balloon’ (Fox 2007). This occurs when a person in authority refuses to take action on a particular request or demand from the citizens by stating that responsibility lies either with officials at the top or with officials from below (Fox 2001).

This practice of moving up and down the scale to justify government inaction is not, in any way, captured in the ‘transparency + participation = accountability’ formula, which instead presents a linear (if not overly horizontal) image of accountability.

5.4.3 Demand-side accountability versus supply-side accountability

There are accountability advocates that either focus on supply-side accountability or demand-side accountability. The first refers to the “accountability supply provided by the state through anti-corruption bureaus, legislative oversight and open data” (Fox 2014). This approach is often seen as less contentious since it allows state institutions to perform its supposed roles on their own.

Supply-side accountability was championed by the World Bank during the latter part of the 2000s on the premise that demand tends to follow supply. They were, in other words, assuming that the interest of citizens in participation will likely increase once reforms are in place, and government information is made available to the public.

Officials are jolted into action if there is a strong demand from societal forces to improve government service, enact a new policy, or change the existing rules. This approach is known as demand-side accountability.

However, supply-side approaches are often not enough to induce reforms since state actors follow certain routines that generally perpetuate existing power relations. In most instances, officials are jolted into action if there is a strong demand from societal forces to improve government service, enact a new policy, or change the existing rules. This approach is known as demand-side accountability, which refers to the actions that citizens undertake to elicit responses from state institutions in order to address specific issues or accountability gaps (ibid. 2014). The cases included in this collection all used this approach at certain points, in the form of lobbying, dialogue, mobilization, and collective protest action.

This is the case, for example, of the RH campaign when its supporters finally convinced a majority of legislators to pass the measure after 15 years of intensive lobbying and countless mobilizations. Societal demand from anti-mining groups also explains why the municipal council of Placer had adopted an ordinance protecting the town's watershed and communal forest, and why, in 2012, President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 79, banning mining activities in certain protected areas.

However, demand-side accountability would not suffice in achieving reforms. Not only should there be demand per se, but it should also be expressed at all levels in order to forestall any attempt to squeeze the balloon. The efficacy of demand–side accountability is also enhanced when citizens are able to maximize the openings provided by the state. In other words, demand-side accountability and supply-side accountability are two complementary approaches that can be used either separately, or in combination, at different levels at particular periods of time to advance possible reform gains. Or as Gaventa points out, there is a need to work on “both sides of the equation” (2002).

5.4.4 Long versus short route to accountability

In the 2000s, the World Bank promoted an approach called the short route to accountability, which “links citizens directly to service providers, through various oversight and voice mechanisms” (Fox 2014: 12). It assumes...
that ‘government failures’ are primarily local, that require exclusively local responses. This was presented as an expedient route that can immediately address government failures.

In contrast, the electoral process plays a central part in the long route, wherein citizens, as the ultimate holders of power, delegate authority to their elected representatives, who then govern bureaucracies that deliver the needed social services. The World Bank criticized this approach, arguing that voters would have to wait for the next round of elections before they could exact accountability, either by electing pro-reform candidates or by removing poorly performing politicians.

However, recent studies suggest that government failures are not locally isolated issues, but are “distributed all the way up the governance ‘supply chain’” (Fox 2014: 11). This means that “the short route to accountability has turned out to be much more indirect than initially postulated, and its success may depend on making the long route more responsive as well” (ibid.: 31–32).

5.4.5 Horizontal accountability and vertical accountability

Other approaches used in the governance community are horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. The first refers to the institutional mechanisms of checks, balances, and oversight within the state. Horizontal accountability sets the standards of behavior for state officials, monitors their actions, and imposes sanctions in case of indiscretion.

Vertical accountability, on the other hand, “refers to political accountability relations between citizens and their elected representatives” (Fox 2014: 12). In this approach, elections are viewed as “the primary institution of vertical accountability,” though “reinforced by civil society efforts to encourage accountable governance” (Fox 2007: 31).

Using vertical integration as an analytical framework, we can identify two limitations of these approaches. First, both horizontal accountability and vertical accountability approaches involve formal and institutional processes or rules. But as Fox points out, “much of what counts as accountability takes place outside of formal institutions” (ibid.: 32). Vertical integration is able to uncover these informal relationships by looking at the constituency or cross-sectoral coalition-building efforts that campaigns undertake across the different levels to gain greater voice, legitimacy and influence. This is done by using a variety of “tools, tactics and approaches ranging from media investigations and coverage to mass protests to leveraging traditional decision-making processes” (Halloran 2015: 2).

Second, both horizontal and vertical accountability approaches are not able to address scale. By either focusing on state–citizen relations or on internal accountability processes of the state, both approaches fail to explain why national accountability reforms do not automatically ‘scale down’ to subnational and local levels, and why local accountability reforms do not always ‘scale up’ to influence higher levels (Fox 2014).

5.4.6 Single, short-term tactics

Because vertical integration uses a variety of strategies across the different levels of engagement, it is clearly at odds with the practice of employing a single, short-term tactic that is isolated from potentially complementary and supportive tactics. These tactics include the use of open data without the support necessary to ensure that such figures or information would be used to ensure accountability and promote human rights. Fox pointed this out, stating that “it is unrealistic to assume that information that is not linked to credible pathways to change will overcome well-known obstacles to collective action” (ibid.: 28).

A similar tactic involves individualized citizen voice that is disconnected from organizations and movements. Of course, it is important that individual citizens who have been excluded and marginalized be given the freedom to share their thoughts and air their demands. However, individualized voices “have limited capacity to negotiate with authority about what to do about those new agenda” (ibid.: 29). Therefore, the process of giving voice should include “not only large numbers of people speaking at once, but the consolidation of organizations that can effectively scale up deliberation and representation” (ibid.: 29). In other words, “voice is most usefully understood as involving both the aggregation and the representation of the views of otherwise excluded citizens” (ibid.: 29).

5.5 Common features of the case studies: Lessons for reform initiatives in the Philippines

Reform victories and accountability gains are no easy feats. The seven campaigns included in this study demonstrate the scale and complexity required in making governments responsive and accountable to their citizens. By using the framework of vertical integration, we were able to
have a better understanding of these initiatives, and how they engaged the different levels at different periods in time. We were also able to deduce the characteristics common to all the campaigns, and how they provide lessons to other reform initiatives in the Philippines. These are discussed in the Sections below.

5.5.1 Multi-level advocacy responds to vertically integrated power structures

A common feature of all the campaigns is that they are cognizant of how power is structured and exercised, and how it influences the interface of societal groups with state actors. As such, a vertically integrated approach mirrors the operations of power and the vertically integrated nature of power relationships.

In a 2014 paper, Fox argued that, “corruption and social exclusion are produced by vertically integrated power structures” (ibid.: 33). This is the reason why anti-accountability forces are “often quite effective at isolating, neutering and rolling back incremental pro-accountability initiatives or institutional enclaves” (Fox and Acreon 2016: 2). To address this challenge, Fox suggests that pro-accountability citizens’ groups develop “parallel processes that are also vertically integrated” (2014: 33).

By adopting such an approach, pro-accountability forces are able to respond appropriately to ‘power.’ This is done by engaging different levels of governance, using multiple strategies involving constituency-building and interfacing with the state. Whenever anti-accountability forces block the reform efforts of ordinary citizens, they could respond by either going up or down the scale in order to overcome such obstacles. When government officials attempt to escape accountability by squeezing the balloon, societal actors can then engage the different levels so as to ensure that the state will respond to their demands.

This is the case in the ongoing land reform campaign in the Bondoc Peninsula, where poor farmers engage both state and non-state actors at the village, municipal, provincial, regional, and national levels. Spearheaded by KMBP and their allies from the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network, the campaign gained international attention by partnering with the International Peace Observers Network, an independent human rights organization based in Germany.

The campaign against large-scale mining is also vertically integrated, with ABAKATAF being involved in grassroots organizing work and local government engagements, while Alyansa Tigil Mina focusing on policy advocacy at the national level. These efforts have persuaded the municipal government of Placer, Surigao del Norte to protect their watershed and communal forests. In the same vein, several local governments from the province of South Cotabato have decided to ban open-pit mining in their respective areas. Alyansa Tigil Mina is also pursuing strategic litigation, with several cases now filed before the lower courts and the Supreme Court.

Other groups like TLWOI have exhibited sophistication in engaging both national and local state agencies to advance the rights of indigenous peoples and indigenous women. It has considerable experience in legislative lobbying since it was one of the groups that campaigned for the enactment of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 and the Magna Carta for Women. It has also been working with various local governments to utilize their 5% local gender and development fund for women's livelihoods.

For its part, DAMPA was able to turn its campaign for decent and affordable housing into a vertically integrated initiative by engaging various government agencies at different levels. This is because different state bodies are assigned to address specific aspects of the housing issue. At the same time, DAMPA encourages its local member-organizations to engage their respective local governments for their housing and shelter-related concerns.

Similarly, the vertically integrated character of the Textbook Count campaign was pivotal in its success. With CSOs covering all the critical stages of the textbook delivery program (from procurement to distribution) at different levels, the Department of Education saw to it that the program complied with the standards of quantity, quality, and process. This has prevented pilferages and has helped ensure the efficient delivery of textbooks. The campaign was also able to identify high-level champions in the Department of Education who provided the necessary ‘political support’ that pushed lower-level education officials to actually encourage CSO participation.
The passage of the RH Law was another massive campaign involving coordinated actions from the community to the national and international levels. Most of the groups that were involved in this initiative were part of a loose national network called RHAN, with sub-networks at the local level. On one hand, RHAN developed the overall strategy for the campaign. On the other, grassroots-based groups linked the issue of RH to local concerns. By vertically integrating their efforts, the pro-RH groups were able to develop a campaign that had considerable support from various sectors at every level of society (Melgar 2014).

But if all these campaigns were vertically integrated, this still begs the question: Why were they so?

Based on the case studies, a campaign becomes vertically integrated as pro-reform and accountability forces confront, respond, and grapple with the reality of power. Consequently, the drivers of integration can be broadly categorized into two types. The first one is designed as a countervailing tactic meant to neutralize elite resistance. The second type aims to maximize the reform initiatives of the state to improve its processes and enhance its performance.

The countervailing tactic can be seen in the agrarian reform campaign, wherein the direction of integration often comes from the ground up. As peasant demands are challenged at the village level, they go to the municipal, and then to the provincial, and then to the national, and so on. Integration is also driven by the fact that landowner power is vertically integrated, with haciendas covering several barangays and municipalities. Their influence also stretches up to the provincial and national levels, covering different bureaucracies and the three branches of government.

A similar situation can be observed in the RH campaign, wherein RH groups were compelled to integrate their efforts to overcome conservative resistance. The strongest opposition came from the Catholic Church, which has considerable influence because of its vertically integrated organizational structure with thousands of parishes at the local levels, and with dioceses and archdioceses at the top. Its clout can also be felt even within the state, with several conservative local governments passing ordinances banning the sale of condoms and artificial family planning methods. This prompted the need for a national RH law to prevent similar restrictions at the local level.

In the case of the anti-mining campaign, small and isolated communities (mostly in the hinterlands) had to integrate with grassroots communities and national-based organizations to overcome the steady encroachment of large mining firms. The campaign meant to address the lack of technical skills and capacity of local communities, which the more sophisticated advocacy groups based in the country's city centers can provide.

In the case of Textbook Count, this campaign is an example of the second type of driver that aims to maximize the reform openings of the state. It was conceptualized at a time when international donor agencies were becoming increasingly concerned with government corruption. To address this issue, they soon awarded grants to several civil society groups, such as G-Watch, to promote social accountability. At around the same time, or on 22 July 2002, the General Procurement Reform Act was signed into law. This law requires CSO representation in the procurement process. These two policy openings at the international and national levels ultimately gave G-Watch the opportunity to partner with the Department of Education and initiate Textbook Count.

Similarly, the TLWOI's campaign for indigenous peoples' rights has been maximizing the favorable policy environment that now exists. As an organization, TLWOI actively seeks representation for indigenous peoples in decision-making bodies at local, regional and national levels that have been identified in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 and in the Magna Carta for Women.

Interestingly, women have played significant roles in the exercise of this vertically integrated citizen power in the campaigns studied. Whether or not gender is a significant variable in the adoption or practice of vertical integration in advocacy campaigns would need to be explored in further research.

5.5.2 Many levels of engagement, a wide variety of actions

It is clear from the earlier discussions that the power of anti-reform forces is vertically integrated, with allies from both inside and outside the state. The seven campaigns responded to this challenge by adopting a number of measures that enhanced their effectiveness. Each campaign had multiple levels of engagement, with varying intensities of engagement per level. Each campaign employed a wide variety of strategies depending on the existing challenges and opportunities.
By studying each of the cases, we can identify three common features central to how the initiatives achieved their key victories. These are: (1) the engagement at multiple levels of governance; (2) the use of multiple approaches and strategies (such as policy advocacy, policy monitoring, grassroots organizing, coalition-building, and public education); and (3) the engagement with multiple actors from both the state and civil society.

We also observed that the types of actions, as well as the drivers and mechanisms of integration, are largely informed by: (1) the intensity of engagement at a particular level; (2) the kind of approach that was employed; and (3) the kind of results that they were aiming for.

For instance, in the agrarian reform campaign, organizing work is being done at both the barangay and municipal levels. This is for two reasons: first, the struggle for land literally occurs on the ground; and second, success is measured by the size of the landholding that is subjected to redistribution and then given to the actual tillers. This then prompted the need for organizing work at these two levels.

At the same time, farmers formed their own federations at the district, provincial, and national levels. This is in order to: (1) multiply the strength of grassroots peasant movements; and (2) address the fact that landowner power is also vertically integrated, with allies at various levels of the state and in the three branches of government. Whenever necessary, farmers undertook legal actions at the municipal up to the national levels, thereby following court procedures in the Philippines.

Farmers also conducted public education campaigns targeting provincial-and national-level audiences. On the part of the farmers, limiting their audience was deliberate for two reasons. First, peasants on the ground are generally convinced of the need for agrarian reform since they are the intended beneficiaries of the program. Second, their education campaigns are intended to be disseminated through commercial media organizations that usually operate at provincial and national levels.

Information and communications technologies (ICTs) are utilized as part of the public education and information strategy of KMP-Katarungan, although their use is largely limited to the national level. They are generally used to inform the public of the condition in the Bondoc Peninsula and to generate their support. The limited role of ICTs could be attributed to the fact that many of the tech-based approaches, currently hailed as the solution to accountability problems, are inappropriate and/or irrelevant to the lives of grassroots people and how they address their collective problems.

As for the other campaigns, longstanding initiatives, particularly on housing, anti-mining, and indigenous peoples’ rights, have been pushing to either amend or totally overhaul the existing laws that continue to guide policies. However, no legislative breakthrough was made even after two decades of intense lobbying and advocacy. This prompted these three campaigns to give greater focus on policy implementation. In the absence of any new national law, the initiatives have challenged a number of local governments to enact local policy, whenever possible. In fact, several municipal governments already issued ordinances banning mining operations in their respective localities.

As for the RH and DRRM campaigns, both of these campaigns began as legislative advocacies demanding national-level actions. But with the stiff opposition of the very powerful Catholic Church and with DRRM being ignored by most legislators, these two initiatives began organizing local-level actions designed to win grassroots support and gain the backing of other sectors. Local programs and ordinances were highlighted to provide the Congress with RH and DRRM models that they could study and learn from. When the DRRM Act and the RH Law were finally passed, the campaigns then shifted from national-level policy advocacy to local-level policy implementation and monitoring.

For its part, Textbook Count was primarily designed as an engagement initiative with the executive branch of government (in this case, the Department of Education) to monitor textbook procurement and delivery. The focus of Textbook Count’s action is mainly at the school, division, and national levels. It was supposed to cover procurements at the regional level as well, but this was soon seen as redundant since “DepEd procurement remains centralized, with textbooks and other large acquisition processes handled by their national office” (Fox and Aceron 2016: 29). To process the monitoring results and generate government response, G-Watch
facilitated exchanges of experiences and problem-solving sessions at the national level and with selected Department of Education divisions.

The program had an advocacy component mainly designed to elicit responses from national-level decision-makers. The advocacy work undertaken at the division and school levels was intended to: (1) ensure CSO participation in textbook delivery and DRRNetPhils’; and (2) allow the school principals and contractors to respond immediately to the findings of the monitoring. The design also included legislative advocacy and engagement with public accountability agencies, when deemed necessary.

All advocacy initiatives use media-based communication as part of their campaigns since it is critical for adding pressure to duty bearers and the powers-that-be. Media is used to name and shame personalities and to make anomalies public. It is also a way of building constituencies as it creates awareness about the campaign. In the Textbook Count case, the media was only used after the monitoring took place. Since Textbook Count operated on the concept of constructive engagement, all findings were first presented to the Department of Education executives privately to give them ample time to respond to the findings. Reports to the media were made after the complete cycle of monitoring (that is, from planning to evaluation) had been conducted, and with the Department of Education’s official response already incorporated into the report.

5.5.3 Multiple actors in coalition

One feature common among the initiatives is their grassroots-organizing component. While RHAN and DRRNetPhils did not undertake community organizing on their own, these two campaign coalitions included membership-based organizations that have a strong grassroots presence. This allowed both RHAN and DRRNetPhils to achieve scale even down to the grassroots level.

Organizing work was apparent in the case of Textbook Count. Textbook Count mobilized BSP and GSP volunteers, and 47 CSOs joined the campaign at both the national and local levels. This initiative was able to tap other community groups, such as the local PTAs and village officials. Textbook Count also undertook coalition-building at the national level, with G-Watch linking up with a wide variety of organizations, such as development NGOs, anti-corruption groups, labor unions, and other sectoral formations.

Grassroots organizing was highly intense in the agrarian reform campaign, with most of the work being done at the village and municipal levels. This was often undertaken by deploying community organizers to targeted barangays. These community organizers will then organize the community around the issue of agrarian reform. Coalition-building is another major component of the land rights struggle. At the provincial and national levels, for instance, the Katarungan/RIGHTS Network has built a network of allies that include the Catholic Church and human rights groups.

On the one hand, DAMPA, for its part, is known for its solid grassroots base, with 12 founding chapters and four expanded chapters present in six regions of the Philippines. It has built a support coalition composed of faith-based groups, legal aid NGOs, and the Philippine Red Cross. DAMPA is also a member-organization of both RHAN and DRRNetPhils.

On the other hand, ABAKATAF emerged organically as residents of Anislangan faced the threat of corporate mining in their area. Knowing that they could not confront the mining firms on their own, they eventually sought allies in Manila, particularly legal aid organizations, such as Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center and the Alternative Law Groups.

Similarly, TLWOI has a strong membership base, operating in Cotabato City and in six other municipalities of Maguindanao province. It also has several allies from other women's groups, academia, think tanks, and development aid agencies.

By looking at their profiles, we can now claim that all the seven campaigns were able to mobilize multiple actors using multiple approaches at different levels. But with the many actions and actors involved across the scale, the question remains: who or what holds these elements together in an integrated set of actions?

We can identify two common mechanisms that enabled the campaigns to achieve integration: (1) having a core team or secretariat; and (2) having a process that could federate the multiple efforts into a vertically integrated whole. On the one hand, a secretariat is important for it provides focus to a campaign by facilitating the communication and coordination process between social and civic actors working at different levels. A federation, on the other hand, provides the initiative with scale by forming a coalition of different forces.
This is evident in the land reform campaign, wherein integration is often facilitated by agrarian NGOs that provide technical assistance to peasant formations. It also has peasant federations, such as Katarungan and KMBP, organized at the district, provincial, and national levels. Such federations have regular assemblies wherein policies are discussed and leaders are elected.

In the cases of the RH and DRRM campaigns, large networks of CSOs having significant nationwide presence led these two campaigns. These networks, namely RHAN and DRRNetPhils, each driven by respective secretariats, maximized the unique strengths of their member-organizations to address various campaign needs. Buklod Tao (People Unite), for example, concentrated on awareness-raising and local mobilization for disaster response and relief, while the Ateneo School of Government focused on the legal aspects of DRRM.

In the RH campaign, Likhaan was tasked with mobilizing grassroots support, while membership-based organizations conducted community discussions and information campaigns. RHAN partnered with the Philippine Legislators’ Committee on Population and Development to orient legislative champions on the merits of the measure. Similarly, Textbook Count was able to mobilize hundreds of volunteers and a significant number of CSOs from the national to the school level in a vertically integrated, nationwide effort. The information gathered from the monitoring later became the basis for the recommendations that G-Watch submitted to the Department of Education.

Meanwhile, ABAKATAF quickly realized the need for a coordinated approach early in their struggle. Their lack of technical capacity led them to seek assistance from Manila-based organizations. The latter groups then helped ABAKATAF project their issue to a national audience. In turn, villagers from Anislagan provided the Manila groups with the necessary insights, stories, and information that helped the latter in crafting better informed policy suggestions. To coordinate all these efforts, Alyansa Tigil Mina was formed as an umbrella network for all anti-mining organizations.

Though TLWOI is deeply involved in lobbying and organizing work, it is able to coordinate all these efforts through a functioning secretariat. It also has a Board of Trustees that sets the organizational direction of TLWOI. With 35 community-based organizations, TLWOI has formed itself into a provincial federation that is present at both the municipal and village levels.

Operating in at least 95 communities throughout the country, DAMPA is involved in community organizing, training, and education. By providing technical assistance to other urban poor groups, it is engaging numerous local governments to ensure decent housing for their members. To coordinate all its efforts, DAMPA has a national secretariat, as well as a website, to provide its members with a quick source of information.

However, integration does not always need to come from the center, nor does it need to be deliberately facilitated by a particular person or mechanism. Unity around a common and concrete goal has an integrating quality, which is also found in a common appreciation of threats, risks, and problems. Evidence, research, and knowledge about an issue can also be factors in integrating actions.

5.5.4 Activities based on analysis of the State and traditions of collective action

All the initiatives we studied have undertaken policy advocacy activities and intervention in policy implementation, but the particular focus on one or the other is, in each case, informed by their appreciation of the nature of the state and traditions of collective action.

By closely studying the cases, we can develop this point further by classifying the campaigns according to: (1) the different traditions of collective citizen action; and (2) whether they use policy advocacy or intervention in policy implementation as their main approach.

In the first type of classification, there are three traditions of collective citizen action in the Philippines, with each tradition employing a different set of approaches for engaging the state. These traditions are categorized as progressive social movements, social accountability (SAcc) campaigns, and hybrid initiatives.

- Progressive social movements focus on advocacy, pressure politics, claims-making, and rights assertion. The campaigns for agrarian reform, anti-mining, and reproductive health fall under this category.
• SAcc campaigns make use of the existing democratic space that advances the anti-corruption agenda to further open up the spaces for constructive engagement. Textbook Count falls under this category.

• Hybrid initiatives are those that exhibit the characteristics of the first two initiatives, using both monitoring and pressure politics. The campaigns for housing, indigenous peoples’ rights, and DRRM fall under this category.

In the second type of classification, we have observed two broad approaches that the campaigns have used to achieve results: (1) policy advocacy; and (2) intervention in policy implementation.

Broadly speaking, policy advocacy, on the one hand, is an approach involving pressure politics to influence the state. Intervention in policy implementation, on the other hand, occurs within the system, often taking the form of performance monitoring, participation in legally recognized bodies and mechanisms, mobilization of assistance and services, as well as the filing of court cases.

A number of CSOs in the case studies are also engaged in direct service delivery. Such activities can be categorized under the second approach, although these can possibly be done independently by the state. On the one hand, RH, anti-mining, agrarian reform, indigenous peoples’ rights, and housing are mainly advocacy campaigns. Textbook Count, on the other hand, is the only one that mainly employed intervention in policy implementation. The campaign for DRRM employed both.

Different traditions are associated with different approaches. Campaigns from the progressive social movement tradition are more inclined to use pressure politics or policy advocacy as their main approach. They are, therefore, less inhibited from using collective protest actions and other adversarial methods to elicit state response and influence government decisions. However, this does not mean that they do not intervene in policy implementation. Rather, policy monitoring and policy implementation intervention are both included in their toolbox. But they prefer to use the first in most circumstances, rather than the second. To elaborate: compared to Textbook Count, the monitoring done by the other groups did not cover entire systems. Monitoring was more ad hoc or reactive to specific threats/problems, and was usually undertaken to mobilize social actors and public opinion as part of advocacy. This highlights the primacy of advocacy, rather than monitoring, as the main approach.

While social accountability efforts in other contexts involve the use of an adversarial approach, social accountability initiatives in the Philippines, as observed in this study, tend to shy away from adversarial politics. Instead, they prefer to address problems together with the state, and often choose problem-solving initiatives that curb corruption, boost state efficiency, and enhance government performance.

The differences in approaches by these various CSOs can be largely explained by how they view the state. Progressive social movement initiatives assert that elite interests have captured the state, and that reforming the state would often require pressure politics. SAcc initiatives assume that the state enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from societal forces, and that it can act autonomously from vested elite interests. This viewpoint sees the state as an arbiter or umpire that balances clashing values and interests.

For this reason, progressive social movements, on the one hand, often use pressure politics and policy advocacy to advance their issues. SAcc groups, on the other hand, engage state processes and work in close coordination with the government to collectively resolve identified issues or problems. Such approaches have implications on SAcc groups’ organizing work, with progressive social movements focusing on community organizing, and SAcc CSOs preferring networking and coalition-building with already existing groups.

5.5.5 A Transformative reform agenda, not short-term goals

The seven initiatives have mainly produced two kinds of results: (1) policy adoption or policy change; or (2) improved and more effective policy implementation.

• The RH and DRRM campaigns both fall under the first category. The RH initiative sought to enact a comprehensive RH law; the DRRM campaign was an effort to have a new legal measure on DRRM.

• The rest are cases of civil society efforts to ensure effective policy implementation. DAMPA’s housing campaign, for example, focused on the proper implementation of the Urban Development Housing Act. Their interventions were meant to guarantee that relocated families are fairly treated by housing authorities, and that basic services are available to the relocated people in their new communities.
• The anti-mining campaign used existing laws to prevent large-scale mining operations in several localities by organizing communities and by working with local government officials.

• For their part, the farmers of Bondoc Peninsula continue to fight for land rights by exerting pressure on the Department of Agrarian Reform so that the latter could effectively implement the country’s agrarian reform law. By using a combination of pressure politics, rightful resistance, and working with state reformers inside the Department, land redistribution has been carried out in certain areas.

• TLWOI, meanwhile, aims to advance the rights of indigenous peoples and indigenous women by maximizing the participatory provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and of the Magna Carta for Women.

• Textbook Count, which was concerned with the timely delivery of the right quantity and quality of textbooks to the right schools, was a program that focused on monitoring government performance and service delivery.

It must be pointed out, however, that some of these campaigns attempted to achieve both results at different points in their history, depending on what the context demanded. The case studies reveal how the main goal of these campaigns has evolved over time, and how their objectives shifted from policy change to effective policy implementation and vice-versa. The main victories that these campaigns have achieved are laid out above.

The Katarungan/RIGHTS Network actively campaigned for the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms Law (CARPER), which sought to extend the land reform implementation for another five years. This law was enacted in 2014. In Bondoc Peninsula, the RIGHTS Network and its local peasant partners from KMBP have succeeded in shifting the control of more than 10,000 hectares of land to 3,800 poor farmers.

TLWOI took part in the passage of relevant national and local policies that advance the rights of indigenous women.

DRRM advocacy groups have succeeded in enacting a national DRRM law. With this new legal framework in place, they are now engaging both national- and local-level DRRM councils, and are looking for communities that could be possible models of disaster preparedness and resilience.

Similarly, with the passage of the RH law, the members of the RHAN coalition shifted their work from policy advocacy to the equally important task of monitoring the implementation so as to ensure that adequate RH services are given to those who need it.

The anti-mining campaign has gained the support of several local governments by passing measures to ban open-pit mining. Anti-mining advocates, however, are still continuing their attempt to have a new legal framework by replacing the existing Mining Act with the Alternative Minerals Bill.

And, finally, Textbook Count has succeeded in reducing the textbook unit price from 80 to 120 Philippines Pesos (PHP) in 1999 to between PHP30 and PHP45 in 2006–2007, and in shortening procurement process time by half. It also instituted a problem-solving component where policy changes in service delivery can be introduced.

It is important to reiterate that all of the initiatives have tried to achieve both policy change and improved policy implementation at a given point in their history, depending on what the context demanded. Nonetheless, they have registered clear success in only one.
5.6 Concluding remarks

Pro-accountability initiatives are able to achieve more substantial victories and gain better tangible results system-wide if the approaches they use are strategic, multi-level, and grounded in the actual power dynamics that are present in any accountability relationship.

This study looked at seven citizen-led reform campaigns that have achieved significant and substantial reform victories in recent years. Despite the complexity of each campaign, we were able to gain a better understanding of these initiatives using the concept of vertical integration, which focuses on scale and how societal groups engage various state actors at different periods in time. Through this lens, we recognized that all the seven campaigns had mobilized various societal forces to engage on multiple levels using multiple strategies and approaches in order to achieve reforms. We also concluded that pro-accountability initiatives are able to achieve more substantial victories and gain better tangible results system-wide if the approaches that they use are strategic, multi-level, and grounded in the actual power dynamics present in any accountability relationship.

As a framework of analysis, vertical integration untangles the complexity involved in accountability politics. It allows a comprehensive look at all levels, actions and actors. As a strategy, it synthesizes in a coherent whole, the different dimensions critical to a meaningful campaign: state-society engagement, coalition-building approaches, tactics and actions, levels of decision-making, horizontal representation, and vertical coordination.

One interesting point of inquiry for future research is whether strategic approaches, such as vertical integration, can only be applicable to a specific type of advocacy. For instance, organizing vertically-integrated campaigns may not be needed for issues that are not highly contested. A related practical question is that, since vertical integration is a complex and comprehensive strategic approach, can ‘partial integration’ be explored as the next best goal? Can actions taken in piecemeal over time be part of a bigger whole that forms a strategic action? Another possible follow-up research that can further enrich the discourse and practice on strategic approaches involves looking at how resources for vertically-integrated civil society initiatives are mobilized and its sources, and how learning happened in the process of organizing campaigns using vertical integration as a strategy and approach.

This study is the first major attempt to use vertical integration in analyzing citizen movements in the Philippines, and to explore the lessons that can be derived from these initiatives. Our contribution is modest, to be sure, but we hope that our effort will encourage other scholars and practitioners to continue using this approach so that we can better understand the complex and dynamic process called change.
References


Endnotes

1 This is a revised version of an essay also published in Fox and Aceron, with Guillán Montero (2016), which can be downloaded here: https://www.u4.no/publications/doing-accountability-differently-a-proposal-for-the-vertical-integration-of-civil-society-monitoring-and-advocacy/. A longer version is also forthcoming as a joint working paper (Fox 2016).

2 For almost a decade, this field has been called transparency and accountability (T/A). Recently, donors are more explicitly recognising the key role of citizen participation, as in the case of the UK Department of International Development’s Empowerment and Accountability programme, and the Hewlett Foundation’s new Global Development programme strategy (http://hewlett.org/programs/global-development-and-population/amplifying-voices/transparency-participation-and-accountability).

3 For example, while the Open Government Partnership (OGP) has grown to 70 member countries from its original eight in 2011, the Independent Reporting Mechanisms’ review of the founding countries’ second National Action Plans indicates that from the total 185 commitments only 11 are potentially transformational, and of those only nine made substantial progress in implementation. Indeed, AID Data’s recent study of international efforts to promote institutional change underscored the capacity of vested interests to resist change (Parks et al. 2015).

4 Another challenge is the ebb and flow of donor enthusiasm for certain kinds of initiatives, which can end up complicating sustainability – as in the case of civil society procurement monitoring in the mid-2000s in the Philippines (a boom followed by a bust).

5 This phrase is a reference to a widely circulated 2014 manifesto that called for ‘doing development differently’. See: http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/

6 This phrase is a reference to a widely circulated 2014 manifesto that called for ‘doing development differently’. See: http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/

7 For extensive conceptual discussion of different meanings of the concept of scale, see Fox (forthcoming).

8 In principle, government oversight agencies could do what vertical integration tries to do – reveal a full ‘x-ray’ of the entire chain of public sector decisions and performance in any given sector – yet very few agencies have the necessary autonomy, capacity
and mandate to do so. Those rare government agencies should certainly be the focus of both civil society and international support. More often, the best that government oversight agencies can do is to respond to scandals with official investigations that may expose the chain of events behind specific incidents. But such oversight rarely addresses broader issues of the effectiveness of entire policies, programmes or institutions – and more often in the anti-corruption context than with broader governance failures such as systemic ineffectiveness or social exclusion.

9 For definition and discussion of ‘proof of concept’, see Fox (2014).

10 This box draws from Fox (2007b).

11 This point is developed in response to debates over questions of terminology and the politics of discourse in the field of accountability (Fox and Halloran 2016).

12 Even in one of the most cited cases in which ‘information is power’ practices demonstrated impact, the newspaper dissemination of Uganda school funding allocations, the results were not as dramatic as initially appeared. While the share of funds diverted dropped sharply, the overall level of spending grew, so the actual amount of funding leakage dropped only 12% (Reinekka and Svennson 2004a, 2004b; Hubbard 2007: 8).

13 Trasparencians founder, Manuel Fernández de Villegas, chose this alternative spelling of the Spanish word for transparency because of concerns about communicating to grass-roots constituencies. In his view, the conventional version of transparency n a term at the time unknown in rural Mexico sounded too close to a colloquial term widely used to describe fraud and deceit (stransan).

14 The WDR’s contribution was less clear in countries that had experienced decades of state–society bargaining over the recognition and inclusion of autonomous social and civil organisations (e.g., the Philippines, India, Brazil, Mexico). In some countries, governments launched large-scale, official social accountability initiatives long before the World Bank spelled out its rationale. This was the case in Mexico, which created an institutional framework for (narrowly defined) ‘social oversight’ in the early 1990s (see for example, Craig et al. 1994).

15 For an application of the ‘last mile’ concept to analysis of efforts by senior level policy reformers to encourage improved frontline public sector performance in the context of social audits in Andhra Pradesh, India, see Veeraraghavan (2015). Note that from a ‘citizens’ eye’ view, the ‘last mile’ of service provision actually looks like the ‘first mile’.

16 The WDR also declined to address the frequent tendency for local citizen voice initiatives to be captured by local elites and turned into instruments of clientelism (e.g., in the case of ‘community-managed’ schools, see Aftschuler 2013). World Bank researchers later showed that this pattern of capture was a systemic risk to ‘induced’ (i.e., top-down) community participation efforts (Mansuri and Rao 2013).

17 ‘Invited spaces’ are arenas for dialogue between authorities and citizens in which the terms of engagement are set by the authorities. ‘Claimed’ or ‘created spaces’, in contrast, are spaces which have been ‘claimed by less powerful actors from or against the power holders, or created more autonomously by them’ (Gaventa 2006: 27; Cornwall and Schattan Coelho 2007). The Community Food Council experience shows that invited spaces can be claimed from below and gain autonomy in spite of official resistance (in this case thanks in part to a sandwich strategy). As one director of Diconsa exhorted in a national meeting of the more autonomous Food Councils: “you push below, and we will squeeze from above” (Fox 1992).

18 ‘Free spaces’ are enabling environments for autonomous collective action by members of subordinated social groups (Polletta 1999).

19 For example, in the state of Guerrero, with a long tradition of autonomous, region-wide self-management initiatives, autonomous leaders controlled seven of the state’s 15 Community Food Councils in mid-2000s. At the time, senior Diconsa officials were willing to tolerate that degree of autonomy, but they used all the means at their disposal to prevent autonomous forces from gaining control over an eighth council – because that would have allowed them to lead the official state-wide association of regional councils (Fox 2007b). In 2015, according to new field reports from Marcos Méndez Lara in the state of Guerrero, even the most consolidated and autonomous councils have been significantly weakened by agency hostility, attempts at politicisation by the ruling party and the deterioration of citizen security.

20 This is a cautionary tale, insofar as it points to a risk in which the larger the organisation’s base, the greater the incentive for the government to attempt to co-opt stakeholder representatives, precisely because scaled-up, autonomous organisations have more bargaining power. This recalls the classic challenge recognised by sociologists more than a century ago in ‘the iron law of oligarchy’, which describes the tendency of leaders of large membership organisations to develop their own interests, distinct from those of their base. This underscores the importance of robust checks and balances within membership organisations to sustain internal democracy (Fox 2007b).

21 In order to make the case for coordinating policy monitoring and advocacy, this discussion considers these two approaches as distinct. That said, practitioners who already seek to articulate the two may frame one as subordinate to the other. For those CSOs that put advocacy strategy first, monitoring may be seen as one of their many tactics. In contrast, for CSOs that see problem-solving policy monitoring as their primary strategy, they may see advocacy as a tactic (for example, for CSOs to get to a foot in the door with policy-makers to launch the monitoring process, as in the Textbook Count case). Here, in order to focus on the challenges involved in articulating monitoring and advocacy, the discussion will not assume that one is the strategy and the other is a tactic. Thanks to Rosie McGee for suggesting clarification of this point.

22 The term ‘constructive engagement’ carries its own historical baggage, as it was the name for US President Ronald Reagan’s policy of support for the apartheid regime in South Africa.

23 The thousands of village-level social audits in Andhra Pradesh were convened by a semi-governmental agency, so they are ‘invited spaces’, but these experiences challenge the frequent assumption that such openings from above are necessarily designed to divert or silence conflict. In both India’s social audits and in the case of Mexico’s Community Food Councils discussed above, nonpartisan but government-backed community organisers convened invited spaces to create safe spaces for collective action that combined monitoring and sometimes adversarial grass-roots advocacy. These two large-scale experiences both underscore the potential synergy between monitoring and advocacy, and disrupt the conventional dichotomy between invited and autonomous spaces.

24 This underscores the distinction between a narrow definition of transparency (limited to public access to official documents and data) and the broader notion of the public’s
right to know, which goes further to include access to information about who are the winners and losers of government decisions, and about how those decisions (and non-decisions) were made.

25 Stone spelled out the crucial agenda-setting power of framing in her discussion of the importance of ‘causal stories’ for targeting and weakening obstacles to change (1989).

26 Two exceptions in terms of scaled-up autonomous power include the 1999 national campaign to lobby Congress to pass the ‘Treasury Ministry from eliminating the programme, and the first several years of state-wide networking in Guerrero, also in the late 1990s. After that period, the autonomous councils’ insider allies lost power (Fox 2007b).

27 For a study of anti-corruption initiatives that emphasises ‘people power’ over more technical approaches, see Beyerle (2014).

28 This is an updated version of an essay also published in Fox and Aceron, with Guillán Montero (2016), which can be downloaded here.

29 This is the case for some initiatives like Bayanihang Eskwela, G-Watch’s monitoring of school-building projects of the Department of Education (DepEd) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

30 In the Philippines, the term “constructive engagement” was popularized by the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP), formed in 2007 as part of a global social accountability program of the World Bank. ANSA-EAP’s primer entitled “Social Accountability: An Approach to Good Governance” defines Constructive Engagement as “building of a mature relationship between two naturally opposable parties – i.e., citizens or citizen groups, on the one hand, and government – bound together by a common reality.” However, this type of practice in the Philippines dates back to the restoration of formal democracy in the country, after Martial Law ended in 1986. Particularly, this practice has been common among NGOs doing work on service delivery or in the co-implementation of programs and projects previously called “partnerships” or “collaborations.” However, only when anti-corruption became a major national issue in early 2000 did this approach get applied to enhancing accountability and responsiveness. In the context of civil society participation, this term attempts to capture a departure in how civil society engages the state – moving from acting from the outside (opposing government or advocating reforms) through pressure politics or “parliament of the streets,” to becoming a “partner” of government, working in the inside to supplement the institutional capacity of the government.

31 Based on DepEd computation, validated by G-Watch.

32 The author provides the following explanation for this estimate: In the ex-ante situation, 40% of textbooks, worth P542 million, would not have reached the district DepEd offices. Textbook Count round 4 covered 70% of the deliveries to district offices and elementary schools, and verified that all books, valued at P379 million, were delivered. If it is assumed that in the remaining 30% of the (not monitored) deliveries, the ex-ante situation still prevailed (the number of unaccounted books remained at pre-Textbook Count levels – a conservative estimate), and that in the segment between district offices and the schools, the 2% losses still continue (again very conservative, given the experience of Textbook Walk), then the value of the additional books now accounted for would be P151 million (P542 million x .70 x .40).

33 Gregorio (2006) explains this figure as follows: G-Watch coordinating functions costed roughly PhP102.5 million in Textbook Count 3. Doubling this amount for what civil society partners in the field spent (transportation costs, food, and time) results in a total monitoring cost of PhP2.05 million. For Textbook Count 3, the Department of Education procured 1,269,617 textbooks worth PhP63.070 million (including delivery costs). On average, civil society monitors signed 65% of all Inspection and Acceptance Reports (IARs). One IAR was equivalent to one delivery site. Assuming that 65% of all textbooks were delivered to these delivery sites, civil society monitors tracked or guaranteed the delivery of PhP40.995 million worth of books. The Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) had estimated that twenty percent (20%) was lost to corruption. Twenty percent (20%) of PhP40.995 was PhP8.199. Therefore, for every peso spent in monitoring, civil society monitors guaranteed that PhP3.99 was not wasted. Even by business standard, this represents a good return.

34 Based on Pulse Asia’s Nationwide Survey on Corruption in 2009.

35 These initiatives include Procurement Watch’s Bantay Eskwela, that monitors school furniture and school-building projects; NAMFREL’s monitoring of medicines in the Department of Health (DoH), and ANSA-EAP’s CheckMySchool, which validates school data and publicizes crowdsourced reports of school-level problems.

36 The main funders were the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF).

37 It was also during this period that G-Watch had its transition in leadership. Its former coordinator, Redempto Parafina, had joined then newly-established ANSA-EAP. Joy Aceron, who was G-Watch’s research associate, took on the post of G-Watch coordinator.

38 The article by Rushda Majeed (2011) zeroed in on this factor more extensively than any other study in explaining both the success and weaknesses of Textbook Count.

39 Author translation. Also, according to John Adrich Telebrico, CMS monitors ask the schools if the textbooks have been delivered to them, but do not necessarily monitor the actual delivery.

40 It is worth noting that public access to information pertaining to textbook delivery performance has been generally more difficult after G-Watch withdrew from the program. Unlike the period in which G-Watch itself had the data, at present, requests can take months. One reason given by DepEd was the absence of designated personnel who would take charge of consolidating the information. Without a process where DepEd is expected to report its performance, there seems to be no push for DepEd to look more closely at these performance data, which had previously shown the success of Textbook Count.

41 In Pulse Asia’s Nationwide Survey on Corruption in 2009 and 2011, DepEd ranked as one of the least corrupt agencies (see http://www.pulseasia.ph/databank/ulat-ng-bayan/). By late 2000, there has also been recognition of the efforts of DepEd to curb corruption among the media and the development community. This marks a stark contrast to the situation in DepEd that was documented by the media during the late 1990s.

42 The 10 agrarian reform NGOs comprising the Rights Network is include: (1) Cagayan Center for Rural Empowerment and Development, Inc. (CREDO), which operates in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela and Quirino; (2) Farmworkers Agrarian Reform
Agrarian reform implementation is not among the devolved functions of local government units. This is still the responsibility of the national government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (which is tasked with redistributing private agricultural lands) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (if the land to be distributed is classified as public land).

Prior to the split, PEACE had successfully campaigned for the removal of two previous agrarian reform secretaries—Hernani Braganza and Roberto Pagdanganan. By 2006, PEACE was preparing to launch a third ouster campaign, this time targeting then-Secretary Nasser Pangandaman. There were those inside PEACE who thought that the proposed campaign was ill-advised, arguing that the network should instead focus on extending the mandate of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) which was set to expire in 2008. They also questioned the decision of the PEACE leadership to form an electoral vehicle called Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC) to contest the 2007 party-list polls, stating that there was no substantive discussion for its creation.

Under this scheme, the peasants will get two-thirds of the produce while the rest will go to the landowner.

Danilo Carranza had used this phrase during an informal conversation with his colleague.

Huk refers to the first three letters of the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese People's Army)—a Marxist-led armed movement that was formed during the Second World War. But even after Japan's surrender, the Huks continued their guerilla activities, this time targeting the newly independent Philippine Republic.

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See Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 2011-2016.

These include the People's Legislative Advocacy Network, Philippine Legislators' Committee on Population and Development Foundation (PLCPF), Disaster Risk Reduction Network (DRRNetPhil), Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood (GROOTS) Philippines, Cut the Cost, Cut the Pain Network (SCCPNet), Medical Action Group (MAG), Likhaan, Reproductive Health Advocacy Network (RHAN) and internationally, GROOTS International and HuairouCommission.

Other non-governmental organizational allies include: COPE Foundation and the Urban Poor Associates (two Philippine NGOs specializing on community training, anti-demolition and crisis intervention); the religious such as the Urban Poor Ministry; the social action centers (SACS) of the archdiocese in their areas of work; SALIGAN (a legal resource NGO based at Ateneo de Manila University); the TAO-Pilipinas; the Philippine Red Cross (providing emergency response training to communities); the Philippine Cancer Society; and Akbayan Party.

51 Executive Order No. 79 is called Institutionalizing and Implementing Reforms In The Philippine Mining Sector Providing PoliciesAnd Guidelines To Ensure Environmental Protection And Responsible Mining In The Utilization Of Mineral Resources.


53 Available at www.alyansatigilmina.net/about last accessed on April 19, 2015.

54 See ATM website.


56 Ibid.


58 Whatever the law upon these points may be every presumption is and ought to be against the government. It is proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, that land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.s (Cariño vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935).

59 The recognized champions were Sen. Juan Flaver and Sen. Francisco Tatad, based on news records.

60 Timuay Justice and Governance Orientation Paper, adopted during the 2nd Timfada Limud of the Teduray and Lambangian Peoples, October 2-10, 2010 in North Upi.

61 Refers to organizations vying for congressional seats through the Party List System, a form of proportional representation in Philippine congressional elections, constituting 20% of the Lower House.

62 A global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts with a ten-year plan, adopted in January 2005 by 168 Governments at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction.

63 Dator-Bercilla (2010) for example cites the efforts of Albay Governor Joey Salceda in ensuring the signature of key legislators for the passage of the Bill. In the Senate, Senators Rodolfo Biazon, Benigno Aquino III, Ramon Revilla Jr. and Edgardo Angara sponsored the bill.

64 RA 8425 defines basic sectors as marginalized sectors in Philippine society to be represented in National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC).
The NAPC En Banc is composed of the President of the Philippines as Chairperson, the NAPC Lead Convener who is appointed by the President, two NAPC Vice-Chairpersons (one from the government and the other from the basic sectors), the heads of 25 national government agencies and the Sectoral Representatives from the 14 basic sectors.

People's organization or PO is a term commonly used in the Philippines. James Putzel defines it as "membership-based organizations, like farmer organizations trade unions, women's organizations, community organizations, and cooperatives, which are set up primarily to promote the interests of their members" (1998: 78).

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), which is chaired by the Secretary of National Defense, is a multi-agency and multi-sectoral body that is mandated to develop a comprehensive and community-based approach to climate change adaptation, and disaster risk reduction and management. There are also Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (NDRRMCs), which are responsible for ensuring disaster-sensitive regional plans and of convening the different regional line agencies whenever there are emergencies. At the same time, there are Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) at the provincial, city and municipal levels. They are mandated to develop and implement their local disaster risk reduction and management plans. See Sections 5 to 11 of Republic Act No. 10121.

According to the Philippine Local Government Code, all local governments (from the village, to the municipality, the city and the province) are mandated to allocate 5% of their budget to gender and development projects. Local governments, however, are given considerable discretion in defining 'gender and development projects'.

National membership-based organizations are able to achieve scale by organizing units or chapters at the different geographic levels. KMBP, for instance, is present in 40 haciendas and is organized at both the municipal and village levels. On the other hand, NGOs like RIGHTS Network achieve scale by partnering with other civil groups that are operating below the national level.

Coined by Kevin O’Brien, ‘rightful resistance’ is a form of popular contention that operates near the boundary of the law, while employing the rhetoric of the powerful to curb political and economic power. For more details of this approach, see O’Brien (1986).

The original law called the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) gave the government ten years to complete its land redistribution efforts. This was later extended for another ten years, thus resetting the deadline to 2008. When the law finally expired in December of that year, more than 1.2 million hectares of agricultural lands were still waiting to be redistributed by the government to thousands of farmer-beneficiaries. This prompted the campaign of peasant groups for the enactment of the CARP Extension Law, known in the Philippines as CARPER.
**Going Vertical** is a result of the action-research collaboration between Government Watch (G-Watch) and the Accountability Research Center (ARC) on multi-level citizen action for accountability. The book investigates how one strategic approach to citizen accountability—vertical integration—enabled seven reform initiatives in the Philippines to gain meaningful results.

**Book editor and chapter authors:**
Joy Aceron
Francis Isaac
Jonathan Fox
Danilo Carranza
Benedict Nisperos
Marlon Lara Cornelio
Federick Vincent Marcelo
Rhia Muhi
Romeo Saliga

**G-Watch** is an independent national action-research organization embedded in a constituency of advocacy and civic organizations all over the Philippines that aim to contribute to the deepening of democracy through citizen empowerment and the scaling of accountability. See more at: [www.g-watch.org](http://www.g-watch.org)

**ARC** is an action-research incubator based in the School of International Service (SIS) at American University. ARC partners with civil society organizations and policy reformers to contribute to research and practice in the field of transparency, participation and accountability. See more at: [www.accountabilityresearch.org](http://www.accountabilityresearch.org)